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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation examines novel issues related to information intermediaries in 
financial markets and consists of three essays on the following three distinct topics: (1) the 
monitoring role of credit rating agencies, (2) heterogeneity in the influence of sell-side analyst 
recommendation changes, and (3) the information flow from sell-side analysts to their 
affiliated asset managers. 
In the first essay (Chapter Two), I focus on a sample of Moody’s issuer-level credit 
watch actions on U.S. nonfinancial public borrowers between 1992 and 2011 and study the 
relations between credit watch resolution outcomes and the dynamics of corporate 
fundamentals. Using firms with watch-preceded rating downgrades (control firms) as a 
benchmark, I document that firms with watch-preceded rating confirmations (treatment firms) 
experience an increase in long-term financing, investment, and profitability immediately 
following the credit watch period. These patterns are stronger for treatment firms of lower 
credit quality, for which external monitoring is more valuable. I further show that financially 
constrained treatment firms substantially increase their long-term financing immediately 
following the watch period, indicating that agency’s monitoring can help alleviate capital 
constraints resulting from information asymmetry. Additional tests show that treatment firms 
are more profitable regardless of corporate governance, implying that agency’s monitoring is 
independent of corporate governance. These findings suggest that credit agencies have real 
effects on corporate behavior, and that a credit watch with direction downgrade acts as an 
effective monitoring mechanism. 
The second essay (Chapter Three) presents empirical and theoretical evidence that 
heterogeneity in the influence of analysts is consistent with ambiguity aversion in the equity 
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market. Specifically, I show that investors are much more responsive to analyst 
recommendation changes when they perceive higher levels of “ambiguity in the firm 
environment”, or difficulty in processing and acting on firm incomplete information. 
Ambiguity-averse investors act as if they underweight prior signals that imply fundamental 
uncertainty, underweight firm signals of uncertain quality, and overweight analyst signals. My 
findings are independent of other relevant factors, such as recommendation deviation from 
consensus or stock price momentum, and persistent irrespective of the direction of 
recommendation changes and the choice of empirical proxies for ambiguity. This essay 
contributes to the analyst literature by providing a behavioral explanation for puzzling 
heterogeneity in the influence of recommendation changes. 
The third essay (Chapter Four) extends research on informed trading prior to 
recommendations from sell-side analysts. My analysis of a sample of downgrades indicates 
that some affiliated asset managers may receive tips from their brokerage analysts and engage 
in selling of the soon to be downgraded stocks. This evidence is limited to the period prior to 
the Global Research Analyst Settlement and stronger for those downgrades that are from the 
sanctioned brokerage firms or issued by affiliated analysts. Further analysis focuses on 
downgrades from the sanctioned firms and shows that informed selling is related to the 
downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of forthcoming downgrades. 
Informed selling is relatively more prevalent prior to strong downgrades, downgrades of high 
magnitude, downgrades that are issued before Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect, or 
downgrades that are issued on high institutional ownership stocks. Overall, my results support 
the tipping hypothesis. 
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CHAPTER ONE: MOTIVATION AND OVERVIEW 
 
1.1. Motivation 
Information intermediaries, such as credit rating agencies and sell-side analysts, play 
the important role of collecting and analyzing information and conveying expert opinions to 
the market, helping alleviate the information asymmetry that typically exists between 
investors and firms. Acting as information equalizers, these intermediaries can help expand 
the supply of capital and lower the informational cost of capital that firms would otherwise 
have to pay. This dissertation goes beyond this traditional view on information intermediation 
and empirically investigates novel issues, which have important implications for our 
understanding of the economic functions of information intermediaries in financial markets. 
Motivated by anecdotal and theoretical evidence, this dissertation focuses on the following 
three distinct topics: (1) the monitoring role of credit rating agencies, (2) heterogeneity in the 
influence of sell-side analyst recommendation changes, and (3) the information flow from 
sell-side analysts to their affiliated asset managers. 
The first topic is motivated by the credit rating model of Boot et al. (2006). In their 
model, a credit watch with direction downgrade has real effects on a firm’s choice between a 
risky and a safe investment project. They demonstrate that if a sizeable proportion of investors 
condition their decisions on the ratings of a rating agency, then the agency can discipline the 
firm through the credit watch period, inducing first-best project choice. Based on the insights 
of this model, I empirically investigate whether a third-party rating agency can effectively 
monitor rated borrowers through the mechanism of a credit watch with direction downgrade. 
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As an effective third-party monitor, the agency can help mitigate moral hazard faced by 
investors and better alleviate information asymmetry in financial markets. 
The second topic is motivated by anecdotal evidence suggesting that ambiguity in the 
firm environment may influence the way investors interpret and respond to information 
signaled by sell-side analysts. Empirical evidence in this respect contributes to our 
understanding of the phenomenon of heterogeneity in investors’ responses to the 
announcements of recommendation changes (Loh and Stulz, 2011). By investigating the 
relation between ambiguity in the firm environment and the influence of recommendation 
changes, my objective is to provide a behavioral explanation for puzzling heterogeneity in the 
influence of recommendation changes. 
The third topic is motivated by anecdotal evidence suggesting that sell-side analysts 
may tip off their affiliated asset managers regarding the content of forthcoming research 
reports. Empirical evidence in this direction highlights the ethical issues that may arise as a 
result of the interdependence among the divisions of a full-service brokerage firm. In this 
respect, I ask the following question: how did recent regulatory reforms (collectively known 
as the Global Research Analyst Settlement) affect the interdependence between brokerage 
analysts and their affiliated asset managers? 
 
1.2. Overview 
This dissertation is organized in five chapters including the introduction (Chapter 
One). Chapter Two investigates whether a third-party rating agency can effectively monitor 
rated borrowers through the mechanism of a credit watch with direction downgrade. Chapter 
Three employs ambiguity aversion as a behavioral explanation for puzzling heterogeneity in 
the influence of sell-side analyst recommendation changes. Chapter Four investigates whether 
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sell-side analysts tip off their affiliated asset managers prior to their downgrade 
announcements. Chapter Five concludes this dissertation. The main chapters, Chapter Two, 
Three, and Four, are self-explanatory and independent from each other. Thus, there is no need 
to read Chapter Two first in order to understand Chapter Three and so on. In what follows, I 
provide a brief overview of the findings of each of these chapters. 
In Chapter Two, I investigate whether credit rating agencies act as third-party 
monitors through the mechanism of a credit watch with direction downgrade. Two main 
channels are in play in this respect. First, by exerting informal influence the agencies can 
induce firms to undertake safe projects, helping improve their profitability. Second, when the 
agencies reveal the true credit quality of firms following the monitoring episode, they can 
help reduce information asymmetry and thus facilitate access to capital markets. Accordingly, 
firms increase their long-term financing and ramp up their investment activities. Based on a 
difference-in-differences panel regression framework, I find that, relative to firms with watch-
preceded rating downgrades (control firms), firms with watch-preceded rating confirmations 
(treatment firms) tend to increase their long-term financing, employ more investment capital, 
and experience an improvement in profitability beginning immediately following the credit 
watch period. These patterns are stronger for treatment firms of lower credit quality, for 
which third-party monitoring is more valuable. I conduct two additional tests that support the 
information asymmetry and informal influence channels. First, I find that financially 
constrained treatment firms substantially increase their long-term financing at the expense of 
short-term financing immediately following the watch period, indicating that these firms 
attempt to benefit from reduction in information asymmetry and the resulting better access to 
capital markets. Second, I show that treatment firms are more profitable regardless of 
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corporate governance, implying that agencies’ informal influence is not an artifact of strong 
corporate governance. 
Chapter Three presents and empirically evaluates a theory of ambiguity that predicts 
stronger influence of recommendation changes issued on firms with more ambiguous 
environments. I focus on two aspects of ambiguity in the firm environment: the ambiguity aspect 
that emerges from lack of knowledge of nonexistent relevant information and that manifests 
itself through the difficulty investors face in formulating prior beliefs about firm fundamentals 
(ambiguity in fundamentals or AIF); and the ambiguity aspect that pertains to the difficulty 
investors face in updating their prior beliefs in response to firm information of uncertain quality, 
(ambiguity in information or AII). I provide evidence that both aspects of ambiguity substantially 
increase the influence of recommendation changes (the “mean” effect). Moreover, I show that 
the influence of recommendation changes issued on higher AII firms substantially increases 
when their fundamentals are perceived to be more ambiguous (the “interaction” effect). One of 
the striking findings of this chapter is that recommendation changes issued on highest AIF, 
highest AII firms are about four times as influential as those issued on lowest AIF, lowest AII 
firms.  
Chapter Four investigates whether affiliated asset managers engage in informed selling 
prior to downgrade releases from their brokerage analysts. I find that, in the period prior to the 
Global Settlement and related regulations, the selling activity of affiliated asset managers is 
associated with significantly negative pre-announcement abnormal returns and abnormally high 
share turnovers, implying pre-downgrade informed selling. Because these regulations include 
provisions that would limit the information flow from sell-side analysts to their affiliated asset 
managers, I can conclude that some of the selling activity is likely to be induced by tips received 
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from those analysts. Focusing on downgrades issued by the sanctioned firms before the Global 
Settlement, I show that pre-downgrade informed selling of affiliated asset managers is related to 
the downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of the soon to be released 
downgrades. Specifically, I find that informed selling is relatively more prevalent prior to strong 
downgrades, downgrades of high magnitude, downgrades that are issued before Regulation Fair 
Disclosure, or downgrades that are issued on high institutional ownership stocks. This provides 
further evidence that some affiliated asset managers may have received tips from their brokerage 
analysts before downgrade releases and engaged in selling of the soon to be downgraded stocks. 
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CHAPTER TWO: DO RATING AGENCIES ACT AS THIRD-PARTY 
MONITORS? EVIDENCE FROM MOODY’S CREDIT WATCHES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 In a well-publicized move, on July 13, 2011, Moody’s Investors Service (Moody’s) 
placed the Aaa bond rating of the U.S. government on watch for possible downgrade given 
the rising possibility that the statutory debt limit would not be raised on a timely basis, 
potentially leading to a default on US Treasury debt obligations. On the same day, Steven 
Hess, a senior credit officer at Moody’s, said in a Bloomberg interview: “What we’re looking 
for is a raising of the limit. It doesn’t matter the process that they get there”, a statement by 
which Moody’s explicitly specifies the action politicians should take to avoid a rating 
downgrade on the U.S. debt, and attempts to influence the Congress to take that action. On 
August 02, 2011, Moody’s confirmed the Aaa rating and said: “The initial increase of the debt 
limit by $900 billion and the commitment to raise it by a further $1.2-1.5 trillion by year end 
have virtually eliminated the risk of such a default, prompting the confirmation of the rating at 
Aaa.”1  
Evidence on the informal (behind-the-scenes) influence of a credit rating agency 
(CRA) extends to the universe of corporations, from both anecdotal and theoretical 
perspectives. In a survey paper, Graham and Harvey (2001) document that credit ratings are 
one of the most important factors in corporate financing decisions according to the surveyed 
CFOs, indicating that firms are concerned about their credit ratings.
2
 In an influential 
                                                          
1
 The above example is from the following article: “Moody’s Places U.S. on Review for Downgrade As Debt Talks 
Stall”, by John Detrixhe, Bloomberg News, July 13, 2011. See also www.moodys.com. 
 
2
 The other most important factor affecting debt policy is financial flexibility.  
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theoretical paper, Boot et al. (2006) present a model in which a credit watch with direction 
downgrade has real effects on a firm’s choice between a risky and a safe investment project. 
They demonstrate that if a sizeable proportion of investors condition their decisions on the 
ratings of a CRA, then the CRA can discipline the firm through the credit watch period, 
inducing first-best project choice.
3
 Hence, according to Boot et al. the watch procedure with 
direction downgrade is much more than a simple auditing mechanism, it allows the agency to 
discipline (monitor) borrowers when their credit quality is at risk. 
In light of the anecdotal and theoretical evidence outlined above, the main empirical 
question I am interested in is the following: can a third-party rating agency effectively 
monitor rated borrowers through the mechanism of a credit watch with direction downgrade? 
To answer this question I analyze the relations between watch resolution decisions and the 
dynamics of firms’ profitability as well as their financing and investment policies. The 
premise of my empirical strategy is that effective third-party monitoring helps improve 
corporate profitability through an informal influence channel, and allows firms to have better 
access to capital markets via reduction in information asymmetry. 
To establish the rationale for the relation between third-party monitoring and corporate 
profitability through an informal influence channel, consider the following. If a CRA initiates 
a credit watch with direction downgrade on a given firm, then the CRA could induce the firm 
to put in turnaround effort through the watch period, and gain information on whether the 
effort was successful in addressing the concerns that led to the watch action. The CRA can 
then condition its watch resolution decision on this information by either confirming or 
downgrading the rating under watch, and better anticipate future changes in the firm’s 
profitability. Thus, effective third-party monitoring through a credit watch should result in 
                                                          
3
 The credit watch period is the period from the watch assignment to the watch resolution announcement. 
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predictable relations between watch resolution outcomes and corporate profitability. I can 
expect the profitability of firms with watch-preceded rating confirmations (treatment firms) to 
substantially improve following the watch period when benchmarked against firms with 
watch-preceded rating downgrades (control firms).  
Effective third-party monitoring can also help reduce information asymmetry in 
capital markets. Treatment firms are set to benefit from a decrease in information asymmetry 
when the agency reveals their true credit quality following the monitoring episode. As a 
result, these firms would have better access to capital markets, in which case they would alter 
their financing mix to rely more on long-term financing and less on short-term financing. 
Provided that these firms have profitable investment opportunities, they would employ the 
additional long-term funds to ramp up their investment activities.  
In sum, effective third-party monitoring should result in better corporate profitability 
through an informal influence channel, as well as higher long-term financing and investment 
through an information asymmetry channel. I can also expect these effects to be stronger 
among treatment firms of lower credit quality, for which third-party monitoring is more 
valuable. 
To test these ideas, I obtain a sample of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating 
downgrades, for a total of 1,890 issuer-level watch assignments with direction downgrade 
reported by Moody’s for the universe of U.S. nonfinancial public firms between 1992 and 
2011. Watch assignments can be issued with direction downgrade, uncertain, or upgrade. 
However, in this chapter I exclusively focus on watch assignments with direction downgrade 
because third-party monitoring is more likely to be effective when firms are being pressured 
to take specific actions to avoid being downgraded. For the rest of the chapter, I use the 
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terminology “watch” to mean “credit watch with direction downgrade” for brevity of 
presentation.  
My primary objective is to test two main hypotheses, which are as follows. (1) The 
mean effects of treatment: relative to control firms, treatment firms increase their long-term 
financing, invest more, and are more profitable beginning immediately after the watch period, 
and (2) The interaction effects of treatment: among treatment firms, the positive changes in 
long-term financing, investment, and profitability are more pronounced for firms of lower 
credit quality.  
In the empirical tests, I first employ a difference-in-differences panel regression 
framework to analyze the dynamic pattern of corporate fundamentals from four quarters 
before to four quarters after the watch period. I provide evidence consistent with my first 
hypothesis and document a substantial increase in the long-term financing, investment, and 
profitability of treatment firms when benchmarked against control firms beginning 
immediately following the watch period. In the first quarter following the watch period, 
treatment firms increase their long-term financing by 3.14% as a percentage of average assets, 
and by four quarters post-watch they have raised their long-term financing by 3.54%, which 
translates to a nearly 100% increase above its pre-watch level of 3.3%. Treatment firms also 
experience a sizeable increase in capital expenditures as a percentage of average assets. In the 
fourth quarter post-watch, the increase amounts to 1.33%, which is equivalent to a roughly 
22% increase above its pre-watch level of 6.1%. Meanwhile, profitability of treatment firms, 
as measured by operating income scaled by average assets, rises by about 1.2% immediately 
after the watch period, and continues on a positive trend until the fourth quarter post-watch, in 
which quarter the increase roughly amounts to 2%. Relative to its pre-watch level of 13.2%, 
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the 2% increase in the operating income ratio translates into a nearly 15% improvement in 
profitability. Consistent with my second hypothesis, I further show that treatment firms of 
lower credit quality experience a more pronounced increase in long-term financing, 
investment, and profitability. Using a triple difference framework, I find that non-investment 
grade treatment firms increase their long-term financing by an incremental 6.4%, spend an 
additional capital equivalent to 1.35% of average assets, and are more profitable based on 
either return on assets or return on equity.  
I conduct two additional tests that provide support for the information asymmetry and 
informal influence channels resulting from third-party monitoring. First, I condition upon 
corporate financial constraints, as proxied by the cash flow-investment gap as in Rajan and 
Zingales (1998), and study the dynamic pattern of corporate fundamentals around the watch 
period. I find that following the watch period financially constrained treatment firms behave 
differently from unconstrained firms. Constrained treatment firms display greater increases in  
their long-term financing at the expense of short-term financing, indicating that these firms 
have propensity to alter their financing mix to benefit from reduction in information 
asymmetry. Second, I condition upon corporate governance, as measured by the G Index of 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), to check whether the positive effect of treatment on 
corporate profitability is in fact an artifact of stronger corporate governance. I find that this 
effect holds regardless of corporate governance, implying that third-party monitoring could be 
a substitute for corporate governance. I also find weaker evidence that the positive effect of 
treatment on profitability is more pronounced among better governance firms.
4
 This indicates 
that third-party monitoring is more effective among firms with stronger governance, perhaps 
because these firms are more inclined to embrace the implicit contract a la Boot et al. (2006). 
                                                          
4
 This evidence lacks statistical significance. 
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To check the robustness of the results, I conduct three robustness tests. First, I test the 
parallel trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences framework, and provide 
evidence that the results are not driven by long-term trends in corporate fundamentals. The 
positive post-watch changes in long-term financing, investment, and profitability do not 
obtain if I falsely assume that treatment occurs two years before it actually does. Second, I 
demonstrate that the results are robust to different empirical methodologies. Using a 
propensity score matching algorithm, I match treatment firms to control firms based on 
relevant factors including the standard determinants of corporate policies, and show that the 
prior conclusions remain valid. Third, I address potential endogeneity in watch resolution 
decisions. In my sample, although treatment and control firms are comparable along a number 
of relevant dimensions prior to the watch period, treatment firms tend to be smaller, have 
better growth profiles, and are more profitable and less financially constrained, implying a 
non-random matching between watch resolution decisions and firms. To control for potential 
endogeneity in watch resolution decisions, I utilize a switching regression model with 
endogenous switching, an empirical design that makes it possible to hold the firm profile 
fixed and to infer the net effects due to watch resolution decisions. That is, I compare the 
actual changes in fundamentals measures for treatment firms with the predicted changes in 
those measures that would obtain had these firms been control firms instead. The findings 
point to significant increases in long-term financing, investment, and profitability for 
treatment firms when compared to their counterfactual peers, implying that the prior 
conclusions are robust to endogeneity concerns. 
It is also important to discuss the incentives faced by CRAs to monitor firms. An 
intermediary must have an incentive to monitor a borrower. As noted by Holmstrom and 
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Tirole (1997), an intermediary must hold a financial stake in a firm’s project to be a credible 
monitor. Of course, the agencies do not hold the debt of the firms they rate. So why are CRAs 
willing to monitor the firms they rate? My answer draws upon the literature on delegated 
monitoring. In particular, Strausz (1997) presents a principal-agent model in which the 
principal can monitor the agent’s action or delegate monitoring to a third-party supervisor, 
and demonstrates that in equilibrium the principal gains by delegating monitoring to the 
supervisor. This is because under direct monitoring the principal has inadequate incentives to 
monitor on his own and faces a lack of commitment problem, which would lead to a lower 
payoff.
5 
In their model, the principal offers a contract to the supervisor which induces him to 
monitor.  
 In the context of this chapter, the model implies that it is optimal for bondholders to 
delegate monitoring of borrowers to a third-party rating agency.
6
 However, since the agency 
is usually not paid by the bondholders but by the borrowers soliciting rating services, how can 
bondholders induce the agency to enforce monitoring? The answer I propose relates to the 
general interest of bondholders in the agency’s ratings, which is from the agency’s 
perspective the reputational capital at stake. If more and more investors condition their 
decisions on the agency’s ratings, then the agency will enjoy better reputation, and inevitably 
more and more borrowers will solicit the rating services of the agency, generating additional 
revenues. If the agency, however, turns out to be an ineffective monitor, then bondholders 
would show little interest in the agency’s ratings, harming its reputation, future income, and 
                                                          
5
 In the literature review section, I provide a more detailed discussion on these issues. 
 
6
 Other arguments in favor of delegation of monitoring are motivated by the efficiency gains resulting from 
delegation. For example, diversified lenders have limited ability to monitor the firms they lend to, and thus face 
incentives to use the services of a specialized monitor. Moreover, delegation of monitoring also allows lenders to 
avoid duplication of monitoring effort. These arguments are discussed in several papers, such as Ramakrishnan and 
Thakor (1984) and Millon and Thakor (1985). 
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potentially its survival. Thus, the need to protect reputational capital induces the agency to 
solve its incentive problems and fulfill its role as a third-party monitor.
7
 
The main contribution of this chapter is to provide novel empirical evidence on third-
party rating agency monitoring through the mechanism of credit watches. This chapter is 
related to an emerging strand of literature examining the implications of agencies’ actions for 
corporate financing and investment behavior. Examples of papers in this literature are Sufi 
(2009) who argues that agencies’ debt certification has real effects on firm financial and 
investment policies, and Tang (2009) who demonstrates that agencies can help alleviate 
information asymmetry in credit markets. Thus, this chapter builds on this literature and is the 
first to document empirical evidence on the monitoring function of the agencies.
8
  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the related 
literature and develops two main hypotheses. Section 2.3 describes the sample formation 
process and presents descriptive statistics. Section 2.4 lays the foundations for the empirical 
tests. Section 2.5 presents the main results. Section 2.6 conducts robustness tests, and Section 
2.7 concludes the chapter. 
 
2.2. Related literature and hypotheses 
2.2.1. Literature review 
One important role of CRAs emerges from the information asymmetry that typically 
exists between lenders and borrowers. Acting as information equalizers, the agencies can help 
expand the supply of capital and lower the informational cost of capital that borrowers would 
                                                          
7
 Since the issuer-pay model is standard, it seems unreasonable that CRAs receive fees from the issuers they are 
supposed to control. My view is that issuers seeking to access the public credit market have no choice but to solicit 
the rating services of CRAs and pay the associated fees. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) provide evidence in this 
respect. 
 
8
 In the literature review section, I provide detailed discussion on how this chapter relates to prior literature.  
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otherwise have to pay. The empirical evidence on the effectiveness of CRAs in achieving this 
role is somewhat mixed. Early studies, such as Liu and Thakor (1984) and Ederington, 
Yawitz, and Roberts (1987), demonstrate that credit ratings have explanatory power in the 
cross-section of yield spreads. More recently, academic researchers have mostly been 
skeptical about the incremental information value of credit ratings. In general, the literature 
shows that credit rating upgrades do not have material announcement effects in both equity 
and bond markets. In contrast, the market reaction to rating downgrades is generally 
statistically significant, but also economically weak. Hand, Holthausen, and Leftwich (1992), 
Goh and Ederington (1993), and Dichev and Piotroski (2001) are examples of papers in this 
literature.
9
 This chapter builds on this literature and investigates the idea that agencies can 
help mitigate information asymmetry in capital markets through the mechanism of a credit 
watch with direction downgrade. 
This chapter also belongs to an emerging strand of literature, which advocates for 
feedback effects of CRAs. Credit actions are not just a response to changes in firm 
characteristics, but they could themselves have real effects on firms’ behavior. Empirical 
studies within this literature primarily focus on corporate capital structure and investment 
decisions. For example, Sufi (2009) shows that the introduction of syndicated bank loan 
ratings induced firms to use more debt and increase their investment, indicating that third-
party debt certification has real effects on firm financial and investment policies. Tang (2009) 
investigates the effects of the introduction of Moody’s 1982 credit rating refinement on the 
rated firms. He demonstrates that firms with higher refined ratings (e.g., a rating refinement 
from A to A1 as opposed to A3 rating) enjoy better access to credit markets and have more 
capital investments, indicating that rating agencies can help alleviate firms’ capital constraints 
                                                          
9
 See Cantor (2004) for a summary of this literature. 
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resulting from information asymmetry in credit markets. Faulkender and Petersen (2006) 
show that firms with access to the public bond markets, as measured by having a bond rating, 
choose higher levels of debt financing. Kisgen (2006) provides evidence that firms adjust 
their capital structure to maintain a particular bond rating, indicating that credit ratings can 
influence capital structure decisions. 
Among theoretical papers within this literature, the most relevant paper to this chapter 
is Boot et al. (2006), who present a model in which a CRA can employ a credit watch 
procedure with direction downgrade to discipline a firm, helping to mitigate moral hazard 
faced by investors. In their model, the firm can choose between a risky and a safe project. 
After receiving a bad signal on the credit quality of the safe project, the CRA could initiate a 
credit watch procedure with direction downgrade, in which case a monitoring regime is put in 
place. In their language, the monitoring regime is equivalent to an implicit contract under 
which the firm is asked to undertake specific turnaround effort to avoid a rating downgrade. 
After observing the firm’s turnaround effort, the agency determines whether it was successful 
and then resolves the watch action accordingly. Boot et al. show that if a sufficient number of 
investors condition their decisions on the rating, then the agency can induce the firm to put in 
turnaround effort and choose the safe project.  
Empirical research on the monitoring role of CRAs is scarce. One study that attempts 
to investigate the issue is Bannier and Hirsch (2010), who argue that the watch procedure has 
a dual role. For high credit quality borrowers, the agencies use the watch procedure mainly to 
deliver information to investors. In contrast, for low credit quality borrowers the agencies 
employ the watch procedure primarily for monitoring purposes. Bannier and Hirsch base their 
conclusions on the market response to the agencies’ announcements, implicitly assuming that 
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the market response truly reflects agencies’ monitoring effort. Unlike this paper, my main 
analysis does not rely on investors’ perception of the agencies’ announcements because this 
perception could be confounded by investors’ anticipation or overreaction/underreaction 
effects, in which cases conclusions may be misleading. In this chapter, I adopt a more direct 
approach and employ an empirical framework that analyzes changes in corporate 
fundamentals, which likely better capture the effects of monitoring. Another related paper is 
Bannier et al. (2012), who attempt to investigate whether CRAs affect firm investment 
decisions. They find that firms reduce (increase) their investment around rating downgrades 
(upgrades), and interpret this result as being consistent with the monitoring role of CRAs. My 
chapter is different along several dimensions. First, my sample consists of watch actions with 
direction downgrade while in their main analysis they employ direct rating changes. Second, I 
study corporate profitability, financing, and investment. In contrast, they focus on corporate 
investment only. Third, I control for endogeneity in watch resolution decisions which they do 
not. 
At a broader level, this chapter is also related to the literature on delegated monitoring. 
In particular, Strausz (1997) presents a principal-agent model in which the principal can 
monitor the agent’s action or delegate monitoring to a third-party supervisor, and 
demonstrates that in equilibrium the principal gains by delegating monitoring to the 
supervisor. Delegation is profitable for the principal for two reasons: incentive and 
commitment effects. First, it is assumed that commitment to monitoring is not possible, 
implying that the principal has inadequate incentives to monitor on his own. With delegation 
of monitoring, the principal has to create two types of incentives: one for the agent and the 
other for the monitor. Because of this separation, the principal is able to regulate the two 
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incentives more accurately (incentive-effect). Second, it is also assumed that information 
obtained from the monitoring process is private, which implies that if the principal acts as the 
monitor, he could not credibly commit to revealing positive information when the agent puts 
in high effort because to do so would mean making public profitable private information. As 
the agent can anticipate the principal’s behavior, the principal’s financial claim becomes 
weaker, and the resulting contract is unprofitable for the principal. Delegation of monitoring, 
however, solves the problem of lack of commitment. The supervisor has no financial interest 
in the agent’s action, and thus has no incentive to withhold positive information should the 
agent choose a high effort level. Hence, delegation of monitoring allows the principal to make 
optimal use of a carrot and stick approach to discipline the agent (commitment-effect).
10
 
 
2.2.2. Hypothesis development 
The nature of the informal influence of CRAs over firms makes it difficult to 
document empirical evidence on the monitoring role of the agencies. Nonetheless, by 
focusing on credit watch actions with direction downgrade, I can obtain an ideal setup to test 
whether CRAs act as third-party monitors. I employ the occurrence of watch assignment and 
resolution announcements as points in time between which I know that interactions have 
taken place between the agencies and firms. Changes in corporate fundamentals that 
                                                          
10
 In another paper, Berlin and Loeys (1988) present a model in which a firm seeking to finance an investment 
project can choose between two contractual arrangements: loan contracts with covenants, which are written in terms 
of readily observable but noisy indicators of the firm’s ability to repay, and loan contracts enforced by a monitoring 
specialist. Because the covenants are based on imperfect information, Berlin and Loeys demonstrate that default 
policies based on these covenants are inefficient, and it is optimal for the firm to hire the services of a delegated 
monitor, ensuring a more efficient liquidation policy. Taken to the context of CRAs, the model implies that an issuer 
is better off obtaining financing and engaging a rating agency to monitor its activities rather than obtaining financing 
with covenants. The agency has incentives to monitor because it collects fees from the issuer in exchange for its 
ongoing monitoring services. It is important to note, however, that in Berlin and Loeys’s model monitoring is 
defined in the sense of gathering and analyzing detailed information rather than disciplining firms. For this particular 
reason, I favor the insights gained from the model of Strausz (1997) to motivate the monitoring role of CRAs. 
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immediately follow these interactions can provide evidence on the monitoring role of the 
agencies. 
Consider the following theoretical framework, which is inspired by the credit rating 
model of Boot et al. (2006). Assume that firms can choose between a risky and a safe 
investment project. A safe project is defined as that with high expected investment returns (or 
high credit quality), and a risky project is defined as having low expected investment returns 
(or low credit quality). In the presence of moral hazard, investors cannot ex-ante determine 
whether these firms will opt for the safe or risky project so that they are reluctant to supply 
capital. A CRA can help mitigate moral hazard faced by capital suppliers by placing firms 
under watch with direction downgrade, in which case a monitoring regime begins. Firms 
threatened with a rating downgrade may have incentives to comply with the agency’s 
directives and choose to undertake the safe project. The CRA can discover through the watch 
period the type of project chosen and accordingly reveals its true credit quality via watch 
resolution announcements. In this respect, firms choosing the safe project would receive 
rating confirmations (treatment firms), and firms opting for the risky project would be 
subsequently downgraded (control firms). It follows that watch resolution decisions and 
future patterns of corporate profitability should be related in a predictable manner. I can 
expect treatment firms to be more profitable than control firms following the watch period. In 
addition, by revealing the true credit quality of the selected project, the CRA can help mitigate 
capital market information asymmetry for treatment firms, which would have better access to 
capital markets. Accordingly, I can expect these firms to rely more on long-term financing 
and ramp up their investment activities.  
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In summary, third-party rating agency monitoring via a watch procedure with 
direction downgrade can help resolve project-choice moral hazard and alleviate the related 
capital market information asymmetry faced by capital suppliers, resulting in predictable 
patterns of corporate financing, investment, and profitability. My first main hypothesis 
illustrates these projections.  
 
Hypothesis 1. The mean effects of treatment. Relative to control firms, treatment firms rely 
more on long-term financing and less on short-term financing, ramp up their investment 
activities, and are more profitable beginning immediately after the watch period.  
 
I can expect third-party monitoring to add more value for firms of lower credit quality 
because these firms typically have no established record of addressing deterioration in their 
credit quality on their own. The CRAs allocate more resources and engage in more intense 
interactions with these firms, in which cases the CRAs would have stronger influence and 
better mitigate information asymmetry. In contrast, firms with high-quality credit standing 
typically have a long history of maintaining capability and promptness in meeting financial 
obligations. These firms need no external monitoring to address potential deterioration in their 
credit quality; they have the ability to exercise adequate turnaround effort on their own. In this 
respect, the credit watch procedure, as a monitoring mechanism, is likely redundant, and the 
CRAs would have less intense interactions and less influence on these firms. 
If CRAs fail to exercise their monitoring function, I would expect to observe, ceteris 
paribus, comparable patterns of subsequent changes in fundamentals for firms with high credit 
quality (less valuable monitoring) and firms with low credit quality (more valuable 
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monitoring). In contrast, if CRAs fulfill their monitoring role, I would expect to observe more 
pronounced subsequent changes in the fundamentals of firms of lower credit quality, for 
which monitoring is more valuable. My second main hypothesis summarizes these views. 
 
Hypothesis 2. The interaction effects of treatment. Among treatment firms, the post-watch 
increase in long-term financing, investment, and profitability is more pronounced for firms of 
lower credit quality. 
 
2.3. Sampling procedure and summary statistics 
The sample of credit watch actions is from Moody’s senior rating database, which 
contains estimated senior unsecured ratings. According to Moody’s Investors Service (2009), 
“a company’s estimated senior rating is set equal to its actual senior unsecured debt rating or, 
if there is none, by implying such a rating on the basis of rated subordinated or secured debt.” 
I choose to work with issuer-level data to abstract from issue-level differences in seniority or 
security, so that I can better capture changes in issuers’ fundamental credit quality. For each 
credit watch observation, Moody’s data provide detailed information that includes the name 
of the issuer, credit rating placed under watch, watch initial direction, and watch 
announcement date. Once the credit watch is resolved, I observe the watch final direction, 
final rating, and watch resolution date.  
I begin the sampling procedure by selecting credit watches with direction downgrade 
that are resolved with either a rating confirmation or downgrade at any date between 1992 and 
2011, yielding an initial sample of 3,184 credit watch observations.
11
 The set of Moody’s 
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 Although Moody’s has been publishing credit watches since 1985, watches gained the status of formal credit 
actions only beginning in 1991. Since there are few observations in 1991, I restrict my sample to start in 1992.  
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ratings consists of 21 letter ratings, which are formed based on generic rating categories (Aaa; 
Aa; A; Baa; Ba; B; Caa; Ca; and C) along with numerical modifiers (1; 2; and 3) appended to 
each generic classification from Aa through Caa. Consistent with prior papers, I translate 
these ratings into numerical scores on the following scale: Aaa = 1; Aa1 = 2; Aa2 = 3; Aa3 = 
4; …; and C = 21.  
Next, I merge credit watch observations with quarterly data from Compustat. I follow 
the literature on firm financing and investment decisions and exclude financial firms, and then 
build a watch-quarter level data set of firms for which accounting information is available 
from Compustat.
12
 Based on this information, I construct several financing, investment, and 
profitability measures.
13
 For financing, I consider five measures, which are: the change in 
long-term debt ratio, equity issuance ratio, change in long-term financing ratio, change in 
short-term debt ratio, and change in cash holdings ratio. For investment, I employ the 
following three measures: the capital expenditures ratio, PPE growth rate, and asset growth 
rate. For profitability, I focus on three measures, which are: the operating income ratio, return 
on assets, and return on equity. These variables and others are defined in Appendix A. To 
mitigate the effects of outliers, I follow the literature and winsorize Compustat variables each 
calendar quarter at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentile. The resulting baseline sample consists of 509 
rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a total of 1,890 watch actions on 802 
unique issuers and for a total of 17,010 watch-quarter observations. 
Table 2.1 shows the distribution of watches by calendar year. As expected, the number 
of watches peaks in the years 2002 and 2009, which both coincide with times of slow 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
12
 I exclude firms with SIC codes 6000-6999. 
 
13
 The ratios used in this chapter are based on either average assets or average equity as a scaling factor. If I scale by 
either lagged assets or lagged equity I obtain similar results (untabulated). 
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economic activity. Most watches are resolved with rating downgrades rather than 
confirmations. Indeed, out of 1,890 watches 1,381 (73.1%) watches are resolved with rating 
downgrades, and only 509 (26.9%) watches are resolved with rating confirmations. The 
incidence of rating downgrades appears to be influenced by concurrent economic conditions, 
peaking during the years 2002 and 2009. 
Table 2.2 reports the transition probabilities of rating downgrades (Panel A) and their 
distribution by magnitude (Panel B). The last column in Panel A shows that most downgrades 
are issued on investment grade firms (Baa or higher). Downgrades issued on investment grade 
firms represent more than 70% of total downgrades. Meanwhile, the last row indicates a high 
incidence of migration from the investment to the non-investment grade category as a result 
of rating downgrades. Panel B shows that downgrades are typically of small magnitude. 
Together, one-notch and two-notch downgrades represent more than 90% of total 
downgrades, suggesting that Moody’s favors gradual changes in ratings. 
Table 2.3 reports the means of several watch characteristics (Panel A) and firm 
attributes (Panel B) as of the end of the quarter prior to the watch period, or quarter 0, for 
treatment and control firms along with their difference tests.
14
 The results indicate that the two 
sets of firms are different along some dimensions and comparable along others. Moody’s 
takes roughly 92 days to resolve a watch action with a rating downgrade compared with 143 
days for a rating confirmation. A longer watch period for treatment firms is consistent with 
more interactions and longer discussions between Moody’s and these firms. Among 
downgraded ratings, only about 28% are initially categorized as non-investment grade ratings. 
In contrast, roughly 33% of confirmed ratings belong to the non-investment grade category. 
The numerical scores associated with ratings before and after watch resolutions indicate that 
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 Appendix A provides variable definitions. 
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control firms have roughly comparable initial ratings but end up with lower ratings following 
watch resolutions. The average magnitude of a rating downgrade is equal to 1.5, and about 
16% of downgraded ratings are fallen angels, which cross the investment grade boundary. 
In Panel B of Table 2.3, the two sets of firms exhibit no significant differences in 
terms of their financing metrics. Relative to control firms, treatment firms grow their total 
assets faster, but employ similar investment capital as a percentage of average assets and have 
comparable PPE growth rates. Meanwhile, treatment firms are more profitable and smaller, 
have better growth profiles based on Tobin’s Q, and are less financially constrained based on 
the cash flow investment gap ratio. However, treatment firms are comparable to control firms 
in terms of either asset tangibility or corporate governance. Collectively, the results indicate 
that the two sets of firms do not exhibit clear systematic differences, which is a desirable 
feature of the sample for my empirical analysis. 
 
2.4. Empirical design 
To investigate the effects of treatment on corporate fundamentals while controlling for 
the standard determinants of corporate policies, I analyze the dynamic pattern of corporate 
fundamentals from four quarters before to four quarters after the watch period. Specifically, I 
employ a panel regression model of the following specification 
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                                            ,   (2.1)  
  
where     is a measure of corporate fundamentals (a financing, investment, or profitability 
measure);     is a set of control variables (measures of firm attributes and credit 
characteristics);         
 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is    quarters 
prior to the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;        
 
 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if the observation is   quarters after the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters; 
           is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit watch is resolved with a rating 
confirmation;   indexes firms;   indexes time measured in calendar quarters;           are 38 
SIC-based industry fixed effects;          are calendar quarter fixed effects; and 
                are fiscal quarter fixed effects. Comparable specifications to Equation (2.1) 
have been used in prior literature to study firm behavior around corporate events (see, e.g., 
Schoar, 2002; Bertrand and Mullianathan, 2003; and Chemmanur et al., 2009). 
In the above specification, the group of interest consists of firms with confirmed 
ratings (treatment firms), and the control group consists of firms with downgraded ratings 
(control firms). For the latter group of firms, the interaction variables         
  
           and        
             are always equal to 0. I also note that the reference 
quarter, quarter 0, is the quarter ending prior to the watch period. By construction, Equation 
(2.1) is a difference-in-differences specification, and the coefficients    and    identify the 
residual changes in measures of corporate fundamentals around the watch period for treatment 
firms relative to control firms. The industry fixed effects,          , control for differences 
across industries; the calendar quarter fixed effects,         , are meant to account for 
changes in market conditions that may influence credit actions or affect firm fundamentals; 
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and the fiscal quarter fixed effects,                , are intended to account for seasonal 
patterns of corporate fundamentals related to fiscal quarters. Following Petersen (2009) and 
Thompson (2011), in my empirical tests I estimate standard errors clustered at the firm and 
calendar quarter levels to control for potential biases related to heteroskedasticity and serial 
correlation of the residuals. 
 
2.5. Treatment and the dynamic pattern of corporate fundamentals 
I hypothesize that third-party monitoring facilitates access to capital markets by 
alleviating information asymmetry for treatment firms, in which case they would increase 
their long-term financing and ramp up their investment activities. I also hypothesize that 
third-party monitoring helps improve the profitability of treatment firms through an informal 
influence channel. Collectively, I refer to these predictions as the mean effects of treatment. I 
further hypothesize that these effects are stronger for treatment firms of lower credit quality. I 
label these additional predictions the interaction effects of treatment.  
In this section, I present evidence on the mean and interaction effects of treatment, and 
conduct additional tests that provide support for the information asymmetry and informal 
influence channels. First, I examine the unconditional patterns of several measures of 
corporate financing, investment, and profitability in the quarters surrounding the watch period 
in a univariate setting. Second, I test the mean effects of treatment in a multivariate setting, 
allowing for the effects of other relevant factors. Third, I investigate the interaction effects of 
treatment by conditioning upon firm credit quality. Fourth, I condition upon firm financial 
constraints to test the information asymmetry channel. Fifth, I condition upon corporate 
governance to test the informal influence channel.  
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2.5.1. Univariate patterns of corporate financing, investment, and profitability 
As a preliminary test for the mean effects of treatment, I examine the unconditional 
patterns of corporate fundamentals around the watch period in a univariate setting. Figure 2.1 
depicts the means of corporate financing (Panel A), investment (Panel B), and profitability 
(Panel C) measures for treatment and control firms from four quarters before to four quarters 
after the watch period. I ensure that each firm is associated with non-missing values for the 
fundamentals measure of interest in every quarter within the event window. The figure 
provides evidence largely consistent with my first main hypothesis. Relative to control firms, 
treatment firms increase their long-term financing, investment, and profitability in the post-
watch period. 
Panel A of Figure 2.1 shows that the change in the long-term debt ratio exhibits 
similar patterns for both sets of firms in the pre-watch period. After watch, however, the long-
term debt ratio substantially increases for treatment firms, while that of control firms remains 
little changed. The gap in the equity issuance ratio between treatment and control firms 
narrows in the few quarters leading up to quarter 0, at which quarter both sets of firms have 
similar equity issuance ratios. Interestingly, the biggest increase in the equity issuance ratio 
for treatment firms occurs between quarter 0 and quarter 1, while that of control firms remains 
unchanged. Focusing on the change in the long-term financing ratio (change in the long-term 
debt ratio plus the equity issuance ratio), I document similar pre-watch patterns for both sets 
of firms. As expected, I observe a substantial increase in the long-term financing ratio of 
treatment firms when benchmarked against control firms in the post-watch period. In contrast, 
treatment and control firms do not exhibit noticeable differences in the patterns of short-term 
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financing. Both short-term debt and cash holdings, as a percentage of average assets, are little 
changed around quarter 0 for both groups of firms.  
Panel B of Figure 2.1 shows that both sets of firms have comparable investment 
metrics prior to the watch period. After watch, however, treatment firms invest more capital 
than their peers. I observe that the difference in capital expenditures reverses sign from 
quarter 0 to 1, subsequent to which treatment firms employ substantially more investment 
capital. Consistent with this observation, I also document a sharp increase in the growth rates 
of PPE and total assets for treatment firms in the post-watch period.  
Panel C of Figure 2.1 shows that treatment firms outperform their peers, most notably 
in the quarters following the watch period. Profitability of treatment firms remains positive 
and mostly stable throughout the event window. In contrast, profitability of control firms 
begins to decline slightly in the few quarters leading up to quarter 0, subsequent to which 
deterioration in profitability accelerates to the downside. 
In sum, Figure 2.1 provides evidence that relative to control firms treatment firms 
increase their long-term financing, ramp up their investment activities, and are more 
profitable in the post-watch period. These patterns are not part of long-term trends in 
corporate fundamentals, but instead they are changes that occur only after the watch period. 
This observation supports the parallel trends assumption necessary for the validity of the 
difference-in-differences tests, which I present in the subsequent section. I provide a formal 
test of this assumption as a robustness check in Section 2.7.    
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2.5.2. The effects of treatment on corporate financing, investment, and profitability 
To test the mean effects of treatment while controlling for other relevant factors, I run 
difference-in-differences panel regressions following the specification in Equation (2.1). 
Table 2.4 reports the estimation results, where the dependent variable is a measure of firm 
financing (Panel A), investment (Panel B), or profitability (Panel C), and the regressors of 
interest are the interaction variables                   and                 , 
where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters. As discussed in Section 2.4, the coefficients of these 
interaction variables identify the residual changes in the outcome variable of interest around 
the watch period for treatment firms relative to control firms. The control variables include 
the natural logarithm of a rating change and a dummy indicating a fallen angel. Since a multi-
notch downgrade or a fallen angel signals potentially more severe deterioration in firm credit 
quality, I would expect to observe weaker fundamentals for firms with stronger downgrades 
or firms whose ratings have crossed the investment grade boundary. Following Rajan and 
Zingales (1995), I also include a set of control variables that may reflect either variations in 
firms’ preferences for financing and investment, the supply of external financing, or future 
investment opportunities. These additional control variables are: firm size, Tobin’s Q, and 
asset tangibility.
15
 Size has been found in the literature to be positively correlated with 
corporate leverage because larger firms are expected to have lower costs of financial distress 
(Graham, Lemmon, and Schallheim, 1998; and Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman, 2001). Size 
could also be used as an inverse proxy for information asymmetry and thus is expected to be 
positively correlated with equity issuance (Rajan and Zingales, 1995). I measure firm size by 
the natural logarithm of firm total assets. I include Tobin’s Q as an additional control because 
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 Since I use firm profitability as an outcome variable, I do not include it as a control in any of my regressions. 
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it is a standard proxy for growth opportunities, and is expected to be positively related to firm 
external financing and investment (Baker and Wurgler, 2002). Tobin’s Q is measured as total 
assets minus book equity plus market equity all divided by total assets. Tangible assets could 
be used as collateral and thus is expected to be positively correlated with leverage (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002). Asset tangibility could also be used as an inverse proxy for information 
asymmetry and thus is expected to be positively related to equity issuance.
16
  
Panel A of Table 2.4 employs several proxies for corporate financing. These are: the 
change in the long-term debt ratio (Model [1]), equity issuance ratio (Model [2]), change in 
the long-term financing ratio (Model [3]), change in the short-term debt ratio (Model [4]), and 
change in the cash holdings ratio (Model [5]). Consistent with my first hypothesis, the results 
indicate that treatment firms rely more on long-term financing and less on short-term 
financing when benchmarked against control firms in the post-watch period. In Model [1], the 
positive coefficients of the interaction dummies                   and        
          substantially increase in magnitude and become statistically significant beginning 
in quarter 1, implying that treatment firms issue substantially higher levels of long-term debt 
following the watch period. In Model [2], the coefficients on the interaction dummies switch 
sign around quarter 0 and remain positive and significant over the subsequent three quarters, 
suggesting that treatment firms issue more equity in the post-watch period. Results from 
Model [3] confirm that treatment firms substantially increase their long-term financing in the 
post-watch period. The incremental long-term financing for treatment firms amounts to more 
than 3% of average assets in every quarter within the post-watch period. In particular, by four 
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 The estimated coefficients of the control variables are not always consistent with the associated expected effects. 
One potential explanation for this is that my sample is nonstandard because it consists of large, well-established 
firms for which issuer-level ratings are available. Therefore, the estimated effects of the control variables are 
actually conditional effects, which may diverge from the unconditional effects that would obtain in a standard 
sample. 
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quarters following the watch period treatment firms have raised their long-term financing by 
3.54%, which represents a more than 100% increase above its pre-watch level of 3.3%.
17
 In 
contrast, Models [4] and [5] indicate that treatment firms do not increase their short-term 
financing in the post-watch period. The change in short-term debt is mostly negative, but also 
insignificant. Cash holdings increase in the first quarter following the watch period, indicating 
that treatment firms tend to use less cash.  However, this effect appears to be short-lived and 
disappears in the subsequent three quarters, indicating that the cash balance is mostly 
unchanged relative to its pre-watch level. 
Panel B of Table 2.4 shows estimation results based on three measures of corporate 
investment, which are: the capital expenditures ratio (Model [6]), PPE growth rate (Model 
[7]), and asset growth rate (Model [8]). The general picture that emerges from this panel is 
that treatment firms ramp up their investment activities only after the watch period. In Model 
[1], the coefficients of the interaction dummies                   and        
          suggest that treatment firms employ comparable levels of investment capital 
before the watch period and significantly more capital afterwards when compared to control 
firms. Indeed, I observe that subsequent to quarter 0 capital expenditures, as a percentage of 
average assets, increase monotonically, and as of quarter 4 they amount to 1.33% of average 
assets, which represents a roughly 22% increase above its pre-watch level of 6.1%. Results 
from Models [7] and [8] provide evidence that treatment firms tend to grow their fixed and 
total assets in the post-watch period. Focusing on the fourth quarter subsequent to the watch 
period, treatment firms grow their fixed and total assets by an incremental 8.90% and an 
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 For all variables, pre-watch levels (levels as of quarter 0) are from the summary statistics of treatment firms in 
Table 2.3. The relative increase is computed as 3.54% divided by 3.3%.  
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additional 7.21%, respectively, which both represent a nearly 100% increase above their 
respective pre-watch levels of 6.70% and 8.10%.   
Panel C of Table 2.4 employs three measures of corporate profitability: the operating 
income ratio (Model [9]), return on assets (Model [10]), and return on equity (Model [11]). 
The results indicate that treatment firms substantially outperform their peers, and most 
importantly the higher profitability attributed to treatment firms is not part of a long-term 
trend. Instead, treatment firms are significantly more profitable only in the post-watch period. 
In Model [9], I observe that treatment firms are about 2% more profitable by the end of 
quarter 4. Relative to its pre-watch level of 13.2%, the 2% increase in the operating income 
ratio represents a nearly 15% improvement in profitability. In Model [10], treatment firms 
outperform their peers by an incremental return on assets of 2.54% as of quarter 4. In the 
same quarter, Model [11] shows that the incremental return on equity for treatment firms is 
equal to a substantial 9.11%. 
To summarize, the results reported in Table 2.4 strongly support the hypothesis on the 
mean effects of treatment. The occurrence of treatment represents a turning point for the 
pattern of corporate financing, investment, and profitability. Relative to control firms, 
treatment firms achieve higher levels of long-term financing, invest more capital, and 
experience a sharp increase in profitability immediately following the watch period.  
 
2.5.3. The effects of treatment on corporate financing, investment, and profitability 
conditional upon firm credit quality 
I hypothesize that treatment firms have better access to capital markets as a result of 
reduction in information asymmetry following the watch period, and accordingly they tend to 
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increase their long-term financing and investment. Moreover, I hypothesize that treatment 
firms experience better profitability as a result of third-party monitoring. Among treatment 
firms, I know that those of lower credit quality are more sensitive to information asymmetry 
and are more susceptible to pressure from the agencies. If this is the case, then consistent with 
the hypothesis on the interaction effects of treatment I can expect the increase in long-term 
financing, investment, and profitability experienced by treatment firms to be stronger for 
those treatment firms of lower credit quality.  
To test the interaction effects of treatment, I condition upon firm credit quality and 
study the dynamic pattern of firm fundamentals around the watch period. First, I divide the 
sample firms into two groups based on Moody’s investment (Baa or higher)/non-investment 
(Ba or lower) grade status. Second, I repeat the analysis in Table 2.4 for each group of firms 
and report difference tests for the coefficients of the interaction variables         
          and                 . 
Table 2.5 reports the estimation results, where the coefficients of the control variables 
are omitted for brevity of presentation.
18
 In support of my predictions, the results show that 
the increase in long-term debt, investment, and profitability of treatment firms is mainly 
driven by non-investment grade firms. Panels A-E indicate that non-investment grade firms 
issue substantially higher long-term debt. The fourth quarter post-watch increase in long-term 
debt is greater than 5% as a percentage of average assets for non-investment grade treatment 
firms when compared to their investment grade peers. Non-investment grade treatment firms 
also marginally reduce their short-term debt and do not alter their cash holdings on a relative 
basis. Panels F-H show that non-investment grade treatment firms increase their investment 
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 All specifications in Table 2.5 include the control variables reported in Table 2.4, with the exception of the non-
investment grade dummy. 
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activities faster than their investment grade counterparts. For example, Panel G shows that as 
of quarter 4 post-watch non-investment grade treatment firms grow their fixed assets by a 
roughly 18% compared to only about 5% for investment grade firms. This amounts to a 
difference in PPE growth rate of 13%, which is statistically significant at the 1% level. Panels 
I-K show that non-investment grade treatment firms are more profitable, although results for 
some ratios lack statistical significance. Based on return on equity in Panel K, the 
outperformance of non-investment grade treatment firms ranges between roughly 10% and 
16% in the post-watch period.         
 
2.5.4. The effects of treatment on corporate financing conditional upon firm financial 
constraints 
In this section, I investigate whether agencies can help alleviate firm financial 
constraints resulting from information asymmetry in credit markets. Among treatment firms, I 
can expect financially constrained firms to benefit the most from the reduction in information 
asymmetry and take advantage of the resulting better access to capital markets to alter their 
financing mix, using the sources of funds that are most sensitive to information asymmetry. 
Accordingly, I can expect financially constrained treatment firms to rely more on long-term 
financing and less on short-term financing when compared to their financially unconstrained 
counterparts in the post-watch period.  
To implement this test, I condition upon firm financial constraints and study the 
dynamic pattern of firm financing around the watch period. Following Rajan and Zingales 
(1998), I employ the cash-flow investment gap to classify firms as financially constrained or 
unconstrained. I measure the cash-flow investment gap as cash flow minus capital 
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expenditures all divided by average assets. I divide the sample firms into two groups based on 
the median value of the cash-flow investment gap as of quarter 0. Next, I repeat the analysis 
in Table 2.4 for each group of firms and report difference tests for the coefficients of the 
interaction variables                   and                 . 
Table 2.6 reports the estimation results, where the coefficients of the control variables 
are omitted for brevity of presentation.
19
 As expected, the results indicate that constrained 
treatment firms engage in financing substitution: they increase their long-term financing and 
decrease their short-term financing, a financing behavior that is consistent with a decrease in 
information asymmetry and a better access to capital markets. Panel C indicates that 
constrained treatment firms significantly increase their long-term financing in the quarters 
following the watch period. The incremental long-term financing ranges between roughly 3% 
and 6% of average assets. Panels A and B show that the incremental long-term financing is 
mainly driven by a sharp increase in long-term debt issuance. Turning to Panels D and E, I 
observe that constrained treatment firms reduce their short-term financing and marginally 
increase their cash holdings in the post-watch period, indicating that these firms rely less on 
short-term financing. Overall, the results indicate that constrained treatment firms substitute 
long-term financing for short-term financing to benefit from the post-watch reduction in 
information asymmetry and the resulting better access to capital markets.  
 
2.5.5. The effects of treatment on corporate profitability conditional upon corporate 
governance 
I am interested in how third-party monitoring interacts with corporate governance. In 
other words, is third-party monitoring a substitute for and/or a complement to corporate 
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 All specifications in Table 2.6 include the control variables reported in Table 2.4. 
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governance? Prior papers show that firms with stronger governance are more profitable (see, 
e.g., Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick, 2003). To test the substitution role, I ask the following: 
does third-party monitoring have a positive effect on corporate profitability beyond that 
attributed to better corporate governance? If corporate profitability improves as a result of 
treatment regardless of corporate governance, then I can conclude that third-party monitoring 
can be a substitute for corporate governance. To test the complement role, I ask whether the 
positive effect of third-party monitoring on corporate profitability increases with stronger 
corporate governance. If this is the case, then I can claim that third-party monitoring can be a 
complement to corporate governance. 
To answer these questions, I condition upon corporate governance and study the 
effects of treatment on corporate profitability. I employ the G Index of Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick (2003) as a proxy for corporate governance. Firms with values for the Index below 
the median value of 10 are classified as firms with strong governance, and other firms are 
categorized as firms with weak governance. Next, among each corporate governance group, I 
identify treatment and control firms, yielding four subgroups: strong governance treatment 
firms, strong governance control firms, weak governance treatment firms, and weak 
governance control firms. 
Table 2.7 reports conditional difference-in-differences estimates for the three 
measures of corporate profitability conditional upon corporate governance. The table also 
reports a triple difference test, where the last difference is computed as the difference-in-
differences estimate for strong governance firms less that for weak governance firms. I 
document that among firms with strong corporate governance, treatment firms are more 
profitable than control firms. For example, Panel A shows that strong governance treatment 
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firms outperform their control peers by about 2% to 3% when the operating income ratio is 
considered. The same effect holds among firms with weak corporate governance, although it 
is economically weaker. For example, Panel A shows that the operating income ratio is higher 
for weak governance treatment firms by about 1% when compared to their control 
counterparts. In sum, the effect of treatment on corporate profitability is not subsumed by that 
resulting from corporate governance. Because treatment has a positive effect on corporate 
profitability regardless of corporate governance, I can conclude that third-party monitoring 
can be a substitute for corporate governance. Interestingly, the results in Table 2.7 also 
indicate that the triple difference estimates are positive and significant albeit at lower 
confidence levels, consistent with an interaction effect between treatment and corporate 
governance. Agency’s monitoring is more effective among firms with better corporate 
governance, perhaps because those firms are more likely to embrace the implicit contract a la 
Boot et al. (2006). 
Table 2.8 reports regression results conditional upon corporate governance. I divide 
the sample firms into two groups: strong and weak governance groups. For each group, I run a 
difference-in-differences panel regression to estimate the coefficients of the interaction 
variables                   and                 . The regressions include all the 
control variables used in Table 2.4, but I do not report their coefficients for brevity of 
presentation. After controlling for other relevant factors and various fixed effects, I observe 
that the substitution role of third-party monitoring persists. The effect of treatment on 
corporate profitability is positive and mostly significant within each corporate governance 
group. The results also indicate that after considering other controls the interaction effect 
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between third-party monitoring and corporate governance is weaker. The difference in the 
conditional effects of treatment on corporate profitability lacks statistical significance.   
In sum, results from Tables 2.7 and 2.8 are consistent with the view that third-party 
monitoring can be a substitute for corporate governance: the agency can exert informal 
influence over firms to undertake profitable projects regardless of their corporate governance. 
The results also point to weaker evidence that third-party monitoring is more effective among 
firms with stronger governance.    
 
2.6. Robustness tests 
In this section, I conduct various robustness tests on my main results. First, I formally 
test the parallel trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences framework. 
Second, I check whether the results are sensitive to empirical methodologies by considering 
propensity score matching as an alternative to the difference-in-differences panel regression 
framework. Third, I address potential endogeneity in agency’s watch resolution decisions and 
provide an assessment of their net effects on measures of corporate fundamentals. 
 
2.6.1. Testing the parallel trends assumption 
A valid concern with the difference-in-differences results is that the changes in 
corporate financing, investment, and profitability measures that I observe in the post-watch 
period may be part of long-term trends. If this is the case, then I cannot attribute these changes 
to treatment, but rather to other unobservable factors that matter for the long-term trends in 
corporate fundamentals.  
To address this concern, I test the parallel trends assumption underlying the 
difference-in-differences framework (see, e.g., Roberts and Whited, 2012). This assumption 
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states that the pre-watch trends in corporate financing, investment, and profitability measures 
for treatment and control firms should be statistically indistinguishable. To implement this 
test, I falsely assume that the onset of treatment occurs two years before it actually does, and 
then I re-estimate the difference-in-differences model in Equation (2.1) based on this 
assumption.
20
  
Table 2.9 reports estimation results of the difference-in-differences model based on 
the falsification test. Consistent with the parallel trends assumption, the results indicate that 
the evidence from my main analysis in Table 2.4 does not reproduce based on the false 
treatment. In all panels, the coefficients of the interaction variables                   
and                  are generally statistically insignificant. In those cases in which the 
coefficients are significant they always take the unexpected sign. Thus, I can be confident that 
the prior difference-in-differences results are valid, and the documented post-watch patterns 
in corporate financing, investment, and profitability are due to treatment rather than part of 
long-term trends. 
 
2.6.2. Propensity score matching 
So far, the difference-in-differences results are based on a panel regression model. To 
explore whether the results are sensitive to this specific empirical methodology, I employ 
propensity score matching, which allows for direct matching between treatment and control 
firms based on the characteristics that matter for corporate fundamentals. I run a probit 
regression to estimate propensity scores. The dependent variable is a dummy equal to one for 
treatment firms and zero for control firms. In the first set of matching variables, I consider 
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 I obtain comparable results when I assume that the onset of treatment occurs one year before it actually does. 
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proxies for the standard determinants of corporate policies, which are: firm size, Tobin’s Q, 
and asset tangibility. The second set consists of the variables I employed in this chapter to 
investigate various conditional effects of treatment. These are dummy variables indicating 
non-investment grade status, financial constraints, and strong governance.
21
 The third set 
consists of dummy variables that indicate calendar years and 38 SIC-based industries. In the 
matching, I determine candidate control firms by allowing for an absolute difference between 
propensity scores of 1%. Then, I match each treatment firm to a control firm chosen randomly 
with no replacement from the group of candidate control firms.
22
 
Table 2.10 reports the results based on 250 matched treatment firms that could be 
matched to control firms based on non-missing values for the matching variables. Focusing on 
the difference-in-differences estimates, I observe that as expected treatment firms rely more 
on long-term financing, invest more, and are much more profitable in the four quarters 
following the watch period. Panel A shows that treatment firms issue more long-term debt and 
do not increase their short-term financing subsequent to the watch period. Panel B 
demonstrates that treatment firms spend more on capital expenditures and grow faster their 
fixed and total assets in the post-watch period. Panel C indicates that treatment firms are 
consistently more profitable in every quarter following the watch period. Collectively, these 
results are highly consistent with those based on the panel regression framework, indicating 
that my prior conclusions with respect to post-watch patterns in corporate fundamentals are 
robust to different empirical methodologies.  
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 The financial constraints dummy indicates the cash flow investment gap ratio is below its median. The corporate 
governance dummy indicates the G Index is below its median. 
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 I obtain similar results if I choose one-to-three matching with a propensity score distance of 3% or one-to-five 
matching with a propensity score distance of 5%. In both cases, the number of matched treatment firms is smaller. 
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2.6.3. Addressing endogeneity 
The panel regression model may fail to account for potential endogeneity in agency’s 
watch resolution decisions. As shown in Table 2.3, treatment firms tend to be smaller, more 
profitable, have better growth profiles, and are less financially constrained. If watch resolution 
decisions are influenced by firm characteristics, then the estimated effects from the panel 
regression are likely contaminated with the effects resulting from endogeneity in watch 
resolution decisions.  
To address selectivity in watch resolution outcomes and establish their direct causal 
effects on firm fundamentals, I consider an empirical framework that makes it possible to hold 
the firm profile fixed and measure the effects due to watch resolution decisions only. The 
empirical model I propose is a switching regression model with endogenous switching, which 
is discussed in Maddala (1983). The model is used by Fang (2005) to control for endogeneity 
in the issuer-underwriter matching in her study of the effects of investment bank reputation on 
the price and quality of debt underwriting services.
23
 I formally present the model in detail in 
Appendix B.  
Table 2.11 shows the estimation results for Equation (B.10), which computes the 
difference between actual and hypothetical changes in a firm’s fundamentals measure. As 
discussed in Appendix B, the hypothetical change in a fundamentals measure is obtained by 
holding the firm’s profile fixed and computing the change in that measure as if the firm’s 
rating were downgraded rather than confirmed. Each panel of the table reports for a given 
fundamentals measure the means of the actual and hypothetical values along with their 
difference tests. Consistent with the main results, the evidence I gather from the table suggests 
                                                          
23
 In general, the switching regression model is suitable to model endogenous dichotomous choices where the 
researcher observes data for the two regimes resulting from these choices.  
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that treatment firms obtain higher long-term financing, invest more, and are more profitable 
when benchmarked against their counterfactual counterparts. To illustrate, I focus on the 
difference-in-differences estimates for the period from quarter 0 to 4. In Panel A, results show 
that for treatment firms the mean change in long-term financing as a percentage of average 
assets is equal to 5.58%, 3.99% higher than the hypothetical 1.59% change that would obtain 
for counterfactual firms. Panel B shows that treatment firms ramp up their investment in PPE 
at an annual growth rate equal to 7.08%; if these firms had been downgraded instead, they 
would achieve a negative growth rate equal to -7.47%, resulting in a significant deterioration 
in fixed asset growth of 14.56%. In Panel C, results indicate that for treatment firms the mean 
actual change in return on equity is equal to 2.45%, which is 10.15% higher than the 
hypothetical -7.69%.  
In sum, Table 2.11 provides evidence that after accounting for potential endogeneity 
in watch resolution decisions treatment firms obtain higher long-term financing, invest more, 
and are more profitable beginning immediately following the watch period, a set of results 
that is consistent with my prior conclusions. 
 
2.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I investigate whether credit rating agencies act as third-party monitors 
through the mechanism of a credit watch with direction downgrade. To this end, I examine the 
relations between credit watch resolution outcomes and the subsequent changes in corporate 
financing, investment, and profitability. Based on the insights provided in Boot et al. (2006), 
the watch procedure with direction downgrade allows for a monitoring regime, whereby the 
agencies exert behind-the-scenes influence over firms placed under watch to extend 
turnaround effort. I conjecture that if the agencies condition their watch resolution decisions 
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on the effectiveness of firm turnaround effort, then the relations between these decisions and 
the patterns of subsequent changes in corporate fundamentals are predictable. Two main 
channels are in play in this respect. First, by exerting informal influence the agencies can 
induce firms to undertake safe projects, helping improve their profitability. Second, when the 
agencies reveal the true credit quality of firms following the monitoring episode, they can 
help reduce information asymmetry and thus facilitate access to capital markets. Accordingly, 
firms increase their long-term financing and ramp up their investment activities.    
Based on a difference-in-differences panel regression framework, I find that, relative 
to firms with watch-preceded rating downgrades (control firms), firms with watch-preceded 
rating confirmations (treatment firms) tend to increase their long-term financing, employ 
more investment capital, and experience an improvement in profitability beginning 
immediately following the credit watch period. These patterns are stronger for treatment firms 
of lower credit quality, for which third-party monitoring is more valuable. 
I conduct two additional tests that support the information asymmetry and informal 
influence channels. First, I find that financially constrained treatment firms substantially 
increase their long-term financing at the expense of short-term financing immediately 
following the watch period, indicating that these firms attempt to benefit from reduction in 
information asymmetry and the resulting better access to capital markets. Second, I show that 
treatment firms are more profitable regardless of corporate governance, implying that 
agencies’ informal influence is not an artifact of strong corporate governance. 
I present three robustness checks on the main results. First, I provide evidence in 
support of the parallel trends assumption underlying the difference-in-differences framework. 
Second, I demonstrate that my results are not sensitive to empirical methodologies. In this 
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respect, I show that the documented post-watch patterns of corporate financing, investment, 
and profitability still hold under a propensity score matching framework. Third, I employ an 
endogenous switching regression model to address endogeneity concerns. I show that after 
controlling for endogeneity treatment firms still experience an increase in long-term 
financing, investment, and profitability following the watch period. 
This chapter contributes to our understanding of the economic functions of rating 
agencies in financial markets. Based on the mechanism of a credit watch with direction 
downgrade, this chapter provides evidence that rating agencies act as third-party monitors, 
helping mitigate moral hazard faced by investors and alleviate information asymmetry in 
capital markets. In terms of future research, there are a number of interesting issues, which I 
do not address in this chapter. First, despite the evidence my results could be driven by a 
reverse causality problem, whereby watch resolution decisions are influenced by agencies’ 
anticipation of future corporate dynamics. In this respect, further testing is needed. Second, an 
alternative explanation of my results could be motivated by agencies’ debt certification rather 
than monitoring. Third, firms placed under watch with direction downgrade may have an 
incentive to manipulate earnings. It would be interesting to investigate whether firms report 
artificially high profitability, avoiding a rating downgrade. 
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Figure 2.1. Watch resolutions and corporate fundamentals. 
The figure displays the pattern of corporate financing (Panel A), investment (Panel B), and profitability (Panel C) 
for firms with confirmed ratings (treatment firms) and firms with downgraded ratings (control firms) from four 
quarters before to four quarters after the watch period. I ensure non-missing values for each corporate fundamentals 
measure in every quarter within the event window. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The baseline sample 
consists of 1,381 rating downgrades and 509 rating confirmations, for a total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch 
actions between 1992 and 2011. 
Panel A: Financing measures 
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Panel B: Investment measures 
 
 
 
 
Panel C: Profitability measures 
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Table 2.1. Sample distribution by calendar year. 
The table shows the distribution of credit watches, rating confirmations, and rating downgrades by calendar year. 
The baseline sample consists of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a total of 1,890 Moody’s 
issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 2011. 
  Watches Rating confirmations Rating downgrades 
Year N % N % N % 
1992 17 0.9% 3 17.6% 14 82.4% 
1993 64 3.4% 27 42.2% 37 57.8% 
1994 56 3.0% 23 41.1% 33 58.9% 
1995 52 2.8% 22 42.3% 30 57.7% 
1996 66 3.5% 25 37.9% 41 62.1% 
1997 68 3.6% 27 39.7% 41 60.3% 
1998 82 4.3% 34 41.5% 48 58.5% 
1999 107 5.7% 40 37.4% 67 62.6% 
2000 135 7.1% 45 33.3% 90 66.7% 
2001 180 9.5% 39 21.7% 141 78.3% 
2002 252 13.3% 34 13.5% 218 86.5% 
2003 158 8.4% 25 15.8% 133 84.2% 
2004 93 4.9% 31 33.3% 62 66.7% 
2005 97 5.1% 21 21.6% 76 78.4% 
2006 93 4.9% 26 28.0% 67 72.0% 
2007 95 5.0% 28 29.5% 67 70.5% 
2008 98 5.2% 24 24.5% 74 75.5% 
2009 110 5.8% 16 14.5% 94 85.5% 
2010 34 1.8% 11 32.4% 23 67.6% 
2011 33 1.7% 8 24.2% 25 75.8% 
       Overall 1,890 100.0% 509 26.9% 1,381 73.1% 
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Table 2.2. Rating downgrade statistics. 
The table shows the transition probabilities of credit rating downgrades (Panel A) and their distribution by 
magnitude (Panel B). The baseline sample contains 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a 
total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 2011. 
  Panel A: Transition probabilities of rating downgrades 
 
New rating category 
Prior rating category Aaa Aa A Baa Ba B Caa Ca C Overall 
Aaa 
 
14 1 
      
15 
 
 
93.3% 6.7% 
      
1.1% 
Aa 
 
32 63 2 
     
97 
 
 
33.0% 64.9% 2.1% 
     
7.0% 
A 
  
182 193 1 
    
376 
 
  
48.4% 51.3% 0.3% 
    
27.2% 
Baa 
   
297 207 4 3 
  
511 
 
   
58.1% 40.5% 0.8% 0.6% 
  
37.0% 
Ba 
    
85 111 3 
  
199 
 
    
42.7% 55.8% 1.5% 
  
14.4% 
B 
     
70 67 3 
 
140 
 
     
50.0% 47.9% 2.1% 
 
10.1% 
Caa 
      
30 11 1 42 
 
      
71.4% 26.2% 2.4% 3.0% 
Ca 
        
1 1 
 
        
100.0% 0.1% 
           Overall 0 46 246 492 293 185 103 14 2 1,381 
  0.0% 3.3% 17.8% 35.6% 21.2% 13.4% 7.5% 1.0% 0.1% 100.0% 
  Panel B: Distribution of rating downgrades by magnitude 
Magnitude         N         % 
1 
    
873 
    
63.2% 
2 
    
379 
    
27.4% 
3 
    
95 
    
6.9% 
4 
    
24 
    
1.7% 
5 
    
5 
    
0.4% 
6 
    
2 
    
0.1% 
8 
    
2 
    
0.1% 
9 
    
1 
    
0.1% 
           Overall         1,381         100.0% 
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Table 2.3. Summary statistics. 
The table shows summary statistics of several credit watch characteristics (Panel A) and firm characteristics (Panel 
B) in the subsamples of credit rating confirmations (treatment firms) and downgrades (control firms). Variables are 
measured as of quarter 0, or the quarter ending prior to the watch period. The table also provides difference tests. All 
variables are defined in Appendix A. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. The baseline sample consists of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a 
total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 2011. 
  Treatment firms Control firms Treatment - Control 
  N Mean N Mean Mean t-value 
Panel A: Watch characteristics 
      Watch days 509 143.3 1,381 92.5 50.8*** 8.59 
Non-investment grade 509 33.0% 1,381 27.7% 0.053** 2.22 
Rating on watch 509 9.4 1,381 9.0 0.3 1.63 
Rating off watch 509 9.4 1,381 10.6 -1.2*** -6.05 
Rating change 509 0.0 1,381 1.5 - - 
Fallen angel 509 0.0% 1,381 15.6% - - 
       Panel B: Firm characteristics 
      Financing 
         Change in long-term debt ratio 455 2.4% 1,257 2.5% -0.1% -0.19 
   Equity issuance ratio 457 1.0% 1,271 0.9% 0.1% 0.23 
   Change in long-term financing ratio 455 3.3% 1,257 3.4% -0.1% -0.15 
   Change in short-term debt ratio 429 1.0% 1,170 0.8% 0.2% 0.68 
   Change in cash holdings ratio 457 0.2% 1,271 0.4% -0.2% -0.93 
Investment 
         Capital expenditures ratio 428 6.1% 1,213 6.2% -0.1% -0.51 
   PPE growth rate 453 6.7% 1,265 4.5% 2.2% 1.53 
   Asset growth rate 457 8.1% 1,271 4.2% 3.9%*** 3.23 
Profitability 
         Operating income ratio 347 13.2% 993 11.4% 1.8%*** 3.95 
   Return on assets 445 2.5% 1,245 0.6% 1.9%*** 4.17 
   Return on equity 415 7.7% 1,123 5.1% 2.6%** 2.02 
Others 
         Assets (million $) 466 13,255.0 1,287 14,853.5 -1,598.5* -1.73 
   Tobin's Q 426 1.10 1,177 0.92 0.18*** 4.01 
   Tangibility 462 41.1% 1,282 39.2% 1.9% 1.56 
   Governance index 387 9.6 1,039 9.8 -0.2 -1.23 
   Cash flow investment gap ratio 420 1.7% 1,192 -0.5% 2.2%*** 4.34 
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Table 2.4. Dynamic pattern of corporate fundamentals around the watch period. 
This table presents the dynamic pattern of corporate financing (Panel A), investment (Panel B), and profitability (Panel C) from four quarters before to four 
quarters after the watch period. Results are for firms with confirmed ratings (treatment firms) benchmarked against firms with downgraded ratings (control 
firms). The dynamic pattern is estimated based on the following regression specification 
      ∑          
 
 
   
            ∑         
 
 
   
            ∑          
 
 
   
 ∑         
 
 
   
             
                                            , (1) 
where     is a financing, investment, or profitability measure;     is a set of control variables, which are: Ln(rating change + 1), Fallen angel, Ln(assets), Tobin's 
Q, and Tangibility; all variables are defined in Appendix A;         
 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters prior to the watch period, 
where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;        
 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters after the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters; 
          is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit watch is resolved with a rating confirmation;   indexes firms;   indexes time measured in calendar 
quarters;           are 38 SIC-based industry fixed effects;          are calendar quarter fixed effects; and                 are fiscal quarter fixed effects. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm and calendar quarter levels. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The baseline sample consists of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions 
between 1992 and 2011. 
  Panel A: Financing 
Dependent variable 
Change in long-term 
debt ratio 
Equity issuance ratio 
Change in long-term 
financing ratio 
Change in short-term 
debt ratio 
 Change in cash 
holdings ratio 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0180 1.58 -0.0027 -0.95 0.0151 1.19 -0.0073 -1.05 0.0032 0.77 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0028 0.26 -0.0055** -2.43 -0.0034 -0.29 -0.0004 -0.05 -0.0003 -0.13 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0014 0.15 -0.0050*** -3.30 -0.0040 -0.42 0.0036 0.55 -0.0012 -0.42 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0062 0.66 -0.0006 -0.39 0.0054 0.53 0.0018 0.27 0.0031 1.20 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0272** 2.40 0.0047** 2.34 0.0314*** 2.66 -0.0078 -0.93 0.0082*** 3.02 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0291** 2.35 0.0043** 2.00 0.0329** 2.50 -0.0065 -0.73 -0.0001 -0.04 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0341** 2.21 0.0038* 1.74 0.0385** 2.40 -0.0066 -0.66 -0.0039 -1.11 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0330*** 2.65 0.0019 0.90 0.0354*** 2.70 0.0007 0.09 -0.0034 -0.90 
Treatment -0.0056 -0.46 0.0042 1.56 -0.0004 -0.04 0.0076 0.95 0.0026 1.00 
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Before
4
 0.0089 1.43 0.0043** 2.22 0.0139* 1.87 0.0001 0.03 0.0008 0.42 
Before
3
 0.0129** 2.23 0.0044*** 2.80 0.0181*** 2.62 -0.0033 -1.10 -0.0001 -0.10 
Before
2
 0.0097** 2.40 0.0036*** 3.58 0.0141*** 3.05 -0.0051 -1.52 -0.0009 -0.60 
Before
1
 0.0054 1.50 0.0013*** 3.82 0.0070* 1.78 -0.0035 -1.24 -0.0019 -1.57 
After
1
 0.0133** 2.24 0.0005 0.60 0.0143** 2.18 0.0058* 1.66 0.0028* 1.72 
After
2
 0.0262*** 3.31 0.0008 0.69 0.0281*** 3.32 -0.0010 -0.24 0.0043** 2.37 
After
3
 0.0214** 2.46 0.0013 1.04 0.0232** 2.51 -0.0062 -1.30 0.0045** 2.47 
After
4
 0.0204*** 2.72 0.0019* 1.67 0.0230*** 2.84 -0.0162*** -3.34 0.0034 1.64 
Ln(rating change + 1) 0.0098 1.03 0.0052 1.62 0.0162 1.56 0.0072 1.37 0.0009 0.55 
Fallen angel -0.0119** -2.24 0.0005 0.35 -0.0118** -1.99 -0.0062*** -2.62 0.0020 1.53 
Ln(assets) 0.0016 0.81 -0.0016*** -2.72 -0.0003 -0.17 0.001 1.50 0.0007 1.27 
Tobin's Q 0.0111*** 3.55 0.0067*** 5.05 0.0169*** 4.40 0.0023* 1.89 0.0035*** 3.25 
Tangibility -0.016 -0.83 -0.0010 -0.17 -0.0182 -0.78 0.0000 0.00 -0.0195*** -4.98 
Intercept 0.0622 1.21 0.0172 1.34 0.0810 1.32 -0.0033 -0.39 -0.0173** -2.05 
N 14,139 14,175 14,139 14,076 14,175 
Adjusted R
2
 0.074 0.072 0.074 0.053 0.041 
   Difference tests 
          
After
1
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0209** 2.25 0.0054** 2.07 0.0260** 2.54 -0.0096* -1.87 0.0051 1.53 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0228** 2.45 0.0049* 1.89 0.0274*** 2.68 -0.0083 -1.63 -0.0032 -0.98 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0278*** 2.99 0.0045* 1.72 0.0330*** 3.22 -0.0084 -1.63 -0.0071** -2.13 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0267*** 2.87 0.0025 0.97 0.0300*** 2.92 -0.0010 -0.21 -0.0065** -1.96 
  Panel B: Investment         
Dependent variable 
Capital expenditures 
ratio 
PPE growth rate Asset growth rate 
    
 
[6] [7] [8] 
      Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
    Before4 × Treatment -0.0017 -0.64 -0.0006 -0.02 -0.0157 -0.61 
    Before3 × Treatment -0.0032 -1.54 -0.0074 -0.34 -0.0124 -0.50 
    Before2 × Treatment -0.0021* -1.85 -0.0037 -0.23 -0.0007 -0.04 
    Before1 × Treatment -0.0003 -0.38 0.0025 0.12 0.0130 0.71 
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After
1
 × Treatment 0.0037 1.40 0.0224 1.15 0.0429* 1.83 
    After2 × Treatment 0.0060** 2.26 0.0669*** 3.02 0.0668*** 2.68 
    After3 × Treatment 0.0100*** 3.21 0.0765*** 3.11 0.0662** 2.52 
    After4 × Treatment 0.0133*** 3.98 0.0890*** 3.59 0.0721** 2.59 
    Treatment -0.0029 -0.79 -0.0210 -0.89 -0.0102 -0.43 
    Before4 0.0009 0.48 0.0387** 2.47 0.0579*** 3.42 
    Before3 0.0016 1.05 0.0316** 2.54 0.0481*** 3.30 
    Before2 0.0017* 1.79 0.0258** 2.52 0.0279*** 3.66 
    Before1 0.0012** 2.09 0.0141** 2.26 0.0125** 2.40 
    After1 -0.0057*** -5.99 -0.0022 -0.27 0.0090 0.99 
    After2 -0.0089*** -6.72 -0.0068 -0.55 0.0112 0.83 
    After3 -0.0118*** -7.11 -0.0121 -0.93 0.0052 0.36 
    After4 -0.0137*** -6.62 -0.0260 -1.59 -0.0079 -0.47 
    Ln(rating change + 1) 0.0027 0.86 -0.0225 -1.12 -0.0254 -1.13 
    Fallen angel -0.0010 -0.46 -0.0133 -1.14 -0.0214* -1.68 
    Ln(assets) -0.0006 -0.62 0.0131*** 2.83 0.0180*** 3.66 
    Tobin's Q 0.0141*** 5.59 0.0268*** 3.14 0.0300*** 3.74 
    Tangibility 0.1036*** 10.03 0.0600 1.16 -0.1596*** -3.25 
    Intercept 0.0513 1.34 -0.0370 -0.35 0.0799 0.77 
    N 13,527 14,166 14,175 
    Adjusted R2 0.417 0.087 0.129 
       Difference tests 
      
    After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0041 1.28 0.0199 0.97 0.0298 1.39 
    After2 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0064** 2.02 0.0644*** 3.15 0.0537** 2.51 
    After3 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0104*** 3.25 0.0740*** 3.62 0.0532** 2.48 
    After4 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0137*** 4.27 0.0865*** 4.22 0.0590*** 2.75         
  Panel C: Profitability         
Dependent variable Operating income ratio Return on assets Return on equity 
    
 
[9] [10] [11] 
      Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
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Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0004 -0.08 -0.0018 -0.38 0.0098 0.53 
    Before3 × Treatment 0.0021 0.48 0.0002 0.06 0.0168 1.14 
    Before2 × Treatment 0.0015 0.29 -0.0020 -0.36 0.0045 0.28 
    Before1 × Treatment 0.0011 0.21 -0.0012 -0.27 0.0002 0.02 
    After1 × Treatment 0.0120*** 2.93 0.0209*** 3.31 0.0591*** 3.62 
    After2 × Treatment 0.0178*** 4.58 0.0306*** 4.20 0.0873*** 4.81 
    After3 × Treatment 0.0213*** 3.88 0.0292*** 3.60 0.0976*** 4.09 
    After4 × Treatment 0.0199*** 4.17 0.0254*** 3.48 0.0911*** 4.16 
    Treatment -0.0179** -2.43 -0.0295**** -3.65 -0.1133*** -4.33 
    Before4 0.0090*** 4.26 0.0114*** 3.65 0.0229** 2.57 
    Before3 0.0067*** 3.57 0.0096*** 3.05 0.0168* 1.82 
    Before2 0.0055*** 2.78 0.0099*** 2.84 0.0221** 2.15 
    Before1 0.0042*** 5.92 0.0058* 1.79 0.0159** 2.06 
    After1 -0.0138*** -11.57 -0.0209*** -4.87 -0.0571*** -5.65 
    After2 -0.0166*** -9.82 -0.0299*** -5.91 -0.0799*** -8.61 
    After3 -0.0156*** -6.02 -0.0291*** -5.12 -0.0908*** -6.97 
    After4 -0.0118*** -3.75 -0.0236*** -4.19 -0.0820*** -5.83 
    Ln(rating change + 1) -0.0212*** -3.47 -0.0380*** -4.71 -0.1100*** -4.45 
    Fallen angel -0.0048 -1.47 -0.0026 -0.64 -0.0046 -0.40 
    Ln(assets) 0.0033** 2.16 0.0069*** 3.91 0.0246*** 4.44 
    Tobin's Q 0.0530*** 8.94 0.0416*** 10.66 0.0945*** 8.15 
    Tangibility 0.0419*** 3.26 -0.0013 -0.10 0.0399 1.00 
    Intercept 0.0453* 1.72 -0.0079 -0.31 -0.0533 -0.85 
    N 11,178 13,851 12,879 
    Adjusted R2 0.470 0.297 0.238 
       Difference tests 
      
    After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0108** 2.18 0.0221*** 3.39 0.0588*** 3.18 
    After2 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0166*** 3.35 0.0318*** 4.88 0.0871*** 4.71 
    After3 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0201*** 4.05 0.0304*** 4.67 0.0973*** 5.26 
    After4 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0188*** 3.77 0.0267*** 4.09 0.0908*** 4.91         
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Table 2.5. The effects of treatment on the dynamic pattern of corporate fundamentals conditional upon credit 
quality. 
Firms are sorted into non-investment (Moody’s Ba rating or lower) and investment (Moody’s Baa rating or higher) 
grade groups. This table presents for each of those groups the dynamic pattern of corporate financing (Panel A), 
investment (Panel B), and profitability (Panel C) from four quarters before to four quarters after the watch period. 
Results are for firms with confirmed ratings (treatment firms) benchmarked against firms with downgraded ratings 
(control firms). The dynamic pattern is estimated for the non-investment and investment grade firm groups 
separately (along with difference tests) based on the following regression specification 
      ∑          
 
 
   
            ∑         
 
 
   
            ∑          
 
 
   
 
 ∑          
  
                                                           , (1) 
where     is a financing, investment, or profitability measure;     is a set of control variables, which are: Ln(rating 
change + 1), Fallen angel, Ln(assets), Tobin's Q, and Tangibility; for brevity of presentation, only the coefficients on 
the variables of interest are reported here; all variables are defined in Appendix A;         
 
 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters prior to the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;        
 
 is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters after the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters; 
           is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit watch is resolved with a rating confirmation;   indexes 
firms;   indexes time measured in calendar quarters;           are 38 SIC-based industry fixed effects;          
are calendar quarter fixed effects; and                 are fiscal quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered 
at the firm and calendar quarter levels. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels, respectively. The baseline sample consists of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a 
total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 2011. 
  Non-investment Investment Non-invest. - Invest. 
  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Panel A: Dependent variable is change in long-term debt ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0805*** 2.88 -0.001 -0.09 0.0815*** 3.91 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0341 1.19 -0.0047 -0.52 0.0388* 1.86 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0219 0.89 -0.003 -0.37 0.0249 1.20 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0207 0.94 0.0027 0.38 0.0179 0.86 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0632** 2.11 0.0124 1.32 0.0507** 2.44 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0692** 2.09 0.0139 1.36 0.0553*** 2.66 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0793** 2.02 0.0187 1.59 0.0606*** 2.91 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0723** 2.52 0.0186* 1.70 0.0536*** 2.58 
N 3,555 10,584   
Adjusted R
2
 0.138 0.081   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0425* 1.91 0.0097 0.99 0.0327 1.58 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0485** 2.18 0.0111 1.14 0.0373* 1.79 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0586*** 2.64 0.0159 1.63 0.0426** 2.05 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0516** 2.31 0.0159 1.63 0.0357* 1.71 
Panel B: Dependent variable is equity issuance ratio 
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Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0049 -0.83 -0.0011 -0.38 -0.0038 -0.66 
Before
3
 × Treatment -0.0075 -1.47 -0.0042*** -2.71 -0.0032 -0.56 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0066* -1.76 -0.0041*** -2.67 -0.0025 -0.45 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0027 1.01 -0.0016 -1.31 0.0044 0.77 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0115* 1.81 0.0021 1.40 0.0094 1.63 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0097 1.41 0.0025 1.56 0.0071 1.25 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0118* 1.86 0.0008 0.53 0.0109* 1.90 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0080 1.22 -0.0009 -0.62 0.0090 1.57 
N 3,555 10,620   
Adjusted R
2
 0.135 0.107   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0087 1.13 0.0037 1.73 0.0049 0.87 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0069 0.90 0.0042* 1.95 0.0027 0.48 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0090 1.17 0.0025 1.16 0.0065 1.13 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0053 0.68 0.0007 0.33 0.0045 0.79 
Panel C: Dependent variable is change in long-term financing ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0770*** 2.72 -0.0027 -0.21 0.0798*** 3.49 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0256 0.89 -0.0094 -0.98 0.0351 1.53 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0146 0.62 -0.0072 -0.85 0.0219 0.96 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0224 1.04 0.0011 0.15 0.0213 0.93 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0744** 2.47 0.0137 1.38 0.0606*** 2.66 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0789** 2.28 0.0154 1.44 0.0635*** 2.78 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0940** 2.32 0.0187 1.55 0.0753*** 3.29 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0817*** 2.61 0.0176 1.55 0.0640*** 2.80 
N 3,555 10,584   
Adjusted R
2
 0.145 0.080   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0519** 2.05 0.0126 1.20 0.0393* 1.72 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0565** 2.23 0.0143 1.36 0.0422* 1.84 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0716*** 2.83 0.0175* 1.67 0.0540** 2.37 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0592** 2.32 0.0165 1.58 0.0427* 1.86 
Panel D: Dependent variable is change in short-term debt ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0139 -0.84 -0.0035 -0.55 -0.0104 -0.91 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0067 0.32 -0.0025 -0.45 0.0093 0.80 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0168 0.80 -0.0009 -0.20 0.0178 1.55 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0128 0.72 -0.0016 -0.42 0.0144 1.25 
After
1
 × Treatment -0.0218 -1.05 -0.0009 -0.13 -0.0209* -1.81 
After
2
 × Treatment -0.0164 -0.80 -0.0015 -0.19 -0.0148 -1.28 
After
3
 × Treatment -0.0152 -0.62 -0.0029 -0.43 -0.0122 -1.06 
After
4
 × Treatment -0.0054 -0.35 0.0030 0.40 -0.0084 -0.73 
N 3,519 10,557   
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Adjusted R
2
 0.109 0.062   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0346*** -3.24 0.0007 0.13 -0.0354*** -3.06 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0292*** -2.73 0.0000 0.02 -0.0293** -2.53 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0280*** -2.63 -0.0013 -0.23 -0.0267** -2.31 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0182* -1.70 0.0046 0.79 -0.0228* -1.97 
Panel E: Dependent variable is change in cash holdings ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0022 -0.24 0.0064 1.26 -0.0087 -1.16 
Before
3
 × Treatment -0.0030 -0.49 0.0018 0.54 -0.0049 -0.65 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0078 -1.26 0.0021 0.63 -0.0099 -1.33 
Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0022 -0.44 0.0055** 2.12 -0.0078 -1.05 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0143** 2.48 0.0070** 2.10 0.0073 0.98 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0023 0.38 0.0001 0.04 0.0021 0.29 
After
3
 × Treatment -0.0008 -0.10 -0.0044 -1.12 0.0035 0.48 
After
4
 × Treatment -0.0032 -0.38 -0.0037 -0.83 0.0005 0.08 
N 3,555 10,620   
Adjusted R
2
 0.078 0.051   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0166** 2.06 0.0014 0.40 0.0152** 2.03 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0045 0.57 -0.0054 -1.55 0.0100 1.34 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0014 0.18 -0.0100*** -2.85 0.0114 1.53 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0009 -0.12 -0.0093*** -2.66 0.0084 1.12 
Panel F: Dependent variable is capital expenditures ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0043 0.55 -0.0034 -1.18 0.0078 1.08 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0024 0.52 -0.0050** -2.06 0.0074 1.03 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0024 0.46 -0.0034 -1.42 0.0058 0.82 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0014 0.33 -0.0007 -0.28 0.0021 0.30 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0074* 1.72 0.0025 0.68 0.0049 0.69 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0124** 2.43 0.0043 1.15 0.0080 1.12 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0178*** 2.83 0.0080** 2.18 0.0098 1.36 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0236*** 3.59 0.0100** 2.46 0.0135* 1.89 
N 3,312 10,215   
Adjusted R
2
 0.497 0.419   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0060 0.83 0.0032 0.95 0.0028 0.39 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0110 1.50 0.0051 1.50 0.0058 0.82 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0164** 2.24 0.0087*** 2.56 0.0076 1.07 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0221*** 3.00 0.0107*** 3.14 0.0114 1.58 
Panel G: Dependent variable is PPE growth rate 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0936** 2.04 -0.029 -0.96 0.1229*** 2.69 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0421 1.16 -0.023 -0.83 0.0653 1.43 
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Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0275 0.83 -0.012 -0.53 0.0399 0.88 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0209 0.62 -0.000 -0.01 0.0212 0.47 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0649* 1.68 0.0050 0.21 0.0598 1.32 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.1411*** 3.10 0.0382 1.58 0.1029** 2.26 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.1674*** 3.36 0.0422* 1.72 0.1252*** 2.74 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.1842*** 3.46 0.0505* 1.68 0.1336*** 2.94 
N 3,546 10,620   
Adjusted R
2
 0.177 0.091   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0439 0.96 0.0052 0.24 0.0386 0.85 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1202*** 2.61 0.0384* 1.74 0.0817* 1.79 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1465*** 3.19 0.0424* 1.92 0.1040** 2.29 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1632*** 3.53 0.0507** 2.29 0.1124** 2.46 
Panel H: Dependent variable is asset growth rate 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.1169*** 3.12 -0.0584* -1.94 0.1754*** 3.65 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0764** 2.35 -0.0433 -1.40 0.1198** 2.49 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0568** 2.31 -0.0224 -0.84 0.0792* 1.65 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0579** 2.37 -0.0017 -0.08 0.0597 1.24 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0925*** 2.85 0.0253 0.85 0.0671 1.40 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.1534*** 4.64 0.0360 1.11 0.1173** 2.44 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.1617*** 4.11 0.0294 0.96 0.1322*** 2.75 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.1729*** 4.31 0.0297 0.84 0.1432*** 2.99 
N 3,555 10,620   
Adjusted R
2
 0.220 0.122   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0346 0.81 0.0271 1.10 0.0074 0.15 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0954** 2.24 0.0378 1.53 0.0576 1.20 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1037** 2.44 0.0312 1.27 0.0724 1.51 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1149*** 2.68 0.0315 1.28 0.0834* 1.73 
Panel I: Dependent variable is operating income ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0071 0.73 -0.0068 -0.99 0.0140 1.32 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0042 0.41 -0.0014 -0.24 0.0057 0.54 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0004 -0.06 0.0005 0.09 -0.0010 -0.10 
Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0015 -0.19 0.0012 0.17 -0.0027 -0.26 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0186** 2.35 0.0087* 1.73 0.0099 0.94 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0229** 2.12 0.0150*** 3.48 0.0078 0.74 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0256** 2.23 0.0178*** 3.48 0.0077 0.74 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0249*** 2.91 0.0155*** 2.92 0.0094 0.89 
N 2,961 8,217   
Adjusted R
2
 0.315 0.548   
   Difference tests 
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After
1
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0202* 1.82 0.0074 1.46 0.0127 1.20 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0244** 2.21 0.0138*** 2.71 0.0105 1.00 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0271** 2.46 0.0166*** 3.25 0.0105 1.00 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0264** 2.38 0.0143*** 2.79 0.0121 1.15 
Panel J: Dependent variable is return on assets 
Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0039 -0.33 -0.0046 -0.87 0.0007 0.05 
Before
3
 × Treatment -0.0052 -0.44 -0.0012 -0.24 -0.0040 -0.29 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0112 -1.04 -0.0012 -0.20 -0.0100 -0.72 
Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0056 -0.59 -0.0006 -0.13 -0.0049 -0.36 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0430*** 3.86 0.0139* 1.86 0.0290** 2.09 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0547*** 5.59 0.0233*** 2.66 0.0313** 2.25 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0457*** 3.17 0.0231*** 2.58 0.0225 1.62 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0384** 2.49 0.0206** 2.37 0.0178 1.28 
N 3,528 10,323   
Adjusted R
2
 0.333 0.299   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0486*** 3.25 0.0146** 2.23 0.0340** 2.44 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0603*** 4.02 0.0239*** 3.65 0.0363*** 2.61 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0513*** 3.44 0.0238*** 3.63 0.0275* 1.98 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0440*** 2.93 0.0212*** 3.24 0.0228 1.63 
Panel K: Dependent variable is return on equity 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0877* 1.82 -0.0194 -1.21 0.1072*** 2.61 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0752 1.61 -0.0076 -0.59 0.0829** 2.01 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0317 0.71 -0.0098 -0.63 0.0416 1.01 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0130 0.58 -0.0095 -0.75 0.0226 0.55 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.1415*** 6.30 0.0361** 2.16 0.1054** 2.56 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.1849*** 3.56 0.0608*** 3.65 0.1241*** 3.02 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.1968*** 3.28 0.0661*** 3.61 0.1306*** 3.18 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.2166*** 3.16 0.0533*** 2.91 0.1632*** 3.98 
N 2,889 9,990   
Adjusted R
2
 0.234 0.260   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.1285** 2.42 0.0457*** 2.74 0.0827** 2.01 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1719*** 3.24 0.0704*** 4.22 0.1015** 2.47 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1837*** 3.47 0.0757*** 4.55 0.1080*** 2.63 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.2035*** 3.81 0.0629*** 3.77 0.1406*** 3.40 
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Table 2.6. The effects of treatment on the dynamic pattern of corporate financing conditional upon financial 
constraints. 
Firms are sorted into financially constrained and unconstrained groups based on the median value of the cash flow-
investment gap ratio (see Appendix A). This table presents for each of those groups the dynamic pattern of corporate 
financing from four quarters before to four quarters after the watch period. Results are for firms with confirmed 
ratings (treatment firms) benchmarked against firms with downgraded ratings (control firms). The dynamic pattern 
is estimated for the financially constrained and unconstrained firm groups separately (along with difference tests) 
based on the following regression specification 
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 ∑          
  
                                                           , (1) 
where     is a financing measure;     is a set of control variables, which are: Ln(rating change + 1), Fallen angel, 
Ln(assets), Tobin's Q, and Tangibility; for brevity of presentation, only the coefficients on the variables of interest 
are reported here; all variables are defined in Appendix A;         
 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
observation is   quarters prior to the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;        
 
 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters after the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;            is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit watch is resolved with a rating confirmation;   indexes firms;   indexes time 
measured in calendar quarters;           are 38 SIC-based industry fixed effects;          are calendar quarter 
fixed effects; and                 are fiscal quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and 
calendar quarter levels. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The baseline sample consists of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a total of 
1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 2011. 
  Constrained Unconstrained Const. - Unconst. 
  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Panel A: Dependent variable is change in long-term debt ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0291 1.54 0.0022 0.17 0.0268 1.41 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0065 0.29 -0.0040 -0.31 0.0105 0.55 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0029 0.16 -0.0035 -0.30 0.0065 0.34 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0078 0.40 0.0069 0.79 0.0009 0.05 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0487** 2.15 0.0031 0.28 0.0456** 2.40 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0495** 2.06 0.0021 0.17 0.0473** 2.49 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0600** 2.08 0.0023 0.17 0.0577*** 3.04 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0416** 2.22 0.0123 0.95 0.0292 1.54 
N 6,624 6,624   
Adjusted R
2
 0.112 0.104   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0409*** 2.96 -0.0037 -0.29 0.0446** 2.35 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0416*** 3.01 -0.0047 -0.37 0.0464** 2.44 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0522*** 3.78 -0.0045 -0.35 0.0568*** 2.99 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0338** 2.44 0.0054 0.42 0.0283 1.49 
Panel B: Dependent variable is equity issuance ratio 
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Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0049 -0.88 0.0014 0.74 -0.0064 -1.23 
Before
3
 × Treatment -0.0091*** -2.80 -0.0002 -0.15 -0.0089* -1.69 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0068*** -2.91 -0.0016 -1.44 -0.0052 -0.99 
Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0013 -0.69 -0.0007 -1.09 -0.0006 -0.12 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0044 1.23 0.0046** 2.48 -0.0001 -0.02 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0041 1.10 0.0044** 1.99 -0.0003 -0.06 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0053 1.35 0.0029 1.28 0.0023 0.45 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0059 1.64 0.0016 0.74 0.0043 0.82 
N 6,642 6,642   
Adjusted R
2
 0.108 0.075   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0058 1.18 0.0053** 2.35 0.0004 0.09 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0054 1.10 0.0051** 2.28 0.0002 0.06 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0067 1.36 0.0036 1.63 0.0030 0.57 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0073 1.48 0.0023 1.06 0.0049 0.94 
Panel C: Dependent variable is change in long-term financing ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0243 1.17 0.0029 0.22 0.0213 1.02 
Before
3
 × Treatment -0.0026 -0.12 -0.0052 -0.39 0.0025 0.12 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0038 -0.22 -0.0056 -0.46 0.0017 0.08 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0063 0.30 0.0064 0.75 -0.0001 -0.01 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0530** 2.25 0.0070 0.59 0.0460** 2.20 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0549** 2.12 0.0044 0.32 0.0505** 2.42 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0684** 2.28 0.0042 0.29 0.0642*** 3.07 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0503** 2.48 0.0130 0.96 0.0372* 1.78 
N 6,624 6,624   
Adjusted R
2
 0.119 0.102   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0467*** 3.01 0.0005 0.04 0.0461** 2.21 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0486*** 3.12 -0.0020 -0.15 0.0506** 2.42 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0621*** 4.00 -0.0022 -0.16 0.0644*** 3.08 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0439*** 2.83 0.0065 0.47 0.0374* 1.79 
Panel D: Dependent variable is change in short-term debt ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0213 -1.63 0.0049 0.68 -0.0263** -2.47 
Before
3
 × Treatment -0.0109 -0.67 0.0080 1.11 -0.0190* -1.78 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0001 -0.01 0.0069 1.05 -0.0070 -0.67 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0018 0.12 0.0016 0.33 0.0001 0.02 
After
1
 × Treatment -0.0214 -1.23 0.0018 0.22 -0.0232** -2.19 
After
2
 × Treatment -0.0201 -1.16 0.0038 0.48 -0.0240** -2.25 
After
3
 × Treatment -0.0202 -1.02 0.0019 0.24 -0.0222** -2.09 
After
4
 × Treatment -0.0011 -0.10 0.0002 0.03 -0.0014 -0.13 
N 6,597 6,597   
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Adjusted R
2
 0.094 0.059   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0232*** -2.77 0.0002 0.04 -0.0234** -2.20 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0219*** -2.61 0.0022 0.33 -0.0242** -2.27 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0220*** -2.63 0.0003 0.05 -0.0224** -2.10 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0029 -0.35 -0.0013 -0.20 -0.0015 -0.15 
Panel E: Dependent variable is change in cash holdings ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0075 0.90 -0.0015 -0.34 0.0090 1.34 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0004 0.09 -0.0009 -0.22 0.0013 0.20 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0033 -0.82 0.0005 0.12 -0.0038 -0.57 
Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0013 -0.37 0.0041 1.05 -0.0055 -0.82 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0154*** 3.04 0.0042 1.12 0.0112* 1.67 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0095* 1.66 -0.0054 -1.08 0.0150** 2.23 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0010 0.19 -0.0067 -1.39 0.0077 1.15 
After
4
 × Treatment -0.0001 -0.03 -0.0062 -1.11 0.0060 0.90 
N 6,642 6,642   
Adjusted R
2
 0.063 0.034   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0168*** 3.28 0.0001 0.02 0.0167** 2.48 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0109** 2.14 -0.0095** -2.17 0.0205*** 3.05 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0024 0.47 -0.0108** -2.47 0.0132** 1.97 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0011 0.23 -0.0104** -2.37 0.0116* 1.72 
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Table 2.7. Pairwise comparison of the effects of treatment and corporate governance on profitability. 
Firms are sorted into strong and weak governance groups based on the median value (equal to 10) of the G Index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). This 
table presents the dynamic pattern of corporate profitability for firms with confirmed ratings (treatment firms) and firms with downgraded ratings (control firms) 
within strong and weak governance firm groups. The dynamic pattern is from four quarters before to four quarters after the watch period. DiD
SG
 (DiD
WG
) is the 
difference-in-differences test for treatment and control firms conditional on strong (weak) governance. DiDiD is a triple difference-in-differences test, where the 
last difference is computed as the difference-in-differences estimate for strong governance firms less that for weak governance firms. Variables are defined in 
Appendix A. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The baseline sample consists of 1,381 rating 
downgrades and 509 rating confirmations, for a total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 2011. 
Quarters     Q1 - Q0 Q2 - Q0 Q3 - Q0 Q4 - Q0 
Firms classified by 
corporate governance 
Firms classified by watch 
resolutions 
N 
Mean  
difference 
t-Stat 
Mean  
difference 
t-Stat 
Mean  
difference 
t-Stat 
Mean  
difference 
t-Stat 
Panel A: Profitability is measured by operating income ratio 
Strong governance Treatment 177 0.0001 0.04 0.0034 1.11 0.0091** 2.53 0.0118*** 3.02 
 
Control 474 -0.0204*** -9.81 -0.0229*** -7.68 -0.0220*** -6.73 -0.0146*** -4.28 
 
DiD
SG
: Treatment - Control 
 0.0206*** 5.88 0.0265*** 6.12 0.0311*** 6.39 0.0265*** 5.09 
           Weak governance Treatment 98 -0.0097*** -3.28 -0.0102*** -3.11 -0.0083* -1.96 -0.0083* -1.71 
 
Control 296 -0.0181*** -9.87 -0.0200*** -8.99 -0.0199*** -7.79 -0.0157*** -5.63 
 
DiD
WG
: Treatment - Control 
 0.0083** 2.38 0.0098** 2.48 0.0116** 2.32 0.0073 1.31 
  DiDiD: DiD
SG
 - DiD
WG
   0.0121** 2.13 0.0165** 2.17 0.0195** 2.29 0.0191** 2.11 
Panel B: Profitability is measured by return on assets 
Strong governance Treatment 232 0.0018 0.50 0.0028 0.70 0.0061 1.29 0.0068 1.40 
 
Control 599 -0.0269*** -8.61 -0.0373*** -8.78 -0.0356*** -6.94 -0.0282*** -4.62 
 
DiD
SG
: Treatment - Control 
 0.0288*** 5.95 0.0402*** 6.80 0.0418*** 5.97 0.0350*** 4.49 
           Weak governance Treatment 133 -0.0059 -1.20 -0.0076 -1.28 -0.0099 -1.50 -0.0076 -1.12 
 
Control 388 -0.0140*** -4.43 -0.0208*** -5.54 -0.0216*** -5.15 -0.0188*** -3.55 
 
DiD
WG
: Treatment - Control 
 0.0081 1.38 0.0132* 1.87 0.0116 1.48 0.0112 1.30 
  DiDiD: DiD
SG
 - DiD
WG
   0.0207** 2.41 0.0270** 2.46 0.0301** 2.33 0.0237 1.55 
Panel C: Profitability is measured by return on equity 
Strong governance Treatment 214 0.0053 0.42 0.0062 0.41 0.0146 0.82 0.0221 1.16 
 
Control 523 -0.0700*** -8.92 -0.0902*** -8.51 -0.1096*** -8.23 -0.1010*** -6.21 
 
DiD
SG
: Treatment - Control 
 0.0754*** 5.03 0.0966*** 5.19 0.1242*** 5.57 0.1232*** 4.90 
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Weak governance Treatment 131 -0.0114 -0.75 -0.0038 -0.21 -0.0112 -0.58 -0.0073 -0.36 
 
Control 374 -0.0426*** -4.26 -0.0650*** -5.38 -0.0720*** -5.15 -0.0648*** -4.39 
 
DiD
WG
: Treatment - Control 
 0.0312* 1.72 0.0612*** 2.81 0.0608** 2.54 0.0575** 2.28 
  DiDiD: DiD
SG
 - DiD
WG
   0.0442* 1.84 0.0353 1.17 0.0634* 1.75 0.0656 1.58 
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Table 2.8. The effects of treatment on the dynamic pattern of corporate profitability conditional upon 
corporate governance. 
Firms are sorted into strong and weak governance groups based on the median value (equal to 10) of the G Index of 
Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). This table presents for each of those groups the dynamic pattern of corporate 
profitability from four quarters before to four quarters after the watch period. Results are for firms with confirmed 
ratings (treatment firms) benchmarked against firms with downgraded ratings (control firms). The dynamic pattern 
is estimated for the strong and weak governance firm groups separately (along with difference tests) based on the 
following regression specification 
      ∑          
 
 
   
            ∑         
 
 
   
            ∑          
 
 
   
 
 ∑          
  
                                                           , (1) 
where     is a profitability measure;     is a set of control variables, which are: Ln(rating change + 1), Fallen angel, 
Ln(assets), Tobin's Q, and Tangibility; for brevity of presentation, only the coefficients on the variables of interest 
are reported here; all variables are defined in Appendix A;         
 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the 
observation is   quarters prior to the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;        
 
 is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters after the watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;            is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit watch is resolved with a rating confirmation;   indexes firms;   indexes time 
measured in calendar quarters;           are 38 SIC-based industry fixed effects;          are calendar quarter 
fixed effects; and                 are fiscal quarter fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and 
calendar quarter levels. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The baseline sample consists of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a total of 
1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 2011. 
  Strong governance Weak governance Strong - Weak 
  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Panel A: Dependent variable is operating income ratio 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0014 0.15 -0.0051 -0.89 0.0066 0.60 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0050 0.73 -0.0011 -0.20 0.0068 0.62 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0022 0.22 0.0004 0.17 0.0018 0.17 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0028 0.32 0.0010 0.17 0.0017 0.16 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0172** 2.48 0.0078 1.29 0.0093 0.84 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0240*** 3.00 0.0129** 2.18 0.0111 1.01 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0280*** 2.85 0.0158** 2.46 0.0121 1.10 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0250*** 2.70 0.0136** 2.06 0.0114 1.04 
N 5,445 3,420   
Adjusted R
2
 0.508 0.513   
   Difference tests 
      After
1
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0143* 1.94 0.0068 0.93 0.0075 0.68 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0212*** 2.87 0.0118 1.62 0.0093 0.84 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0251*** 3.41 0.0147** 2.02 0.0103 0.94 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0222*** 3.01 0.0125* 1.71 0.0096 0.88 
Panel B: Dependent variable is return on assets 
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Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0032 0.43 -0.0108 -1.37 0.0140 0.99 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0037 0.44 -0.0001 -0.04 0.0038 0.27 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0011 0.11 -0.0020 -0.49 0.0032 0.23 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0012 0.13 -0.0020 -0.78 0.0033 0.23 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0231** 2.37 0.0081 1.32 0.0149 1.06 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0392*** 3.44 0.0134 1.60 0.0258* 1.82 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.0388*** 2.76 0.0127 1.29 0.0261* 1.84 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.0353** 2.57 0.0144 1.63 0.0208 1.47 
N 6,714 4,482   
Adjusted R
2
 0.327 0.286   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0219** 2.18 0.0102 1.21 0.0116 0.82 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0380*** 3.79 0.0154* 1.83 0.0225 1.59 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0376*** 3.74 0.0147* 1.75 0.0228 1.61 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0340*** 3.39 0.0165* 1.96 0.0175 1.24 
Panel C: Dependent variable is return on equity 
Before
4
 × Treatment 0.0187 0.69 -0.0205 -0.90 0.0393 1.00 
Before
3
 × Treatment 0.0260 1.01 0.0019 0.15 0.0241 0.61 
Before
2
 × Treatment 0.0081 0.27 -0.0085 -0.87 0.0166 0.43 
Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0051 0.24 -0.0065 -0.78 0.0116 0.30 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0671** 2.34 0.0371** 2.54 0.0299 0.76 
After
2
 × Treatment 0.0872*** 3.01 0.0684** 2.43 0.0188 0.48 
After
3
 × Treatment 0.1158*** 2.75 0.0715** 2.46 0.0442 1.13 
After
4
 × Treatment 0.1143*** 3.40 0.0696** 2.57 0.0446 1.14 
N 6,138 4,356   
Adjusted R
2
 0.293 0.221   
   Difference tests 
      After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0620** 2.34 0.0436 1.60 0.0183 0.47 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0821*** 3.10 0.0749*** 2.73 0.0072 0.18 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1107*** 4.18 0.0780*** 2.85 0.0326 0.83 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.1091*** 4.12 0.0761*** 2.79 0.0330 0.84 
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Table 2.9. Testing the parallel trend assumption. 
I falsely assume that the onset of treatment occurs two years before it actually does, and define false watch assignment and resolution announcements as the two-
year lagged actual assignment and resolution announcements, respectively. The table presents the dynamic pattern of corporate financing (Panel A), investment 
(Panel B), and profitability (Panel C) from four quarters before to four quarters after the false watch period. Results are for firms with confirmed ratings 
(treatment firms) benchmarked against firms with downgraded ratings (control firms). The dynamic pattern is estimated based on the following regression 
specification 
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                                            , (1) 
where     is a financing, investment, or profitability measure;     is a set of control variables, which are: Ln(rating change + 1), Fallen angel, Ln(assets), Tobin's 
Q, and Tangibility; all variables are defined in Appendix A;         
 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters prior to the false watch 
period, where    1, 2, 3, or 4 quarters;        
 
 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the observation is   quarters after the false watch period, where    1, 2, 3, or 
4 quarters;           is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the credit watch is resolved with a rating confirmation;   indexes firms;   indexes time measured in 
calendar quarters;           are 38 SIC-based industry fixed effects;          are calendar quarter fixed effects; and                 are fiscal quarter fixed 
effects. Standard errors are clustered at the firm and calendar quarter levels. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. The baseline sample consists of 509 rating confirmations and 1,381 rating downgrades, for a total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions 
between 1992 and 2011. 
  Panel A: Financing 
Dependent variable 
Change in long-term 
debt ratio 
Equity issuance ratio 
Change in long-term 
financing ratio 
Change in short-term 
debt ratio 
 Change in cash 
holdings ratio 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
  Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
Before
4
 × Treatment -0.0084 -0.93 -0.0011 -0.29 -0.0085 -0.78 0.0071 1.39 -0.0082** -2.09 
Before
3
 × Treatment -0.0019 -0.27 -0.0009 -0.23 -0.0025 -0.30 0.0041 0.93 0.0013 0.44 
Before
2
 × Treatment -0.0022 -0.31 0.0005 0.12 -0.0021 -0.23 -0.0011 -0.33 -0.0018 -0.57 
Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0010 -0.69 -0.0020 -0.81 -0.0031 -0.32 0.0020 0.61 -0.0006 -0.35 
After
1
 × Treatment 0.0030 0.79 -0.0036 -1.02 -0.0015 -0.28 -0.0015 -0.40 -0.0054** -1.99 
After
2
 × Treatment -0.0021 -0.34 -0.0038 -0.98 -0.0058 -0.72 -0.0042 -0.94 -0.0043 -1.32 
After
3
 × Treatment -0.0089 -1.07 -0.0052 -1.30 -0.0129 -1.24 0.0038 0.59 -0.0068* -1.68 
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After
4
 × Treatment -0.0158 -1.55 -0.0062 -1.51 -0.0214* -1.74 0.0085 1.22 -0.0046 -1.37 
N 15,525 15,543 15,525 15,399 15,543 
Adjusted R
2
 0.081 0.127 0.110 0.063 0.055 
   Difference tests 
          
After
1
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment 0.0040 0.50 -0.0016 -0.48 0.0016 0.16 -0.0035 -0.90 -0.0048 -1.30 
After
2
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0011 -0.15 -0.0018 -0.53 -0.0028 -0.29 -0.0062 -1.58 -0.0037 -1.00 
After
3
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0079 -1.00 -0.0031 -0.94 -0.0098 -1.01 0.0018 0.47 -0.0061* -1.69 
After
4
 × Treatment - Before
1
 × Treatment -0.0148* -1.87 -0.0042 -1.25 -0.0183* -1.89 0.0064* 1.65 -0.0040 -1.08 
  Panel B: Investment         
Dependent variable 
Capital expenditures 
ratio 
PPE growth rate Asset growth rate 
    
 
[6] [7] [8] 
      Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
    Before4 × Treatment -0.0014 -0.40 -0.0203 -0.92 -0.0239 -1.07 
    Before3 × Treatment -0.0016 -0.49 -0.0108 -0.75 -0.0124 -0.81 
    Before2 × Treatment 0.0001 0.05 -0.0008 -0.06 -0.0040 -0.26 
    Before1 × Treatment -0.0007 -0.93 -0.0037 -0.44 0.0013 0.15 
    After1 × Treatment 0.0002 0.05 -0.0077 -0.43 -0.0120 -0.74 
    After2 × Treatment -0.0013 -0.47 -0.0247 -1.32 -0.0305 -1.54 
    After3 × Treatment -0.0030 -0.78 -0.0236 -1.05 -0.0260 -1.16 
    After4 × Treatment -0.0052 -1.57 -0.0407* -1.74 -0.0233 -1.12 
    N 14,868 15,534 15,543 
    Adjusted R2 0.463 0.093 0.126 
       Difference tests 
      
    After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment 0.0009 0.25 -0.0040 -0.22 -0.0132 -0.72 
    After2 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0006 -0.18 -0.0210 -1.16 -0.0317 -1.72 
    After3 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0023 -0.66 -0.0199 -1.10 -0.0273 -1.48 
    After4 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0045 -1.28 -0.0369** -2.04 -0.0245 -1.33 
   
  
  Panel C: Profitability         
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Dependent variable 
Operating income 
ratio 
Return on assets Return on equity 
    
 
[9] [10] [11] 
      Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat Coefficient t-Stat 
    Before4 × Treatment -0.0004 -0.11 0.0003 0.09 0.0082 0.80 
    Before3 × Treatment -0.0008 -0.28 -0.0001 -0.05 0.0108 1.28 
    Before2 × Treatment -0.0005 -0.15 -0.0021 -0.71 0.0024 0.30 
    Before1 × Treatment 0.0003 0.06 -0.0016 -0.75 0.0038 0.42 
    After1 × Treatment 0.0000 -0.01 0.0007 0.21 0.0022 0.17 
    After2 × Treatment -0.0014 -0.24 0.0020 0.62 0.0024 0.21 
    After3 × Treatment -0.0036 -0.74 0.0028 0.67 0.0010 0.06 
    After4 × Treatment -0.0017 -0.28 0.0032 0.63 0.0045 0.23 
    N 11,898 15,030 14,517 
    Adjusted R2 0.373 0.275 0.159 
       Difference tests 
      
    After1 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0003 -0.06 0.0023 0.53 -0.0017 -0.12 
    After2 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0017 -0.33 0.0036 0.83 -0.0015 -0.10 
    After3 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0039 -0.75 0.0044 1.02 -0.0029 -0.20 
    After4 × Treatment - Before1 × Treatment -0.0020 -0.38 0.0048 1.10 0.0007 0.05         
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Table 2.10. Propensity score matching. 
This table reports results based on a propensity score matching framework, which involves two stages. In the first stage, I 
run a probit regression to estimate propensity scores. The dependent variable is a dummy that equals one for firms with 
confirmed ratings (treatment firms) and zero for firms with downgraded ratings (control firms). The independent 
variables are: a dummy indicating non-investment grade status (Ba or lower), a dummy indicating the cash flow-
investment gap ratio is below its median value, a dummy indicating the G Index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) is 
below its median value, Ln(assets), Tobin’s Q, Tangibility, 38 SIC-based industry dummies, and calendar quarter 
dummies. In the second stage, I randomly match each treatment firm to a control firm with no replacement based on a 1% 
allowable absolute difference between propensity scores. The matching algorithm is optimized to maximize the number 
of propensity score matches. In this respect, the optimization algorithm retains the matches for treatment firms with the 
fewest possible number of matches first. The table compares the means of the changes in firm financing (Panel A), 
investment (Panel B), and profitability (Panel C) measures for matched treatment and control firms and reports difference 
tests. Changes in corporate fundamentals are computed from the quarter ending prior to the watch period (quarter 0) to up 
to four quarters subsequent to the watch period. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The superscripts *, **, and *** 
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The baseline sample consists of 1,381 rating 
downgrades and 509 rating confirmations, for a total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions between 1992 and 
2011. 
  
Quarters 
Matched treatment 
firms (N=250) 
Matched control 
firms (N=250) Treat. - Cont. t-Stat 
Panel A: Financing measures 
Change in long-term debt ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0443 0.0139 0.0304** 2.39 
Q2 - Q0 0.0617 0.0266 0.0351** 2.34 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0582 0.0191 0.0391** 2.52 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0514 0.0127 0.0387*** 2.61 
      Equity issuance ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0042 0.0012 0.0030 0.75 
Q2 - Q0 0.0041 0.0013 0.0028 0.75 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0043 -0.0004 0.0047 1.21 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0039 -0.0007 0.0046 1.28 
      Change in long-term financing ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0491 0.0154 0.0337** 2.44 
Q2 - Q0 0.0670 0.0296 0.0374** 2.29 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0647 0.0207 0.0440** 2.58 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0567 0.0137 0.0430*** 2.66 
      Change in short-term debt ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0018 0.0072 -0.0054 -0.70 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0053 0.0052 -0.0105 -1.21 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0124 0.0005 -0.0129 -1.44 
 
Q4 - Q0 -0.0156 -0.0100 -0.0056 -0.66 
      Change in cash holdings ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0085 -0.0005 0.0090** 2.12 
Q2 - Q0 0.0026 0.0043 -0.0017 -0.38 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0002 0.0058 -0.0056 -1.21 
  Q4 - Q0 -0.0005 0.0042 -0.0047 -1.04 
Panel B: Investment measures 
Capital expenditures ratio Q1 - Q0 -0.0009 -0.0051 0.0042* 1.77 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0020 -0.0083 0.0063** 2.28 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0020 -0.0108 0.0088*** 2.80 
 
Q4 - Q0 -0.0021 -0.0129 0.0108*** 3.12 
      PPE growth rate Q1 - Q0 0.0486 0.0070 0.0416* 1.66 
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Q2 - Q0 0.0896 0.0157 0.0739** 2.39 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0931 0.0148 0.0783** 2.48 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0791 0.0032 0.0759** 2.44 
      Asset growth rate Q1 - Q0 0.0623 -0.0026 0.0649*** 2.60 
Q2 - Q0 0.0970 0.0182 0.0788*** 2.72 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0894 0.0178 0.0716** 2.38 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0747 0.0063 0.0684** 2.27 
Panel C: Profitability measures 
Operating income ratio Q1 - Q0 -0.0044 -0.0225 0.0181*** 5.02 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0048 -0.0261 0.0213*** 5.19 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0011 -0.0224 0.0213*** 4.69 
 
Q4 - Q0 -0.0005 -0.0141 0.0136*** 2.66 
      Return on assets Q1 - Q0 -0.0040 -0.0203 0.0163*** 3.26 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0038 -0.0234 0.0197*** 3.50 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0029 -0.0236 0.0208*** 3.36 
 
Q4 - Q0 -0.0039 -0.0149 0.0110 1.63 
      Return on equity Q1 - Q0 -0.0070 -0.0662 0.0592*** 3.61 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0039 -0.0759 0.0720*** 3.83 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0009 -0.0883 0.0874*** 3.58 
  Q4 - Q0 -0.0071 -0.0538 0.0467* 1.69 
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Table 2.11. Switching regression with endogenous switching.  
This table compares the means of the actual and hypothetical changes in firm financing (Panel A), investment (Panel B), 
and profitability (Panel C) measures and reports the differences in means computed as in Eq. (B.10). The estimated 
hypothetical change in a firm fundamentals measure reflects what the change would be if the firm’s rating had been 
downgraded rather than confirmed. Changes in firm fundamentals are computed from the quarter ending prior to the 
watch period (quarter 0) to up to four quarters subsequent to the watch period. Variables are defined in Appendix A. The 
superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The baseline sample consists 
of 1,381 rating downgrades and 509 rating confirmations, for a total of 1,890 Moody’s issuer-level watch actions 
between 1992 and 2011. 
  
Quarters 
Actual change for  
treatment firms (N=234) 
Hypothetical change for  
counterfactuals (N=234) Act. - Hyp. t-Stat 
Panel A: Financing measures 
Change in long-term debt ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0480 0.0038 0.0442*** 3.48 
Q2 - Q0 0.0646 0.0228 0.0418*** 3.16 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0600 0.0297 0.0303** 2.23 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0512 0.0102 0.0411*** 3.76 
      Equity issuance ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0020 -0.0042 0.0062*** 2.83 
Q2 - Q0 0.0035 -0.0008 0.0043* 1.89 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0041 0.0020 0.0021 0.84 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0040 0.0028 0.0012 0.52 
      Change in long-term financing ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0503 -0.0001 0.0505*** 3.76 
Q2 - Q0 0.0692 0.0231 0.0461*** 3.23 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0646 0.0337 0.0309** 2.17 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0558 0.0159 0.0399*** 3.49 
      Change in short-term debt ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0007 0.0147 -0.0141* -1.66 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0079 -0.0008 -0.0070 -0.79 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0149 -0.0128 -0.0020 -0.22 
 
Q4 - Q0 -0.0162 -0.0054 -0.0108 -1.40 
      Change in cash holdings ratio Q1 - Q0 0.0095 -0.0007 0.0103*** 2.70 
Q2 - Q0 0.0041 -0.0008 0.0049 1.38 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0017 -0.0039 0.0022 0.67 
  Q4 - Q0 -0.0029 -0.0141 0.0111*** 2.92 
Panel B: Investment measures 
Capital expenditures ratio Q1 - Q0 -0.0051 -0.0067 0.0016 0.96 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0049 -0.0068 0.0018 1.11 
 
Q3 - Q0 -0.0033 -0.0069 0.0035* 1.88 
 
Q4 - Q0 -0.0022 -0.0068 0.0046** 2.24 
      PPE growth rate Q1 - Q0 0.0456 -0.0759 0.1215*** 5.64 
Q2 - Q0 0.0810 -0.0792 0.1603*** 6.63 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0814 -0.0655 0.1469*** 6.06 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0708 -0.0747 0.1456*** 6.43 
      Asset growth rate Q1 - Q0 0.0755 0.0319 0.0436** 2.17 
Q2 - Q0 0.1079 0.0444 0.0635*** 2.97 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0930 0.0586 0.0344 1.56 
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Q4 - Q0 0.0820 0.0391 0.0430* 1.96 
Panel C: Profitability measures 
Operating income ratio Q1 - Q0 -0.0045 -0.0244 0.0201*** 7.40 
Q2 - Q0 -0.0029 -0.0214 0.0185*** 6.41 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0016 -0.0185 0.0202*** 6.09 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0024 -0.0245 0.0269*** 7.83 
      Return on assets Q1 - Q0 0.0012 -0.0125 0.0139*** 4.24 
Q2 - Q0 0.0034 -0.0173 0.0208*** 5.39 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0025 -0.0106 0.0132*** 2.61 
 
Q4 - Q0 0.0026 -0.0102 0.0130*** 2.71 
      Return on equity Q1 - Q0 0.0086 -0.0402 0.0489*** 4.37 
Q2 - Q0 0.0162 -0.0622 0.0785*** 5.60 
 
Q3 - Q0 0.0221 -0.0313 0.0536** 2.58 
  Q4 - Q0 0.0245 -0.0769 0.1015*** 5.18 
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CHAPTER THREE: AMBIGUITY AVERSION AND THE INFLUENCE OF 
ANALYSTS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Investors face a large amount of information yet the way they interpret and respond to 
such information in financial markets is poorly understood. In particular, there is substantial 
evidence of anomalous heterogeneity in investors’ responses to the announcements of sell-side 
recommendation changes. Specifically, investors appear to be highly responsive only to select few 
recommendation changes. As documented by Loh and Stulz (2011), only 12% of recommendation 
changes are influential, implying that a typical recommendation change does not have a 
substantial identifiable impact on the stock price.
24
 For example, on April 9, 2012, BTIG’s Walter 
Piecyk downgraded Apple to neutral from buy rating, citing concerns about squeezing margins in 
the post-paid wireless industry; though the downgrade was widely covered in the media on that 
day, Apple’s stock price actually closed up $2.55, or 0.4%. In another example, however, when 
Barclays Capital’s Jeff Kvaal cut his rating on Nokia to equal weight from overweight on April 
13, 2012, Nokia’s shares lost $.21, or more than 5% of their market value on that day.25 
A close look at the analysts’ reports reveals key information that may well justify investors 
being highly responsive to the Nokia’s downgrade and hardly responsive to the Apple’s. Barclays 
Capital’s Jeff Kvaal writes: “[…] near term pressures are rising and are both clouding and 
lengthening this uncertain transition period. With this lack of visibility and what clearly will be 
another year of significant earnings declines, we downgrade Nokia to 2-Equal Weight/2-Neutral 
                                                          
24
 Loh and Stulz define a recommendation change as being influential if it satisfies two conditions. The first condition is 
that the event abnormal return has the same direction as the associated recommendation change. The second condition is 
that the recommendation change is statistically influential. That is, the absolute value of the associated event abnormal 
return is higher than      √     , where    is the residual standard deviation of stock daily returns against the three 
Fama–French factors in the three-month period prior to the recommendation change announcement. 
 
25
 The above examples are from the following articles:  “Even Apple Isn’t Immune to a Case of the Mondays”, by Paul 
Vigna, The Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2012; “Apple: BTIG Cuts to Hold; iPhone Subsidies Could Dry Up”, by Tiernan 
Ray, Barron’s, April 9, 2012; “Nokia: Barclays Cuts to Hold, $4 Target, on ‘Tougher Transition’”, by Tiernan Ray, 
Barron’s, April 13, 2012. 
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from a 1-Overweight […]” In contrast, BTIG’s Walter Piecyk writes: “We continue to maintain 
our view that Apple is the primary beneficiary of an accelerating growth trend in the global 
adoption of smartphones, considering global penetration of smartphones has not even reached 
30%”. What is clear from these statements is that Apple, despite its downgrade, is still perceived 
as a stable, growing company, whereas Nokia is viewed as a company with high ambiguity and 
low visibility. Ambiguity in the firm environment may influence the way investors interpret and 
respond to information signaled by analyst recommendation changes. 
This chapter investigates the implications of ambiguity in the firm environment for the 
influence of recommendation changes. Specifically, I present and empirically evaluate a theory of 
ambiguity that predicts a positive relation between ambiguity in the firm environment and the 
influence of recommendation changes. The main premise of the theory is that in ambiguous 
situations investors with ambiguity-averse preferences choose a worst-case scenario when they 
make decisions (Gilboa and Schmeidler, 1989). This assumption yields a range of empirical 
predictions, which I develop in Section 3.2. 
Ambiguity in the firm environment, as I define it, refers to the difficulty investors face in 
processing and acting on firm incomplete information. The nature of deviation from complete 
information defines the specific aspect of ambiguity in the firm environment. This chapter focuses 
on two distinct aspects of ambiguity in the firm environment. First, when information distortion 
primarily relates to missing relevant information that otherwise could never be known, investors 
perceive ambiguity in firm fundamentals (hereafter ambiguity in fundamentals, or AIF). More 
specifically, by AIF I mean the difficulty investors face in formulating prior beliefs about firm 
fundamentals due to lack of knowledge of nonexistent relevant information. At the decision time, 
the information investors possess is insufficient to make reasonably precise projections of a firm’s 
future cash flows because the future is yet to be created. They face significant indeterminacy of 
the future, perhaps due to possibility of structural change in the firm’s business model or 
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operating environment. In the examples above, Nokia’s investors perceive AIF in that they lack 
visibility on the future as the firm undergoes restructuring, the outcome of which is difficult to 
predict given the insufficient information available at the time. In contrast, Apple’s investors are 
more confident about the future because the information available at the decision time suggests 
that the firm is set to grow and capitalize on increasing global demand for smartphones. Second, 
when information distortion pertains to missing relevant information that otherwise could be 
known, investors perceive ambiguity in the firm information environment (hereafter ambiguity in 
information, or AII). The concept of AII pertains to cases in which a firm conveys information 
that is too sparse or imprecise for investors to correctly interpret, thereby facing difficulty in 
updating their prior beliefs in response to that information. In this case, the quality of information 
disclosed by the firm is at issue. Bad corporate governance, deficiencies in a firm’s information 
disclosure process, lack of earnings guidance or operational updates, or the complex nature of a 
firm’s business or operating environment are factors that may contribute to poor-quality 
information environments. In general, smaller firms, younger firms, or firms with lower analyst 
coverage release less information to the public, receive little media coverage, and attract less 
regulatory attention, thereby offering investors information environments of lower quality.
 26
  
Using a large sample of analyst recommendation changes between 1994 and 2010, I 
provide evidence that recommendation changes issued on higher AIF or higher AII firms are more 
influential ( the “mean effect” of ambiguity). Empirical proxies for AIF and AII are introduced in 
Section 3.2. I use the buy-and-hold abnormal return over a two-day period, day 0 (announcement 
day) to 1, to measure the influence of a recommendation change. After controlling for various 
analyst attributes and firm characteristics, I find that upgrades issued on higher AIF firms are 
associated with a buy-and-hold abnormal return that is higher by an economically large and 
                                                          
26
 The terminologies AIF and AII are due to Caskey (2009). The definitions above are inspired from Camerer and Weber 
(1992) and Dequech (2000). Camerer and Weber define ambiguity (equivalent to AII here) as follows: “Ambiguity is 
uncertainty about probability, created by missing information that is relevant and could be known.”  Dequech defines 
fundamental uncertainty (equivalent to AIF here) as follows: “[…] some information does not exist at the decision time 
because the future is yet to be created.”  
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statistically significant 117 bps. The effect of AII is also significant. I find that upgrades issued on 
higher AII firms are more influential by an amount ranging between 43 and 153 bps. In the 
subsample of downgrades, I find that the effect of AIF amounts to 211 bps and that of AII varies 
between 78 and 91 bps. All these effects are statistically significant at the 1% level.  
I further show that the positive relation between AII and the influence of recommendation 
changes is stronger for firms for which investors perceive higher levels of AIF (the “interaction 
effect” of ambiguity). In the subsample of high AIF firms, I find that the effect of AII is 
substantial, ranging between 77 (116) and 220 (151) bps in case of upgrades (downgrades). In 
contrast, if I condition on low AIF firms the effect of AII is weaker, varying between 19 (24) and 
109 (47) bps in case of upgrades (downgrades).  
Overall, my findings are consistent with the view that in situations of incomplete 
information the opinions of experts, such as analysts, should be extremely valuable to investors. 
Compared to an average investor, analysts are typically better able to explain firm business 
complexities notably when firm fundamentals are more uncertain; they also invest more effort in 
idiosyncratic information searches when public information is of uncertain quality (Mohanram 
and Sunder, 2006). The average investor may view information signaled by analysts as resolving 
some of the ambiguity in the firm environment and thus could be highly responsive to that 
information.  
Broadly speaking, this chapter contributes to the analyst literature by providing a novel 
behavioral explanation for anomalous heterogeneity in the influence of recommendation changes. 
After controlling for other relevant factors, I show that investors are much more responsive to 
recommendation changes when they perceive higher levels of ambiguity in the firm environment, 
a behavior consistent with ambiguity aversion in the equity market. Prior studies show that several 
analyst, firm, and recommendation characteristics affect the influence of recommendation 
changes. For instance, Stickel (1995) finds that recommendation changes are more informative if 
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they are stronger, of higher magnitude, accompanied by earnings forecasts, from reputable 
analysts or larger brokerage houses, or issued on smaller firms. Ivković and Jegadeesh (2004) 
demonstrate that upgrades are most informative in the week before earnings announcements, but 
they fail to find similar evidence for downgrades. Asquith, Mikhail, and Au (2005) provide 
evidence that the content of analyst reports, such as target price revision, affects the influence of 
recommendation changes. Jegadeesh and Kim (2010) document that stock price reaction is 
stronger for recommendations issued away from consensus. Using a novel methodology, Loh and 
Stulz (2011) provide a comprehensive summary of prior findings and show that recommendation 
changes are more likely to be influential if they are from reputable analysts, issued away from 
consensus, or issued on growth, small, high institutional ownership, or high earnings forecast 
dispersion firms. None of these studies attempts to relate the influence of recommendation 
changes to behavioral biases on the part of investors. 
Jiang, Lee, and Zhang (2005) and Zhang (2006) show that price continuation anomalies 
associated with earnings announcements and analyst earnings forecast revisions, respectively, are 
stronger among firms with higher information uncertainty, but they do not consider short-term 
returns or recommendation changes. Moreover, they do not make any distinction between AIF 
and AII, as their so-called information uncertainty simultaneously captures both aspects of 
ambiguity. In contrast, in this chapter I distinguish between AIF and AII and show that their 
interaction has a real effect on the influence of recommendation changes. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents a simple of 
model of information processing under ambiguity and introduces empirical proxies for variables 
of interest. Section 3.3 describes the sample formation process and presents descriptive statistics. 
Section 3.4 presents the main results. Section 3.5 conducts some robustness tests, and Section 3.6 
concludes the chapter. 
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3.2. Model and empirical proxies 
In this section, I present a simple model of information processing under both AIF and AII 
and discuss its empirical predictions. Next, I motivate and propose empirical proxies for both 
aspects of ambiguity. 
  
3.2.1. Model 
Ellsberg (1961) provides experimental evidence suggesting that agents face and dislike not 
only risk (known odds) but also ambiguity (unknown odds) in making decisions, implying that the 
observed preferences are inconsistent with the subjective expected utility (SEU) theory of Savage 
(1954). Specifically, SEU theory assumes that subjective probabilities are never unknown, 
whereas experimental evidence suggests that how much agents’ know about a state’s probability 
does influence their willingness to bet on the state (Camerer and Weber, 1992). Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989) propose an axiomatic foundation of the maxmin expected utility rule, which is 
compatible with the observed preferences emphasized by Ellsberg (1961). The rule implies that 
ambiguity-averse agents who perceive a set of priors in situations of incomplete information take 
into account the minimal expected utility over all priors when evaluating a bet. Put another way, 
they act as if they choose a worst-case prior when they make decisions. In what follows, I shall 
rely on this intuitive behavior and assume that ambiguity-averse investors make decisions based 
on the perception that a worst-case scenario reveals the true state of nature.  
The concept of AIF can be viewed as a situation in which ambiguity-averse investors are 
endowed with a set of priors about firm fundamentals and face difficulty in identifying a unique 
prior from this set with which to value the firm. Following Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), these 
investors typically act as if they select a worst-case prior from the perceived set of priors. It 
follows that they exhibit underconfidence in their prior beliefs about firm ambiguous 
fundamentals and thus act as if they underweight prior information about firm ambiguous 
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fundamentals and overweight new information signaled by a recommendation change. As a result, 
they respond more strongly to recommendation changes issued on high-AIF firms than to 
recommendation changes issued on other firms. 
Conceptually, one can view AII as a situation in which ambiguity-averse investors who 
observe a firm’s signal of uncertain quality perceive the precision of the signal to lie in a certain 
range, thereby facing difficulty in updating their prior beliefs in response to that signal. Following 
Epstein and Schneider (2008), it is assumed that these investors act as if they choose a worst-case 
assessment of quality when processing the ambiguous signal. It follows that they are 
underconfident about the quality of the signal and thus act as if they underweight information 
implied by that signal and overweight new information from analysts. If investors exhibit such 
behavior, they will be more responsive to recommendation changes issued on high-AII firms than 
to recommendation changes issued on other firms. 
Though AIF and AII refer, by definition, to distinct aspects of ambiguity, their 
implications for investors’ beliefs may not be as independent as they first appear. Ambiguity-
averse investors may well be more concerned about a firm’s quality of information when the 
firm’s fundamentals are perceived to be more ambiguous. For a firm with stable fundamentals, 
ambiguity-averse investors dislike information of uncertain quality, but not as much as they would 
if the firm’s fundamentals were perceived to be unstable. Hence, ambiguity-averse investors who 
process poor-quality information from firms with more ambiguous fundamentals may exhibit 
stronger underconfidence in the quality of that information and thus act as if they place too little 
weight on that information and overweight more information from analysts. As a result, they are 
more responsive to analyst recommendation changes issued on high AII firms when their 
fundamentals are perceived to be more ambiguous. Below, I formalize these conceptual views and 
derive the associated empirical predictions. 
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There are four dates,          . The economy has a representative investor, a 
representative analyst, a firm (risky asset), and a riskless asset. The investor is assumed to be 
ambiguity-averse and risk-neutral (for tractability). The riskless interest rate is assumed to be 
zero. All random variables are independent and normally distributed. Each share of the firm is a 
claim to a dividend  , which is revealed at date    . At date    , the dividend is 
  
     ,  (3.1) 
 
where   is the mean dividend, and   is the noise associated with the dividend and is normally 
distributed with mean zero and variance   ,    (    ). At date    , the ambiguity-averse 
investor lacks knowledge of nonexistent relevant information and thus perceives AIF.
27
 Formally, 
the mean dividend and the dividend volatility are perceived to lie in a set, (   )  [   ]  [   ], 
implying a perceived set of multiple priors over dividend outcomes. Following Gilboa and 
Schmeidler (1989), it is assumed that the investor acts as if he chooses a worst-case prior from the 
perceived set of priors. It follows that the selected prior has a worst-case mean dividend,  , and a 
worst-case dividend volatility,  . Hence, the investor believes in the prior    (   
 
). 
Intuitively, investor’s perception of AIF has two key effects on his prior beliefs. First, the investor 
acts as if he chooses the lower bound of the mean dividend perceived range, implying a 
pessimistic view on firm’s ambiguous fundamentals. Second, the investor is underconfident in his 
estimate of the mean dividend, as indicated by his choice of the upper bound of the dividend 
volatility perceived range (see Figure 3.1). 
                                                          
27
 For example, a structural change in a firm’s business leaves more room for speculation and makes it difficult for 
investors to make reasonably precise projections of the firm’s future cash flows. As a result, investors perceive the firm’s 
fundamentals to be ambiguous. 
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At date    , the firm discloses ambiguous news (e.g., a surprise announcement of an 
acquisition indicating a shift in the firm’s strategy without disclosing further details). Formally, 
the news is represented by a signal 
 
       ,  (3.2) 
 
where    is the noise associated with the signal and is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance   
 ,     (    
 ). The investor perceives AII because he does not know how to interpret 
the surprise news due to lack of supporting information. He is unsure about the quality of the 
signal and thus perceives the precision of the signal,    
 ⁄ , to lie in some range. Formally, the 
investor perceives a set of likelihoods of the signal   , that is,     (   
 
   
 ), where   
   
[  
    
 
], or    
 ⁄   [   
 ⁄     
 ⁄ ]. Following Epstein and Schneider (2008), the investor acts as 
if he selects a worst-case assessment of quality,    
 ⁄ , and thus believes in a worst-case 
likelihood,     (   
 
   
 
).28 This indicates that the investor is underconfident about the 
quality of the firm’s ambiguous signal. 
At date    , the representative analyst issues a recommendation change on the firm. 
Formally, the recommendation change is represented by a signal 
 
       ,  (3.3) 
 
where    is the noise associated with the signal and is normally distributed with mean zero and 
variance   
 ,     (    
 ). By assumption, there is no ambiguity about the quality of the signal    
                                                          
28
 Epstein and Schneider (2008) assume that a worst-case likelihood depends on the value of the ambiguous signal. As a 
result, investors respond more strongly to bad news than to good news. In contrast, here I assume that a worst-case 
likelihood is independent of the value of the ambiguous signal, so that the ambiguous signal is always interpreted as of 
lowest quality. My assumption is more consistent with the empirical evidence on the underreaction to both good and bad 
news from firms with high information uncertainty (see for example, Zhang, 2006). 
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because ambiguity, as I define it, stems from the difficulty the investor faces in processing and 
acting on distorted information disclosed by the firm only. Hence, the variance of the noise 
associated with this signal,   
 , is perceived to be constant. It follows that the investor believes in 
the likelihood     (   
 
   
 ). 
Now I turn to deriving prices at dates        . Because the ambiguity-averse investor is 
assumed to be risk-neutral and the riskless interest rate is assumed to be zero, the price of one 
share of the firm at each date satisfies 
 
    ( ),  (3.4.a) 
    (    ), (3.4.b) 
    (       ). (3.4.c) 
 
At date    , the dividend is revealed, and the firm’s share price is equal to its true mean 
dividend,    By standard rules for updating normal random variables (Anderson, 1984), 
 
    ,      (3.5.a) 
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  ,  (3.5.c) 
 
where    
 
(  
 
   
 )    
 
  
 .  
At date    , the firm’s share price equals the lower bound of the price (mean dividend) 
perceived range, implying that the investor exhibits pessimistic views about firm’s ambiguous 
fundamentals. This simple result emphasizes pessimism bias in investor’s prior beliefs as a key 
implication of his aversion to lack of knowledge of nonexistent relevant information (in the next 
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section, I shall use this intuition to motivate a proxy for AIF). At date    , the firm’s share price 
is a weighted average of the previous price,  , and the firm’s ambiguous signal,   . The weight 
associated with this signal is inversely related to investor’s underconfidence in the quality of the 
signal, as measured by   
 
 relative to   
 . At date    , the firm’s share price is a weighted 
average of the previous price,  , the firm’s ambiguous signal,   , and the analyst’s signal,   . The 
weight associated with the signal    is of particular interest. It is straightforward to show that it is 
increasing in investor’s underconfidence in his previous price estimate,  , as measured by  
 
 
relative to   , and increasing in his underconfidence in the quality of the firm’s ambiguous signal, 
as measured by   
 
 relative to   
 .
29
 It follows that the weight the investor places on the analyst’s 
signal equals the upper bound of its perceived range.  
Let    
      
,    
   ,    
   , and     be the weights associated with the analyst’s signal,   , 
under various ambiguity scenarios. These are defined as follows 
 
   
       
 
 
  
 
 
 
(  
 
   
 )   
 
  
 
,  (3.6.a) 
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 .  (3.6.d) 
 
By comparing these weights, one can infer the cross-sectional implications of ambiguity 
for the influence of the analyst’s signal. Tedious calculations (see Appendix C) show that 
 
                                                          
29
 This result holds provided that the analyst’s signal is not noise-free. That is, if the analyst’s signal is fully informative 
(    ) then its weight equals one. 
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         ,   (3.7.a) 
   
         ,   (3.7.b) 
(   
          
   )  (   
       )   , (3.7.c) 
 
and I thus have the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 1: 
1. The “mean” effect: Ambiguity-averse investors overweight analyst signals when they 
perceive either AIF or AII (3.7.a)-(3.7.b). 
2. The “interaction” effect: Ambiguity-averse investors who perceive AII overweight more 
analyst signals when firm fundamentals are perceived to be ambiguous (3.7.c). 
 
3.2.2. Empirical proxies 
This chapter proposes a novel measure of AIF and follows prior work in measuring AII. 
Because the perception of AIF pertains to investors’ beliefs, it cannot be directly observed and 
therefore can only be measured through its implications for the firm value. Based on the 
discussion from the previous section, investor’s lack of knowledge of nonexistent relevant 
information at the decision time has two key effects that should be accounted for in any empirical 
proxy for AIF. First, the ambiguity-averse investor perceives the firm’s share price,   , to lie in 
the range [   ]. Intuitively, the more severe the deviation from complete information, the higher 
the uncertainty the investor faces and the more diffuse the price range he perceives. That is, with 
higher fundamental uncertainty, the investor perceives   and   to be lower and higher, 
respectively, indicating higher uncertainty with respect to the firm’s value. In the cross-section of 
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firms, the ratio 
   
 
 is likely to capture such an effect.
30
 Second, the investor is pessimistic about 
firm’s ambiguous fundamentals. This is a direct implication of the intuitive assumption that this 
investor acts as if he selects a worst-case prior when he perceives a set of multiple priors he has to 
choose from. Pessimism bias in investor’s beliefs causes the firm’s share price,   , to trade at a 
low level,  . Empirically, one would expect that the more severe the investor’s pessimism bias, 
the closer the price to this low level. To measure this effect in the cross-section of firms, I propose 
the ratio 
    
   
.
31
 Because both ratios capture distinct, key implications of AIF that should be 
reflected in any successful empirical proxy, I multiply them to yield the measure 
    
 
. This 
measure reaches its highest value when      and attains its lowest value (zero) when     . 
Obviously, the high and low prices,   and  , pertain to investor’s beliefs and thus can 
never be observed. Nevertheless, one can employ salient reference points from the price history as 
empirical proxies for these perceived prices. It is natural to consider a stock’s 52-week high and 
low prices as empirical proxies for   and  .32 After all, these salient prices are widely publicized 
in the financial media and may well be used by investors as reference prices in formulating 
beliefs.
33
 Formally, my empirical proxy for AIF is a stock price’s nearness to its 52-week low, or 
N52WL, which is defined as  
 
        (          )       ⁄ ,  (3.8) 
                                                          
30
 I scale the perceived price difference by   to make the final measure comparable across firms. 
 
31
 The ratio equals one when      and zero when     . 
 
32
 Unreported results show that all findings hold, irrespective of the choice of either six-month or two-year high and low 
prices as empirical proxies for   and  . 
 
33
 Prior literature provides ample evidence on the importance of the 52-week high and low prices in investment decision 
making. For instance, George and Hwang (2004) show that a stock price’s nearness to its 52-week high drives profits 
from momentum investing; Huddart, Lang, and Yetman (2009) find that trading volume increases when stock prices 
cross either their 52-week highs or lows; Baker, Pan, and Wurgler (2012) provide evidence that the target’s 52-week high 
price acts as a psychological reference point in mergers and acquisitions. 
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where   is the calendar month prior to the announcement of a recommendation change;     is 
stock  ’s price observed at the end of month ; and        and        are stock  ’s  52-
week high and low prices, respectively, determined from the 52-week period prior to the end of 
month . 
I follow prior literature and employ the reciprocal of firm size, reciprocal of analyst 
coverage, and reciprocal of firm age as empirical proxies for AII (Hirshleifer, 2001; Jiang, Lee, 
and Zhang, 2005; Zhang, 2006; Autore, Billingsley, and Schneller, 2009). It seems plausible that 
smaller firms offer investors information environments of lower quality. Since information 
production costs are typically fixed, small firms are likely to produce less information than large 
firms. Firm size (ME) is measured as the market capitalization (in millions of dollars) at the end of 
month  . I also use the reciprocal of firm age as a proxy for AII. Compared to old firms, young 
firms release less information to the public, receive little media coverage, and attract less 
regulatory attention, thereby offering investors information environments of lower quality. Firm 
age (AGE) is defined as the number of quarters between the first time a firm’s stock appears in 
CRSP and month  . I also employ the reciprocal of analyst coverage as a proxy for AII because 
analysts are typically reluctant to cover firms with poor-quality information environments. As a 
result, investors are likely to receive little information from firms with lower analyst coverage and 
thus face higher information uncertainty. Analyst coverage (ACOV) is defined as the total number 
of analysts following a firm during the 12-month period prior to the end of month . As noted by 
Zhang (2006), each empirical proxy might also capture other effects, thereby confounding any 
inferences. Nonetheless, when these proxies are taken together, they have the common ability to 
capture information uncertainty. 
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3.3. Sampling procedure and descriptive statistics 
This section describes the sample formation process, presents the features of sample 
recommendation changes, and discusses descriptive statistics of variables of interest. 
 
3.3.1. Sample formation 
The sample of analyst recommendations is from the Thompson Reuters Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimate System (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations File. Thompson Reuters 
receives different wordings from different brokerage firms but then translates them into numerical 
scores on the following scale: strong buy = 1, buy = 2, hold = 3, sell = 4, and strong sell = 5. To 
construct my sample, I select all valid recommendations from 1993 (inception) to 2010. Valid 
recommendation data consist of recommendations issued on common equity for which the 
activation dates, ACTDATS, and review dates, REVDATS, are subsequent to the announcement 
dates, ANNDATS; the analyst identification code, AMASKCD, and the firm identification codes, 
TICKER and CUSIP, are not missing; and recommendation levels are between one and five. 
To construct recommendation changes, I follow Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) 
and code ratings as follows: the first time an analyst issues a recommendation on a given firm in 
I/B/E/S is an initiation.
34
 Following recommendations are categorized as either outstanding or 
non-outstanding. Outstanding recommendations are those that are not stopped by the brokerage 
firm and for which no more than 12 months have elapsed since the previous recommendation was 
confirmed.
35
 Outstanding recommendations are further broken down into upgrades, downgrades, 
and reiterations. Non-outstanding recommendations are coded as reinitiations. Ultimately, only 
                                                          
34
 One key difference, though, between my sample construction procedure and that described in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and 
Marston (2009) is as follows: they define a recommendation change at the level of broker/firm pairs, whereas I define a 
recommendation change at the level of analyst/firm pairs. Since analysts may be employed by a new broker at any given 
point in time, it seems more appropriate to define a recommendation change at the level of analyst/firm rather than 
broker/firm pairs.   
 
35
 I use the review date, REVDATS, of the previous recommendation for the confirmation status and the I/B/E/S stop file, 
RECDSTP, to check for broker scale changes and suspensions/terminations of broker coverage. 
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upgrades and downgrades announced between 1994 and 2010 are retained in the sample. By 
construction, an upgrade’s (downgrade’s) magnitude ranges between one and four (-4 and -1). 
Following prior studies, I apply two screens to the sample of recommendation changes to 
minimize potential confounding effects. Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2008) attribute 
recommendation change clustering to firm-specific news. Welch (2000) argues that analysts herd 
based on little information. In either case, it is important to insulate the sample from data 
clustering biases. For a given firm, I ensure that any upgrade (downgrade) that is preceded by 
another upgrade (downgrade) in the two previous trading days is excluded from the sample. 
Altinkiliç and Hansen (2009) argue that analyst recommendation changes do not have a material 
market reaction once corporate announcements are removed. To minimize the effects of firm-
specific news, I drop any recommendation change that is preceded by an earnings announcement 
in the two previous trading days. After both data screens are applied, the sample consists of 
84,140 upgrades and 96,721 downgrades. 
Finally, I merge the refined sample of recommendation changes with other variables 
(defined in Appendix D) constructed based on data from several sources. Stock data are from 
CRSP, accounting information is from Compustat, data on institutional ownership are from 
Thompson Reuters, and information on analyst affiliation is from the SDC database. The merged 
final sample retains only recommendation changes for which stock returns and the main empirical 
proxies for ambiguity are not missing. The merged final sample consists of 62,242 upgrades and 
71,507 downgrades. 
For a sample recommendation change   issued on a stock  , I compute a two-day buy-and-
hold abnormal return as  
 
     (   )  ∏(      )
 
   
 ∏(      
    ) 
 
   
         (   ) 
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where      is the raw return on stock   on day   and     
     is the date-  raw return on a benchmark 
portfolio with comparable size, book-to-market, and momentum characteristics as stock   (Daniel, 
Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers, 1997, hereafter DGTW).
36
 Then, an average two-day buy-and-
hold abnormal return is calculated as  
 
     (   )  
 
 
∑     
 
   
(   )                (    ) 
 
where   equals the number of recommendation changes. 
 
3.3.2. Sample features 
Panel A of Table 3.1 shows the transition frequencies of recommendation changes. 
Analyst recommendations are highly optimistic, with strong buy, buy, and hold recommendations 
making up the largest percentage of sample recommendations (more than 90%).
37
 Furthermore, 
transition frequencies are strikingly high within these three recommendation categories. For 
example, among prior hold recommendations, 34.8% are upgraded to current strong buy, 46% are 
upgraded to current buy recommendations, and less than 20% are downgraded to current sell or 
strong sell recommendations.  
Panel B of Table 3.1 presents the distribution of recommendation changes according to 
their direction and magnitude. The distribution appears to be symmetric in that recommendation 
changes with higher magnitude are less frequent in both directions. The one-notch and two-notch 
recommendation changes make up more than 98% of the total number of sample recommendation 
                                                          
36
 In unreported results, I compute an average three-day buy-and-hold abnormal return, from day -1 to 1, and find that my 
conclusions about the effects of AIF and AII remain unchanged. 
 
37
 (30,536+36,587+54,807)/133,749=91.16%. 
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changes, which is consistent with the view that analysts strongly favor gradual diffusion of 
information.
38
 
 
3.3.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 presents descriptive statistics for variables of interest: an event two-day buy-
and-hold abnormal return (BHAR(0,1)), a stock price’s nearness to its 52-week low (N52WL), firm 
size (ME), firm analyst coverage (ACOV), and firm age (AGE). Panel A (B) shows results for the 
subsample of upgrades (downgrades). The results indicate that event BHARs are consistent with 
the direction of recommendation changes, but they are also highly asymmetric. For example, 
upgrade BHARs have a mean of 2.12% and a median of 1.28%, indicating a positive skewness in 
the distribution. They are also volatile as indicated by the standard deviation of 6.80%. By 
construction, the measure N52WL is bounded by zero from below and unbounded from above. Its 
mean is slightly higher in the subsample of downgrades (0.996 versus 0.783), implying that 
downgrades are on average more likely than upgrades to be issued on stocks whose prices are 
close to their 52-week lows. The mean ME in the subsample of upgrades (8,427 $m) is higher 
than that in the subsample of downgrades (7,348.4 $m), suggesting that analysts tend to upgrade 
rather than downgrade large firms. On average, about nine analysts cover both upgraded and 
downgraded firms. Not surprisingly, upgraded firms are on average older than downgraded firms 
(81.48 quarters versus 75.90 quarters).      
Table 3.3 reports the Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the diagonal) 
correlations for the main variables. Panels A and B show that the influence of both upgrades and 
downgrades, as measured by BHARs, is higher for smaller firms, younger firms, firms with lower 
analyst coverage, or firms whose stock prices are closer to their 52-week lows.  Moreover, the 
three measures ME, ACOV, and AGE appear to be highly positively correlated. For example using 
                                                          
38
 (45,553+24,735+40,691+20,751)/133,749=98.49%. 
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Spearman correlations in the subsample of upgrades (Panel A), the correlations between ME on 
one hand and ACOV and AGE on the other hand are 0.636 and 0.475, respectively, implying that 
these measures capture common firm characteristics. I can also draw a similar conclusion from 
the subsample of downgrades in Panel B. 
 
3.4. Ambiguity aversion and the influence of recommendation changes 
The general idea of this chapter is that ambiguity-averse investors overweight analyst 
signals when they perceive higher levels of ambiguity in the firm environment. I focus on two 
aspects of ambiguity in the firm environment: the ambiguity aspect that emerges from lack of 
knowledge of nonexistent relevant information and that manifests itself through the difficulty 
investors face in formulating prior beliefs about firm fundamentals, or AIF; and the ambiguity 
aspect that pertains to the difficulty investors face in processing firm information of uncertain 
quality, or AII. I empirically evaluate this central idea using several tests and proxies for 
ambiguity. First, I test the effects of each aspect of ambiguity separately (the “mean” effect). 
Second, I investigate the implications of AII when firm fundamentals are perceived to be more or 
less ambiguous (the “interaction” effect).  
 
3.4.1. The “mean” effect 
Ambiguity-averse investors overweight analyst signals when they perceive higher levels of 
either AIF or AII. As a result, this chapter’s first main hypothesis states that recommendation 
changes issued on higher AIF or higher AII firms are more influential. The two empirical 
predictions implied by this hypothesis are: (1) recommendation changes issued on firms whose 
stock prices are closer to their 52-week lows are associated with higher magnitude of event 
abnormal returns, and (2) recommendation changes issued on smaller firms, younger firms, or 
firms with lower analyst coverage are associated with higher magnitude of event abnormal 
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returns. This section conducts several tests of these predictions. First, I present results of 
univariate tests. Second, I conduct regressions of event BHARs on ambiguity measures, allowing 
for the effects of other relevant factors. 
Table 3.4 presents event ABHARs across ambiguity quintiles formed based on the 
measures N52WL, reciprocal of ME, reciprocal of ACOV, or reciprocal of AGE. This table 
provides consistent evidence that recommendation changes in the highest ambiguity quintile are 
much more influential than those in the lowest ambiguity quintile. In particular, recommendation 
changes issued on high-AIF stocks are about three times as influential as those issued on low-AIF 
stocks. For example, in Panel B of Table 3.4, downgrades issued on stocks whose prices are 
closest to their 52-week lows are associated with an event ABHAR equal to -4.06%, whereas 
downgrades issued on stocks whose prices are closest to their 52-week highs are associated with 
an event ABHAR equal to only -1.19%. Moreover, irrespective of the direction of recommendation 
changes and the choice of empirical proxies for AII, Table 3.4 shows that recommendation 
changes issued on high-AII stocks are more influential than those issued on low-AII stocks. For 
example, in Panel A of Table 3.4, upgrades issued on smallest firms are more influential than 
those issued on largest firms by about 2.38%.      
In Table 3.5, I investigate the effects of ambiguity measures on event BHARs in a 
multivariate setting. To examine these effects while controlling for other relevant factors that 
could influence event BHARs, I employ the specification 
 
     (   )               (     )                (     )          
        (     )                 (     )                  (3.11) 
 
The dependent variable is the BHAR(0,1) associated with a recommendation change  . The 
explanatory variables of interest are        (     )      ,       (     )      , 
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        (     )      , and        (     )      . These are dummy variables 
indicating that the measures      , reciprocal of   , reciprocal of     , and reciprocal of 
    are above their respective 70th percentiles. Hence,        (     )       is designed 
to capture high levels of AIF, whereas       (     )      ,         (     )      , 
and        (     )       are constructed to measure high levels of AII. If investors are 
more responsive to recommendation changes when they perceive higher levels of both aspects of 
ambiguity, then one would expect the coefficients   ,   ,   , and    to be significantly positive in 
the subsample of upgrades and negative in the subsample of downgrades. To put an accurate 
interpretation on these coefficients, I should control for moderate levels of ambiguity. The vector 
  in Equation (3.11) includes the control variables        (           )      ,   
    (           )      ,         (           )      , and        (       
    )      . For example,        (           )       is a dummy variable 
indicating the measure N52WL is above its 30th and below its 70th percentile. Other dummy 
variables are constructed in the same way. Hence, by including these control variables the 
coefficients   ,   ,   , and    can be interpreted as the incremental effects of high relative to low 
ambiguity on the influence of recommendation changes.  
The vector   also includes a battery of control variables that may contribute to the 
influence of recommendation changes. These are: a book-to-market ratio (BM), price momentum 
(MOM), institutional ownership (IO), the natural logarithm of analyst experience (Ln(AEXP)), an 
analyst affiliated dummy (AFF dummy), an analyst independent dummy (IND dummy), 
recommendation deviation from consensus (DC), magnitude of a recommendation change (MAG), 
a Regulation Fair Disclosure dummy (FD dummy), and a Global Research Analyst Settlement 
dummy (GS dummy). These variables are defined in Appendix D. To draw correct statistical 
inferences, I address simultaneous residual correlations over time and across firms. Following 
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Petersen (2009), I include calendar year dummies in all regressions and estimate standard errors 
clustered at the firm level.
39
  
Panel A of Table 3.5 shows the estimation results of several versions of Equation (3.11) in 
the subsample of upgrades. The results consistently show that high levels of ambiguity are 
associated with substantially greater influence of upgrades. In specification [1], upgrades issued 
on stocks whose prices are closest to their 52-week lows (high-AIF stocks) are more influential 
than those issued on stocks whose prices are closest to their 52-week highs (low-AIF stocks) by 
179 bps (       ). In specification [2], the results suggest that upgrades issued on high-AII 
stocks are more influential than those issued on low-AII stocks. For example, relative to upgrades 
issued on large firms, those issued on small firms are more influential by 194 bps (       ). 
Specification [3] shows the estimation results for the full version of Equation (3.11). All 
coefficients of proxies for high ambiguity are both economically and statistically significant. For 
example, a stock price’s nearness to its 52-week low increases the influence of upgrades by 117 
bps  (       ). The effects of the three proxies for high AII are also significant, but the size-
based proxy appears to have the strongest economic effect. Indeed, upgrades issued on small firms 
are more influential than those issued on large firms by 153 bps (       ).  
The coefficients of the control variables generally take on the expected signs, but their 
economic and statistical significance appears to be mitigated by the inclusion of proxies for high 
ambiguity. To illustrate, consider specification [3]. Although BM, MOM, IO, and Ln(AEXP) are 
positively correlated with event BHARs, their effects are neither statistically nor economically 
significant. The coefficients on analyst dummies suggest that upgrades from affiliated analysts 
increase event BHARs by 61 bps (      ), whereas upgrades from independent analysts 
decrease event BHARs by 98 bps (        ). The coefficients on DC and MAG imply that the 
more an upgrade deviates from consensus or the higher its magnitude, the more it is influential. 
                                                          
39
 I do not report the coefficients of the year dummies here. 
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Finally, the coefficient of FD dummy is insignificant, whereas the coefficient of GS dummy is 110 
bps (      ). 
Panel B of Table 3.5 shows similar evidence on the positive relation between high 
ambiguity and the influence of recommendation changes in the subsample of downgrades. 
Focusing on specification [3], downgrades issued on stocks whose prices are closest to their 52-
week lows (high-AIF stocks) are associated with event BHARs that are relatively higher in 
magnitude by 211 bps (        ). Relative to downgrades issued on low-AII stocks, those 
issued on high-AII stocks are substantially more influential. For example, downgrades issued on 
stocks with lowest analyst coverage are more influential than those issued on stocks with highest 
analyst coverage by 81 bps (       ). The effects of size-based and age-based AII proxies are 
also in the same direction with comparable economic significance. 
Focusing on the effects of control variables, the coefficient of BM is insignificant. The 
coefficients on MOM, IO, and Ln(AEXP) suggest that downgrades issued on high-momentum 
stocks, downgrades issued on higher institutional ownership stocks, or downgrades from more 
experienced analysts are more influential. As expected, the coefficients on analyst dummies imply 
that downgrades from affiliated analysts are more influential by 107 bps (       ), whereas 
downgrades from independent analysts are less influential by 143 bps (      ). The 
coefficients of recommendation characteristic variables take on the expected signs. Downgrades 
issued away from consensus or downgrades of higher magnitude are more influential. 
Downgrades issued after Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect are less influential by 57 bps 
(      ), whereas those issued after the enactment of the Global Research Analyst Settlement 
are more influential by 103 bps (       ). 
The general picture that emerges from these results is that investors are much more 
responsive to recommendation changes when they perceive higher levels of ambiguity in the firm 
environment. The evidence holds for both aspects of ambiguity irrespective of the direction of 
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recommendation changes and persists even after controlling for other relevant factors, such as 
deviation from consensus and stock price momentum.  
 
3.4.2. The “interaction” effect 
I argue that the degree to which AII affects the influence of analyst signals will vary in a 
predictable manner across firms with differing levels of AIF. Ambiguity-averse investors may 
well be more concerned about the uncertain-quality of firm signals when they perceive firm 
fundamentals to be more ambiguous and thus place too little weight on firm signals and 
overweight more analyst signals. As a result, the second main hypothesis of this chapter emerges: 
recommendation changes issued on high-AII firms are more influential when their fundamentals 
are perceived to be more ambiguous. The empirical prediction that follows is that 
recommendation changes issued on small firms, young firms, or firms with low analyst coverage 
are associated with higher magnitude of event ABHARs when their stock prices are closer to their 
52-week lows. In what follows, I conduct both univariate and multivariate analyzes testing this 
empirical prediction. 
In Table 3.6, I use a double sort procedure and divide the sample into low-, moderate-, and 
high-AIF firm groups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of N52WL and further divide each of 
these groups into low-, moderate-, and high-AII firm subgroups based on the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of either the reciprocal of ME (Panel A), reciprocal of ACOV (Panel B), or reciprocal 
of AGE (Panel C). I find that irrespective of the direction of recommendation changes and the 
choice of empirical proxies for AII, the difference in influence between recommendation changes 
issued on high-AII firms and those issued on low-AII firms generally increases with AIF. For 
example, when I use the reciprocal of ACOV as a proxy for AII (Panel B), the magnitude of this 
difference increases from 0.83% to 1.94% in the case of upgrades and from 0.66% to 1.57% in the 
case of downgrades as AIF increases from a low to high level. Moreover, Table 3.6 also shows 
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that, in all cases, recommendation changes issued on high-AIF, high-AII firms are about four 
times as influential as those issued on low-AIF, low-AII firms. For example, when I use the 
reciprocal of AGE as a proxy for AII (Panel C), upgrades (downgrades) issued on high-AIF, high-
AII firms are associated with an event ABHAR equal to 3.84% (-4.51%) compared with only 1% 
(-0.94%) for upgrades (downgrades) issued on low-AIF, low-AII firms. 
Table 3.7 mainly answers how the relation between AII and the influence of 
recommendation changes varies with AIF after other relevant factors are controlled for. I divide 
the sample into low-, moderate-, and high-AIF firm subsamples based on the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of N52WL, and for each of these subsamples I estimate the specification 
 
     (   )              (     )                  (     )          
       (     )                 (3.12) 
 
This specification is similar to that in Equation (3.11), except for here I exclude the 
variables        (     )       and        (           )      . All variables 
included in Equation (3.12) are defined as before (see Appendix D). If investors are more 
responsive to recommendation changes issued on high-AII firms when their fundamentals are 
perceived to be more ambiguous, one would expect the coefficients   ,   , and    to increase in 
magnitude with AIF. Specifically, I expect these coefficients to be more positive in the subsample 
of upgrades and more negative in the subsample of downgrades among higher AIF firms. 
Table 3.7 shows estimation results of the above specification and provides unequivocal 
evidence that the positive relation between AII and the influence of recommendation changes is 
weakest when AIF is perceived to be lowest and strongest when AIF is perceived to be highest. 
This main conclusion holds irrespective of the direction of recommendation changes and the 
choice of empirical proxies for AII. For example, in Panel B of Table 3.7, regression [1] (low-AIF 
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firm subsample) suggests that downgrades issued on smaller firms, downgrades issued on firms 
with lower analyst coverage, and downgrades issued on younger firms are more influential by 
only 43 (       ), 47 (       ), and 24 bps (       ), respectively. In contrast, 
regression [3] (high-AIF firm subsample) shows that downgrades issued on smaller firms, 
downgrades issued on firms with lower analyst coverage, and downgrades issued on young firms 
are more influential by 116 (       ), 151 (       ), and 147 bps (       ), 
respectively.  
These results have an intuitive interpretation: when ambiguity-averse investors are 
uncertain about the quality of firm information, their uncertainty scales with more ambiguous 
fundamentals. Because these investors dislike uncertainty, they exhibit stronger underconfidence 
in the quality of firm information and thus act as if they underweight more that information and 
overweight more analyst information. As a result, they are more responsive to recommendation 
changes issued on firms with poor-quality information environments when their fundamentals are 
perceived to be more ambiguous. 
 
3.5. Robustness tests 
This section presents results of several robustness tests. First, I consider an alternative 
definition for influence of recommendation changes. Second, I examine the implications of 
differences in investors’ opinions for the influence of recommendation changes. Third, I 
investigate whether the measure N52WL is related to recommendation deviation from consensus 
or stock price prior performance.  
 
3.5.1. Loh and Stulz’s (2011) definition of influence of a recommendation change 
Table 3.8 shows the proportions of influential recommendation changes across AIF/AII 
firm subgroups. These proportions are calculated as follows. First, following Loh and Stulz 
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(2011), I classify a recommendation change as influential if the associated event BHAR(0,1) is 
both in the correct direction and statistically significant. An event BHAR(0,1) is classified as 
statistically significant if it satisfies the condition      (   )       √    , where    is 
the residual standard deviation of stock daily returns against the three Fama–French factors in the 
three-month period prior to the end of month  .40 Second, I use a double sort procedure and 
divide the sample into low-, moderate-, and high-AIF firm groups based on the 30th and 70th 
percentiles of N52WL and further divide each of these groups into low-, moderate-, and high-AII 
firm subgroups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of either the reciprocal of ME (Panel A), 
reciprocal of ACOV (Panel B), or reciprocal of AGE (Panel C). Third, I compute for each AIF/AII 
firm subgroup the proportion of influential recommendation changes as the number of influential 
recommendation changes scaled by the total number of recommendation changes within that 
subgroup. 
Table 3.8 consistently shows that the proportion of influential recommendation changes 
among high-AIF, high-AII firms is substantially higher than that among low-AIF, low-AII firms. I 
can draw this conclusion regardless of the direction of recommendation changes and the choice of 
empirical proxies for AII. For example, using the reciprocal of ACOV as a proxy for AII (Panel 
B), the proportion of influential upgrades (downgrades) issued on high-AIF, high-AII firms is 
17.51% (17.53%) compared with only 9.22% (8.97%) for upgrades (downgrades) issued on low-
AIF, low-AII firms. I note that the proportions of influential recommendation changes across 
AIF/AII firm subgroups seem to be low, ranging roughly between 8% and 17%. Nevertheless, this 
range is quite comparable with Loh and Stulz’s (2011) finding that only 12% of recommendation 
changes are influential. The influence test adopted here is somewhat stringent in that it requires a 
recommendation change to move the stock price by roughly 2.77 daily standard deviations in the 
                                                          
40
 To estimate idiosyncratic volatility, I require a minimum of 50 trading days. The daily idiosyncratic volatility estimate 
is scaled by √  since the event BHAR(0,1) is computed over a two-day event window. Here 1.96 is the critical value from 
a normal distribution with a 5% significance level. 
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right direction over a two-day period. According to a normal distribution, however, such event 
can occur with only 2.5% probability. Hence, on a relative basis, an influence probability of 17% 
is quite large and suggests that recommendation changes issued on high-AIF, high-AII firms are 
likely to have to a large identifiable impact on their stock prices. 
 
3.5.2. Divergence in investors’ opinions and the influence of recommendation changes 
Prior studies investigate the implications of differences of investors’ opinions for stock 
prices and post-earnings announcement drifts (Diether, Malloy, and Scherbiba, 2002; Anderson, 
Harris, and So, 2007) as well as for takeover announcement characteristics (Moeller, 
Schlingemann, and Stulz, 2007; Chatterjee, John, and Yan, 2012). Diether, Malloy, and Scherbiba 
(2002) contend that dispersion in earnings forecasts is a reasonable proxy for differences of 
opinion among investors. Recently, Loh and Stulz (2011) find that recommendation changes 
issued on firms with higher dispersion in earnings forecasts are more influential. Unlike Loh and 
Stulz, I go one step further and investigate whether the positive relation between differences of 
investors’ opinions and the influence of recommendation changes is stronger when public 
information is of lower quality. 
I argue that for firms with information environments of uncertain quality differences in 
investors’ opinions could exacerbate the influence of recommendation changes. When opinions 
diverge in a poor-quality information environment, optimists would overestimate the quality of 
good news and underestimate the quality of bad news. Pessimists, on the other hand, would do 
exactly the opposite. Hence, trading will likely generate high volume but also little returns as 
optimists do not take bad news seriously and pessimists tend to discount good news, resulting in 
underreaction to both good and bad news. As new information from analysts arrives, these 
investors update their beliefs in the direction implied by that information: optimists take less 
optimistic views following downgrade announcements, and pessimists become less pessimistic 
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after upgrade announcements. As a result, one would expect investors with divergent views to be 
more responsive to both upgrades and downgrades as they update their beliefs in the right 
direction. 
Like Diether, Malloy, and Scherbiba (2002), I employ dispersion in earnings forecasts 
(FDISP) to proxy for divergence in investors’ opinions.41 I estimate FDISP as the standard 
deviation of analyst annual EPS forecasts (a minimum of three forecasts) submitted any time 
during the three-month period prior to the end of month  , scaled by the stock price as of the end 
of this period. If an analyst makes more than one forecast during the three-month period, only the 
last forecast is used in my calculations. 
In Table 3.9, I use a double sort procedure and divide the sample into low-, moderate-, and 
high-AII firm groups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of either the reciprocal of ME (Panel 
A), reciprocal of ACOV (Panel B), or reciprocal of AGE (Panel C), and further divide each of 
these groups into low-, moderate-, and high-divergence firm subgroups based on the 30th and 
70th percentiles of FDISP. I find that for any given level of AII divergence in investors’ opinions 
increases the influence of recommendation changes. Moreover, the increase in influence is 
notably higher among high- than low-AII firms. For example, in Panel C of Table 3.9, the 
difference in influence between upgrades issued on young, high-divergence firms and those issued 
on young, low- divergence firms is equal 1.41% compared with only 0.62% as the difference in 
influence between upgrades issued on old, high-divergence firms and those issued on old, low-
divergence firms. Hence, differences of investors’ opinions raise the influence of recommendation 
changes, but such an effect is stronger among firms with information environments of lower 
quality. 
 
                                                          
41
 In unreported results, I also obtain similar evidence when I use idiosyncratic volatility as an alternative proxy for 
divergence in investors’ opinions. 
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3.5.3. Is the measure N52WL related to deviation from consensus or momentum effects? 
In this section, I investigate whether the measure N52WL captures other effects, such as 
those related to recommendation deviation from consensus or stock price prior performance. It is 
natural to ask whether the positive relation between N52WL and the influence of recommendation 
changes is driven by recommendation deviation from consensus: if investors recognize that 
certain recommendation changes do not add information and simply move toward consensus, they 
will rationally respond less to these recommendation changes than to those that deviate from 
consensus (Jegadeesh and Kim, 2010). In unreported results, I find that the correlation between 
N52WL and DC is positive in the subsample of upgrades and negative in the subsample of 
downgrades. This implies that upgrades (downgrades) moving toward consensus are more likely 
to be issued when the price is near its 52-week high (low). Thus, if deviation from consensus 
drives the positive relation between N52WL and the influence of recommendation changes, one 
would expect investors to respond less strongly to upgrades issued on stocks with prices near their 
52-week highs and to downgrades issued on stocks with prices near their 52-week lows. However, 
the univariate evidence is at odds with this joint prediction since, in particular, downgrades issued 
on stocks with prices near their 52-week lows are the most influential when compared to other 
downgrades (Panel B of Table 3.4). 
Alternatively, it is possible that N52WL simply captures momentum effects: a stock whose 
price increases (decreases) to levels near its 52-week high (low) is likely to be associated with a 
positive (negative) price trend. Based on the univariate evidence, however, it is unlikely that 
momentum drives the positive relation between N52WL and the influence of recommendation 
changes. This is because a momentum-based explanation predicts, in particular, that upgrades 
issued on stocks with prices near their 52-week highs will be more influential than what the 
evidence in Table 3.4 implies. Indeed, Panel A of Table 3.4 shows that upgrades issued on stocks 
with prices near their 52-week highs are the least influential when compared to other upgrades. 
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Table 3.10 provides further evidence against these concerns. If the measure N52WL is 
independent of deviation from consensus or stock price momentum effects, then its explanatory 
power for the influence of recommendation changes should persist after controlling for these 
effects. In Table 3.10, I use a double sort procedure and divide the sample into low-, moderate-, 
and high-deviation from consensus (Panel A) or momentum (Panel B) firm groups based on the 
30th and 70th percentiles of DC or MOM, respectively, and further divide each of these groups 
into low-, moderate-, and high-AIF subgroups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of N52WL. 
The results show consistent evidence that the influence of recommendation changes increases 
with N52WL within each firm group formed based on either deviation from consensus or 
momentum. For example, as shown in Panel A of Table 3.10, the magnitude of the event ABHAR 
of downgrades issued closer to consensus increases from 0.98% for stocks with prices closer to 
their 52-week highs to 3.05% for stocks with prices closer to their 52-week lows. Panel B of 
Table 3.10 shows that among upgrades issued high-momentum stocks, those issued on stocks with 
prices close to their 52-week lows are more influential than those issued on stocks with prices 
close to their 52-week highs by 1.38%. Moreover, among downgrades issued on low-momentum 
stocks, those issued on stocks with prices close to their 52-week lows are associated with an event 
ABHAR equal to -4% compared with only -2.32% for downgrades issued on stocks with prices 
close to their 52-week highs. Hence, I can conclude that neither deviation from consensus nor 
stock price momentum drives the positive relation between N52WL and the influence of 
recommendation changes.  
 
3.6. Conclusion 
There is substantial evidence of puzzling heterogeneity in investors’ responses to the 
announcements of sell-side recommendation changes. As noted by Loh and Stulz (2011), few 
recommendation changes have a large identifiable impact on the stock price, implying that the 
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effects of a typical recommendation change cannot be distinguished from noise. Motivated by 
recent, well-publicized analysts’ reports on Apple and Nokia, I propose and empirically evaluate a 
theory of ambiguity that predicts stronger influence of recommendation changes issued on firms 
with more ambiguous environments. I focus on two aspects of ambiguity in the firm environment: 
the ambiguity aspect that emerges from lack of knowledge of nonexistent relevant information 
and that manifests itself through the difficulty investors face in formulating prior beliefs about 
firm fundamentals (ambiguity in fundamentals or AIF); and the ambiguity aspect that pertains to 
the difficulty investors face in updating their prior beliefs in response to firm information of 
uncertain quality, (ambiguity in information or AII). 
I provide evidence that both aspects of ambiguity substantially increase the influence of 
recommendation changes (the “mean” effect). Moreover, I show that the influence of 
recommendation changes issued on higher AII firms substantially increases when their 
fundamentals are perceived to be more ambiguous (the “interaction” effect). One of the striking 
findings of this chapter is that recommendation changes issued on highest AIF, highest AII firms 
are about four times as influential as those issued on lowest AIF, lowest AII firms. In general, all 
findings are persistent irrespective of the direction of recommendation changes and the choice of 
empirical proxies for ambiguity. 
To support my empirical findings, I propose a simple model of information processing in 
which a representative ambiguity-averse investor perceives ambiguity in the firm environment. 
When this investor perceives both aspects of ambiguity, he acts as if he underweights prior signals 
that imply fundamental uncertainty, underweights firm signals of uncertain quality, and 
overweights analyst signals.  
This chapter focuses on a particular type of analyst information, that signaled by a 
recommendation change. It would be interesting to investigate whether the positive relation 
between ambiguity in the firm environment and the influence of analyst news holds beyond 
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recommendations changes. For example, an interesting line of future research would be to 
investigate whether the effects of earnings forecast or target price revision announcements are 
stronger for firms with more ambiguous environments. 
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Figure 3.1. Conceptual view of AIF. 
This figure depicts the conceptual implications of a situation in which an ambiguity-averse investor perceives AIF. 
The investor perceives a set of priors over dividend outcomes (the figure shows three of them) and acts as if he 
selects a worst-case prior from this set. The worst-case prior (selected) has a worst-case mean dividend,   , implying 
investor’s pessimistic views on firm’s ambiguous fundamentals, and a worst-case dividend variance,  
 
, indicating 
investor’s underconfidence in his mean dividend estimate. The true prior (prior that would prevail with no perceived 
AIF) has a mean dividend equals   and a dividend variance equals   . The best-case prior has a best-case mean 
dividend,  , and a best-case dividend variance,   . 
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Table 3.1. Features of recommendation changes. 
This table shows transition (Panel A) and magnitude frequencies (Panel B) of recommendation changes. The 
sample of recommendations is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendations File, from 1993 (inception) to 
2010. Recommendations are associated with numerical scores on the following scale: strong buy = 1, buy = 2, 
hold = 3, sell = 4, and strong sell = 5. Upgrades and downgrades are constructed at the analyst/firm level from 
outstanding recommendations announced between 1994 and 2010. I identify outstanding recommendations as 
those recommendations not stopped by the brokerage firm and for which no more than 12 months have elapsed 
since the previous recommendation was confirmed. By construction, an upgrade’s (downgrade’s) magnitude 
ranges between one and four (-4 and -1). To minimize the effects of analyst herding or firm-specific news, I 
drop any recommendation change that is preceded by an earnings announcement or another recommendation 
change (issued in the same direction on the same firm) in the two previous trading days. 
  Panel A: Transition frequency matrix of recommendation changes 
 
Current recommendation 
Prior recommendation 1 (Strong buy) 2 (Buy) 3 (Hold) 4 (Sell) 5 (Strong sell) Total 
1 (Strong buy) - 13,647 20,184 337 538 34,706 
 
- 39.3% 58.2% 1.0% 1.6% 100% 
2 (Buy) 13,499 - 26,044 1,079 344 40,966 
 
33.0% - 63.6% 2.6% 0.8% 100% 
3 (Hold) 16,487 21,807 - 5,601 3,472 47,367 
 
34.8% 46.0% - 11.8% 7.3% 100% 
4 (Sell) 196 883 5,198 - 261 6,538 
 
3.0% 13.5% 79.5% - 4.0% 100% 
5 (Strong sell) 354 250 3,381 187 - 4,172 
 
8.5% 6.0% 81.0% 4.5% - 100% 
Total 30,536 36,587 54,807 7,204 4,615 133,749 
 
Panel B: Distribution of recommendation changes 
Magnitude   Frequency     Percentage 
+4 
 
354 
  
0.3% 
+3 
 
446 
  
0.3% 
+2 
 
20,751 
  
15.5% 
+1 
 
40,691 
  
30.4% 
0 
 
- 
  
- 
-1 
 
45,553 
  
34.1% 
-2 
 
24,735 
  
18.5% 
-3 
 
681 
  
0.5% 
-4   538     0.4% 
Total   133,749     100% 
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Table 3.2. Descriptive statistics. 
This table shows descriptive statistics for variables of interest in the subsamples of upgrades (Panel A) and downgrades (Panel B). The 
variables are: an event two-day buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR(0,1)), a stock price’s relative nearness to its 52-week low 
(N52WL), firm size (ME), analyst coverage (ACOV), and firm age (AGE). The event BHAR(0,1) is a two-day buy-and-hold return on a 
stock less a two-day buy-and-hold return on a DGTW portfolio with comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. Other 
variables are defined in Appendix D. The sample of recommendation changes is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendations File, 
from 1994 to 2010.  
            Percentiles 
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Skew Kurt 99% 75% Median 25% 1% 
  Panel A: Upgrades 
BHAR(0,1) 62,242 2.12% 6.80% 17.4 1466.0 23.35% 3.94% 1.28% -0.73% -10.25% 
N52WL 62,242 0.783 2.425 30.0 2174.2 7.927 0.704 0.302 0.119 0.000 
ME 62,242 8,427.0 24,728.0 7.9 89.3 123,979.0 5,710.1 1,578.7 484.8 35.8 
ACOV 62,242 9.1 6.1 1.1 1.4 28 12 8 4 1 
AGE 62,242 81.5 76.8 1.4 1.5 318 113 54 25 4 
  Panel B: Downgrades 
BHAR(0,1) 71,507 -2.30% 9.47% 23.3 2236.2 16.40% 0.70% -1.33% -4.15% -33.56% 
N52WL 71,507 0.996 3.349 19.7 775.3 11.179 0.849 0.313 0.092 0.000 
ME 71,507 7,348.4 22,909.0 8.7 108.5 107,480.0 4,712.4 1,274.7 386.1 27.8 
ACOV 71,507 8.6 6.1 1.2 1.6 28 12 7 4 1 
AGE 71,507 75.9 74.3 1.6 2.0 315 105 49 22 4 
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Table 3.3. Correlation matrix. 
This table reports the Pearson (above the diagonal) and Spearman (below the 
diagonal) correlations for variables of interest. The variables are: an event two-
day buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR(0,1)), a stock price’s relative 
nearness to its 52-week low (N52WL), firm size (ME), analyst coverage 
(ACOV), and firm age (AGE). The event BHAR(0,1) is a two-day buy-and-hold 
return on a stock less a two-day buy-and-hold return on a DGTW portfolio with 
comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. Other variables are 
defined in Appendix D. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The sample of recommendation 
changes is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendations File, from 1994 to 
2010.  
  BHAR(0,1) N52WL ME ACOV AGE 
Panel A: Upgrades 
BHAR(0,1) 1 0.101*** -0.057*** -0.074*** -0.072*** 
N52WL 0.111*** 1 -0.058*** 0.038*** -0.107*** 
ME -0.103*** -0.321*** 1 0.310*** 0.283*** 
ACOV -0.072*** -0.012*** 0.636*** 1 0.139*** 
AGE -0.067*** -0.246*** 0.475*** 0.179*** 1 
Panel B: Downgrades 
BHAR(0,1) 1 -0.024*** 0.036*** 0.046*** 0.063*** 
N52WL -0.126*** 1 -0.057*** 0.048*** -0.114*** 
ME 0.093*** -0.318*** 1 0.304*** 0.290*** 
ACOV 0.064*** 0.015*** 0.645*** 1 0.156*** 
AGE 0.076*** -0.250*** 0.497*** 0.199*** 1 
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Table 3.4. Event ABHARs sorted by ambiguity proxies: the “mean” effect. 
This table shows event ABHARs across firm quintiles formed based on proxies for ambiguity. The 
proxies are: a stock price’s nearness to its 52-week low (N52WL), reciprocal of firm size (1/ME), 
reciprocal of analyst coverage (1/ACOV), and reciprocal of firm age (1/AGE). The event 
ABHAR(0,1) is the average of two-day buy-and-hold returns on stocks less two-day buy-and-hold 
returns on DGTW portfolios with comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. Other 
variables are defined in Appendix D. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Difference t-tests are based on the Satterthwaite method (of 
unequal variances). The sample of recommendation changes is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail 
Recommendations File, from 1994 to 2010.  
  Sorted by N52WL Sorted by 1/ME Sorted by 1/ACOV Sorted by 1/AGE 
Panel A: Upgrades 
Q1 (low) 1.30% 1.04% 1.36% 1.43% 
Q2 1.42% 1.45% 1.81% 1.63% 
Q3 1.78% 1.99% 2.36% 2.22% 
Q4 2.28% 2.69% 2.46% 2.49% 
Q5 (high) 3.83% 3.43% 2.85% 2.85% 
Q5 - Q1 2.54%*** 2.38%*** 1.49%*** 1.42*** 
Panel B: Downgrades 
Q1 (low) -1.19% -1.31% -1.60% -1.41% 
Q2 -1.37% -1.64% -1.96% -1.83% 
Q3 -1.95% -2.37% -2.45% -2.42% 
Q4 -2.95% -3.20% -2.93% -2.57% 
Q5 (high) -4.06% -3.00% -2.61% -3.34% 
Q5 - Q1 -2.87%*** -1.68%*** -1.01%*** -1.93%*** 
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Table 3.5. Effects of ambiguity proxies on event BHARs: the “mean” effect. 
This table presents regression results of event BHARs on proxies for ambiguity and a number of control 
variables. The event BHAR(0,1) is a two-day buy-and-hold return on a stock less a two-day buy-and-hold return 
on a DGTW portfolio with comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. Proxies for high ambiguity 
are constructed as dummy variables indicating ambiguity proxies are higher than their respective 70th 
percentiles. Ambiguity proxies are: a stock price’s nearness to its 52-week low (N52WL), reciprocal of firm 
size (1/ME), reciprocal of analyst coverage (1/ACOV), and reciprocal of firm age (1/AGE). Control variables 
include proxies for moderate ambiguity, which are constructed as dummy variables indicating ambiguity 
proxies are above their 30th and below their 70th percentiles, respectively. Other control variables are book-to-
market equity ratio (BM), momentum (MOM), institutional ownership (IO), the natural logarithm of analyst 
experience (Ln(AEXP)), an affiliated analyst dummy (AFF dummy), an independent analyst dummy (IND 
dummy), a recommendation deviation from consensus (DC), the magnitude of a recommendation change 
(MAG), a dummy variable indicating a recommendation is issued after Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD 
dummy), and a dummy variable indicating a recommendation is issued after the Global Research Analyst 
Settlement (GS dummy). The variables are defined in Appendix D. For ease of presentation, the coefficients of 
the year dummies are suppressed from the table. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with t-statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. The sample of recommendation changes is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendation File, from 
1994 to 2010. 
  Dependent variable: BHAR(0,1) 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
Explanatory variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Panel A: Upgrades 
   Intercept -0.0000 (-0.03) -0.0123*** (-8.07) -0.0132*** (-8.71) 
Ambiguity proxies 
      
   N52WL (>70th) dummy 0.0179*** (21.77) 
  
0.0117*** (14.88) 
   1/ME (>70th) dummy 
  
0.0194*** (18.62) 0.0153*** (15.18) 
   1/ACOV (>70th) dummy 
  
0.0021** (2.23) 0.0043*** (4.48) 
   1/AGE (>70th) dummy 
  
0.0061*** (7.15) 0.0044*** (5.24) 
Ambiguity controls 
      
   N52WL (>30th , <70th) dummy 0.0036*** (8.14) 
  
0.0012*** (2.69) 
   1/ME (>30th , <70th) dummy 
  
0.0077*** (12.80) 0.0060*** (10.19) 
   1/ACOV(>30th , <70th) dummy 
  
0.0021*** (3.34) 0.0033*** (5.19) 
   1/AGE (>30th , <70th) dummy 
  
0.0016*** (2.62) 0.0009* (1.67) 
Firm characteristics 
      
   BM 0.0015 (1.57) 0.0014 (1.60) 0.0012 (1.58) 
   MOM 0.0012** (2.35) -0.0004 (-0.85) 0.0007 (1.40) 
   IO -0.0071*** (-3.66) 0.0005 (0.26) 0.0012 (0.63) 
Analyst characteristics 
      
   Ln(AEXP) 0.0001 (0.37) 0.0004 (1.32) 0.0005 (1.53) 
   AFF dummy 0.0052*** (5.46) 0.0063*** (6.70) 0.0061*** (6.58) 
   IND dummy -0.0102*** (-12.22) -0.0097*** (-11.85) -0.0098*** (-12.08) 
Recommendation characteristics 
      
   DC 0.0011*** (5.56) 0.0013*** (6.63) 0.0013*** (6.50) 
   MAG 0.0024*** (4.20) 0.0027*** (4.69) 0.0026*** (4.52) 
   FD dummy 0.0035 (1.18) 0.0032 (1.06) 0.0025 (0.86) 
   GS dummy 0.0113*** (3.91) 0.0119*** (4.17) 0.0110*** (3.86) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Clustering by firm Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R
2
 0.031 
 
0.038 
 
0.042 
 
F-test 58.77*** 
 
59.54*** 
 
61.60*** 
 
N 58,494   58,494   58,494   
Panel B: Downgrades 
   Intercept 0.0119*** (5.52) 0.0217*** (9.46) 0.0261*** (11.44) 
Ambiguity proxies 
      
   N52WL (>70th) dummy -0.0262*** (-23.31) 
  
-0.0211*** (-18.67) 
   1/ME (>70th) dummy 
  
-0.0157*** (-10.35) -0.0091*** (-5.98) 
   1/ACOV (>70th) dummy 
  
-0.0043*** (-3.76) -0.0081*** (-6.92) 
   1/AGE (>70th) dummy 
  
-0.0107*** (-9.11) -0.0078*** (-6.74) 
Ambiguity controls 
      
   N52WL (>30th , <70th) dummy -0.0083*** (-13.39) 
  
-0.0067*** (-10.85) 
   1/ME (>30th , <70th) dummy 
  
-0.0071*** (-9.49) -0.0043*** (-5.91) 
   1/ACOV(>30th , <70th) dummy 
  
-0.0021*** (-2.71) -0.0041*** (-5.26) 
   1/AGE (>30th , <70th) dummy 
  
-0.0041*** (-4.69) -0.0027*** (-3.25) 
Firm characteristics 
      
   BM 0.0018 (1.36) 0.0017 (1.30) 0.0021 (1.46) 
   MOM -0.0025*** (-3.56) 0.0015** (2.36) -0.0016** (-2.34) 
   IO -0.0047** (-2.28) -0.0135*** (-6.39) -0.0139*** (-6.68) 
Analyst characteristics 
      
   Ln(AEXP) -0.0006 (-1.46) -0.0007* (-1.73) -0.0009** (-2.32) 
   AFF dummy -0.0105*** (-8.48) -0.0111*** (-8.94) -0.0107*** (-8.73) 
   IND dummy 0.0145*** (9.19) 0.0140*** (8.92) 0.0143*** (9.11) 
Recommendation characteristics 
      
   DC -0.0012*** (-5.75) -0.0014*** (-6.39) -0.0014*** (-6.44) 
   MAG -0.0051*** (-6.75) -0.0049*** (-6.57) -0.0048*** (-6.45) 
   FD dummy 0.0050* (1.83) 0.0051* (1.86) 0.0057** (2.07) 
   GS dummy -0.0103*** (-4.11) -0.0117*** (-4.65) -0.0103*** (-4.10) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Clustering by firm Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R
2
 0.021 
 
0.022 
 
0.026 
 
F-test 55.56*** 
 
49.04*** 
 
53.46*** 
 
N 67,106   67,106   67,106   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
113 
 
Table 3.6. Event ABHARs sorted by ambiguity proxies: the “interaction” effect. 
This table shows event ABHARs across firm subgroups formed based on proxies for ambiguity. The proxies 
are: a stock price’s nearness to its 52-week low (N52WL), reciprocal of firm size (1/ME), reciprocal of 
analyst coverage (1/ACOV), and reciprocal of firm age (1/AGE). I use a double sort procedure and divide 
the sample into low-, moderate-, and high-AIF groups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of N52WL and 
further divide each of these groups into low-, moderate-, and high-AII subgroups based on the 30th and 
70th percentiles of either 1/ME (Panel A), 1/ACOV (Panel B), or 1/AGE (Panel C). The event ABHAR(0,1) 
is the average of two-day buy-and-hold returns on stocks less two-day buy-and-hold returns on DGTW 
portfolios with comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. Other variables are defined in 
Appendix D. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. Difference t-tests are based on the Satterthwaite method (of unequal variances). The sample of 
recommendation changes is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendations File, from 1994 to 2010. 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
 
AIF proxied by N52WL 
AII Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) 
Panel A: AII proxied by 1/ME 
Low  (<30th) 0.79% 1.12% 2.06% -0.86% -1.39% -2.94% 
Moderate 1.34% 1.85% 3.35% -1.23% -2.03% -4.46% 
High (>70th) 1.87% 2.29% 4.75% -1.61% -2.58% -3.69% 
High - Low 1.07%*** 1.17%*** 2.70%*** -0.75%*** -1.19%*** -0.75%*** 
Panel B: AII proxied by 1/ACOV 
Low  (<30th) 0.92% 1.17% 2.33% -0.88% -1.34% -2.78% 
Moderate 1.37% 1.84% 3.53% -1.26% -2.05% -4.00% 
High (>70th) 1.76% 2.29% 4.27% -1.55% -2.55% -4.35% 
High - Low 0.83%*** 1.13%*** 1.94%*** -0.66%*** -1.21%*** -1.57%*** 
Panel C: AII proxied by 1/AGE 
Low  (<30th) 1.00% 1.40% 2.91% -0.94% -1.52% -3.13% 
Moderate 1.26% 1.83% 3.39% -1.22% -1.93% -3.74% 
High (>70th) 1.78% 2.04% 3.84% -1.54% -2.60% -4.51% 
High - Low 0.77%*** 0.64%*** 0.93%*** -0.59%*** -1.08%*** -1.38%*** 
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Table 3.7. Effects of ambiguity proxies on event BHARs: the “interaction” effect. 
This table presents the regression results of event BHARs on proxies for AII and a number of control variables 
in three AIF-level subsamples formed based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of N52WL. The event BHAR(0,1) 
is a two-day buy-and-hold return on a stock less a two-day buy-and-hold return on a DGTW portfolio with 
comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. The term N52WL is a stock price’s nearness to its 52-
week low. Proxies for high AII are constructed as dummy variables indicating AII proxies are higher than their 
respective 70th percentiles. Proxies for AII are: the reciprocal of firm size (1/ME), reciprocal of analyst 
coverage (1/ACOV), and reciprocal of firm age (1/AGE). Control variables include proxies for moderate AII, 
which are constructed as dummy variables indicating AII proxies are above their 30th and below their 70th 
percentiles, respectively. Other control variables are book-to-market equity ratio (BM), momentum (MOM), 
institutional ownership (IO), the natural logarithm of analyst experience (Ln(AEXP)), an affiliated analyst 
dummy (AFF dummy), an independent analyst dummy (IND dummy), a recommendation deviation from 
consensus (DC), the magnitude of a recommendation change (MAG), a dummy variable indicating a 
recommendation is issued after Regulation Fair Disclosure (FD dummy), and a dummy variable indicating a 
recommendation is issued after the Global Research Analyst Settlement (GS dummy). The variables are defined 
in Appendix D. For ease of presentation, the coefficients of the year dummies are suppressed from the table. 
The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, with t-
statistics in parentheses. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. The sample of recommendation changes 
is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendation File, from 1994 to 2010. 
  Dependent variable: BHAR(0,1) 
 
[1] [2] [3] 
 
AIF proxied by N52WL 
 
Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) 
Explanatory variable Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat 
Panel A: Upgrades 
   Intercept -0.0082*** (-4.93) -0.0096*** (-6.20) -0.0153*** (-3.29) 
Ambiguity proxies 
      
   1/ME (>70th) dummy 0.0109*** (7.46) 0.0121*** (10.41) 0.0220*** (9.38) 
   1/ACOV (>70th) dummy 0.0019* (1.78) 0.0039*** (3.70) 0.0085*** (3.51) 
   1/AGE (>70th) dummy 0.0037*** (3.57) 0.0018** (1.99) 0.0077*** (3.57) 
Ambiguity controls 
      
   1/ME (>30th , <70th) dummy 0.0058*** (8.32) 0.0070*** (9.34) 0.0087*** (5.02) 
   1/ACOV(>30th , <70th) dummy 0.0011* (1.69) 0.0026*** (3.63) 0.0063*** (3.55) 
   1/AGE (>30th , <70th) dummy 0.0000 (0.14) 0.0011* (1.76) 0.0022 (1.35) 
Firm characteristics 
      
   BM -0.0006 (-1.52) -0.0006*** (-2.86) 0.0021** (2.07) 
   MOM 0.0022** (2.33) 0.0033*** (4.71) -0.0006 (-0.72) 
   IO 0.0062*** (3.34) 0.0025 (1.46) -0.0071 (-1.50) 
Analyst characteristics 
      
   Ln(AEXP) 0.0006* (1.76) 0.0009*** (2.72) 0.0000 (0.03) 
   AFF dummy 0.0035*** (3.40) 0.0053*** (4.47) 0.0107*** (4.41) 
   IND dummy -0.0065*** (-7.28) -0.0082*** (-8.75) -0.0148*** (-6.90) 
Recommendation characteristics 
      
   DC 0.0005*** (3.33) 0.0005*** (3.33) 0.0030*** (5.04) 
   MAG 0.0009 (1.62) 0.0018*** (3.15) 0.0051*** (3.11) 
   FD dummy 0.0073* (1.92) 0.0059* (1.81) 0.0001 (0.02) 
   GS dummy 0.0026 (0.72) 0.0057* (1.74) 0.0180*** (3.39) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
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Clustering by firm Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R
2
 0.051 
 
0.041 
 
0.029 
 
F-test 26.59*** 
 
32.61*** 
 
15.63*** 
 
N 17,503   23,469   17,522   
Panel B: Downgrades 
   Intercept 0.0078*** (4.12) 0.0176*** (7.36) 0.0388*** (6.80) 
Ambiguity proxies 
      
   1/ME (>70th) dummy -0.0043*** (-2.71) -0.0115*** (-6.68) -0.0116*** (-3.17) 
   1/ACOV (>70th) dummy -0.0047*** (-4.07) -0.0069*** (-4.65) -0.0151*** (-5.12) 
   1/AGE (>70th) dummy -0.0024** (-2.18) -0.0078*** (-5.74) -0.0147*** (-4.34) 
Ambiguity controls 
      
   1/ME (>30th , <70th) dummy -0.0026*** (-3.21) -0.0054*** (-5.49) -0.0084*** (-3.77) 
   1/ACOV(>30th , <70th) dummy -0.0021*** (-2.81) -0.0027*** (-2.88) -0.0082*** (-3.82) 
   1/AGE (>30th , <70th) dummy -0.0011* (-1.65) -0.0021** (-2.39) -0.0089*** (-2.74) 
Firm characteristics 
      
   BM 0.0009* (1.80) 0.0013* (1.81) 0.0026 (1.37) 
   MOM -0.004*** (-4.63) -0.0011 (-1.32) -0.0011 (-0.81) 
   IO -0.0091*** (-4.96) -0.0165*** (-6.54) -0.0147*** (-2.91) 
Analyst characteristics 
      
   Ln(AEXP) -0.0010** (-2.55) -0.0014*** (-2.62) -0.0008 (-0.77) 
   AFF dummy -0.0011 (-1.03) -0.0092*** (-5.44) -0.0217*** (-7.11) 
   IND dummy 0.0057*** (5.70) 0.0113*** (8.68) 0.0281*** (5.44) 
Recommendation characteristics 
      
   DC -0.0009*** (-5.11) -0.0009*** (-3.95) -0.0026*** (-4.30) 
   MAG -0.0014** (-2.29) -0.0032*** (-3.35) -0.0097*** (-4.99) 
   FD dummy 0.0037 (1.21) 0.0108*** (3.35) 0.0027 (0.47) 
   GS dummy -0.0057* (-1.87) -0.0102*** (-3.36) -0.0124** (-2.48) 
Year fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   
Clustering by firm Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
 
R
2
 0.024 
 
0.025 
 
0.019 
 
F-test 14.16*** 
 
19.06*** 
 
18.09*** 
 
N 20,126   26,920   20,060   
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Table 3.8. Using Loh and Stulz’ (2011) definition of influence of a recommendation change. 
This table shows the proportions of influential recommendation changes across AIF/AII firm subgroups. 
These proportions are calculated as follows. First, following Loh and Stulz (2011), I classify a 
recommendation change as influential if the associated event BHAR(0,1) is both in the correct direction and 
statistically significant. An event BHAR(0,1) is classified as statistically significant if it satisfies the 
condition      (   )       √    , where    is the residual standard deviation of stock daily 
returns against the three Fama–French factors in the three-month period prior to the end of month  . 
Second, I use a double sort procedure and divide the sample into low-, moderate-, and high-AIF firm 
groups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of N52WL and further divide each of these groups into low-, 
moderate-, and high-AII firm subgroups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of either the reciprocal of 
ME, reciprocal of ACOV, or reciprocal of AGE. Third, I compute for each AIF/AII firm subgroup the 
proportion of influential recommendation changes as the number of influential recommendation changes 
scaled by the total number of recommendation changes within that subgroup. The event BHAR(0,1) is a 
two-day buy-and-hold return on a stock less a two-day buy-and-hold return on a DGTW portfolio with 
comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. The sample of recommendation changes is from the 
I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendations File, from 1994 to 2010. 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
 
AIF proxied by N52WL 
AII Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) 
Panel A: AII proxied by 1/ME 
Low  (<30th) 10.59% 10.54% 10.36% 10.29% 11.43% 11.64% 
Moderate 14.43% 14.98% 15.57% 12.60% 15.33% 17.79% 
High (>70th) 14.84% 15.58% 16.96% 12.68% 16.36% 14.91% 
Panel B: AII proxied by 1/ACOV 
Low  (<30th) 9.22% 9.21% 10.23% 8.97% 10.13% 10.63% 
Moderate 14.12% 14.79% 15.27% 12.77% 14.96% 16.15% 
High (>70th) 17.05% 17.23% 17.51% 13.75% 17.83% 17.53% 
Panel C: AII proxied by 1/AGE 
Low  (<30th) 12.66% 13.12% 13.91% 12.16% 12.93% 13.85% 
Moderate 13.07% 14.18% 14.98% 11.55% 14.89% 15.53% 
High (>70th) 14.61% 14.06% 14.19% 12.22% 15.46% 15.72% 
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Table 3.9. Divergence in investors’ opinions and the influence of recommendation changes. 
This table compares event ABHARs across firm subgroups based on proxies for AII and divergence in investors’ 
opinions. Proxies for AII are: the reciprocal of firm size (1/ME), reciprocal of analyst coverage (1/ACOV), and 
reciprocal of firm age (1/AGE). The proxy for divergence in investors’ opinions is earnings’ forecast dispersion 
(FDISP). I use a double sort procedure and divide the sample into low-, moderate-, and high-AII firm groups 
based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of either 1/ME (Panel A), 1/ACOV (Panel B), or 1/AGE (Panel C) and 
further divide each of these groups into low-, moderate-, and high-divergence firm subgroups based on the 30th 
and 70th percentiles of FDISP. The event ABHAR(0,1) is the average of two-day buy-and-hold returns on stocks 
less two-day buy-and-hold returns on DGTW portfolios with comparable size, B/M, and momentum 
characteristics. Other variables are defined in Appendix D. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Difference t-tests are based on the Satterthwaite method (of unequal 
variances). The sample of recommendation changes is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendations File, from 
1994 to 2010. 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
 
AII  
Opinions' divergence 
proxied by FDISP 
Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) 
Panel A: AII proxied by 1/ME 
Low  (<30th) 1.05% 1.81% 2.33% -1.38% -2.50% -3.41% 
Moderate 1.05% 1.67% 3.08% -1.30% -2.09% -3.24% 
High (>70th) 1.25% 2.07% 4.05% -1.43% -2.42% -4.07% 
High - Low 0.20%*** 0.26%*** 1.71%*** -0.04% 0.08% -0.66%*** 
Panel B: AII proxied by  1/ACOV 
Low  (<30th) 1.28% 1.62% 1.98% -1.59% -2.23% -2.75% 
Moderate 1.21% 1.85% 2.45% -1.42% -2.20% -2.91% 
High (>70th) 1.71% 2.74% 3.58% -2.02% -2.75% -3.81% 
High - Low 0.42%*** 1.11%*** 1.61%*** -0.42%*** -0.51%*** -1.06%*** 
Panel C: AII proxied by 1/AGE 
Low  (<30th) 1.23% 1.64% 1.99% -1.45% -2.18% -3.03% 
Moderate 1.26% 1.73% 2.50% -1.39% -2.15% -3.04% 
High (>70th) 1.85% 2.73% 3.40% -1.79% -2.98% -3.73% 
High - Low 0.62%*** 1.09%*** 1.41%*** -0.34%*** -0.79%*** -0.69%*** 
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Table 3.10. Robustness of the measure N52WL as a proxy for AIF. 
This table compares event ABHARs across firm subgroups. I use a double sort procedure and divide the sample into 
low-, moderate-, and high-deviation from consensus (Panel A) or momentum (Panel B) stock groups based on the 
30th and 70th percentiles of DC or MOM, respectively, and further divide each of these groups into low-, moderate-
, and high-AIF subgroups based on the 30th and 70th percentiles of N52WL. The event ABHAR(0,1) is the average 
of two-day buy-and-hold returns on stocks less two-day buy-and-hold returns on DGTW portfolios with 
comparable size, B/M, and momentum characteristics. Other variables are defined in Appendix D. The superscripts 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Difference t-tests are based on the 
Satterthwaite method (of unequal variances). The sample of recommendation changes is from the I/B/E/S U.S. 
Detail Recommendations File, from 1994 to 2010. 
  Upgrades Downgrades 
 
DC or MOM 
AIF proxied by N52WL Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) Low (<30th) Moderate High (>70th) 
Panel A: Sorted by DC and N52WL 
Low  (<30th) 1.21% 1.40% 1.28% -0.98% -1.16% -1.55% 
Moderate 1.69% 1.80% 1.75% -1.84% -1.84% -2.42% 
High (>70th) 2.82% 3.50% 3.70% -3.05% -3.64% -4.60% 
High - Low 1.61%*** 2.11%*** 2.42%*** -2.07%*** -2.48%*** -3.06%*** 
Panel B: Sorted by MOM and N52WL 
Low  (<30th) 1.77% 1.16% 1.45% -2.32% -1.00% -1.37% 
Moderate 2.66% 1.41% 1.66% -3.54% -1.54% -1.47% 
High (>70th) 4.65% 2.27% 2.83% -4.00% -2.91% -3.28% 
High - Low 2.87%*** 1.11%*** 1.38%*** -1.68%*** -1.91%*** -1.91%*** 
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CHAPTER FOUR: AFFILIATED ASSET MANAGERS AND INFORMED 
SELLING PRIOR TO ANALYSTS’ DOWNGRADES: WHAT ARE THE 
IMPLICATIONS OF THE GLOBAL SETTLEMENT? 
 
4.1. Introduction 
The interdependence among the divisions of a full-service brokerage firm typically 
raises ethical issues with respect to the interests of investors. Anecdotal evidence suggests that 
sell-side analysts, those employed by a brokerage firm, may tip off their affiliated asset 
managers regarding the content of the soon to be released research reports. For example, on 
March 14, 2007 the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) fined Banc of America 
Securities LLC US$26 million over the claims that trading employees had access to research 
reports before they were published, and in at least two instances the bank traded in advance of 
their release.
42
 
Informed trading prior to the announcement of recommendations by sell-side analysts 
is not new to the literature. Irvine, Lipson, and Puckett (2007) document abnormally high 
institutional buying beginning five days before initial buy and strong buy recommendations 
are released. More recently, Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) present evidence of 
abnormally high short-selling prior to the release of analysts’ downgrades. Both studies 
support the hypothesis of tipping by sell-side analysts to select institutional clients. It is 
important to note that the evidence on tipping presented in these two studies is specific to the 
1998-2001 period. Following this period, however, the regulatory environment had seen 
substantial mutation with the adoption of the Global Research Analyst Settlement and related 
                                                          
42
 See the SEC’s administrative proceeding file No. 3-12591 and Wall Street Journal (2007). 
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regulations in 2002-2003.
43
 The purpose of the new regulations is to make analysts’ research 
more meaningful and enhance its confidentiality. Although prior evidence suggests that these 
regulatory changes have altered several aspects of sell-side research, their potential effects on 
the practice of tipping by sell-side analysts have received little attention in the literature.
44
 
This chapter builds on prior research and investigates evidence of informed selling by 
affiliated asset managers prior to downgrade releases for the period from 1996 to 2010.
45
 
Specifically, the two main objectives are (i) to study the extent of informed selling in response 
to prominent regulatory provisions that would limit the information flow from sell-side 
analysts to their affiliated asset managers, and (ii) to investigate the relation between informed 
selling and the downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of forthcoming 
downgrades.  
In this chapter, an affiliated asset manager is defined as any manager who discloses 
13f security holdings under the name of a brokerage firm that employs a sell-side analyst. I 
use the CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) holdings data set, which collects institutional 
holdings from the SEC’s Form 13f and records these holdings on a manager-quarter basis. To 
overcome the well-documented misclassification of managers in the Institutional (13f) 
                                                          
43
 Another important regulation, Regulation Fair Disclosure, was adopted in 2000. There is consensus in the 
literature that Regulation Fair Disclosure has had a negative effect on the precision and informativeness of analyst 
research (Bailey, Li, Mao, and Zhong, 2003; Agrawal, Chadha, and Chen, 2006; Gintschel and Markov, 2004). 
 
44
 The documented effect of the Global Settlement and related regulations is that optimistic recommendations have 
become less frequent and more informative, whereas pessimistic recommendations have become more frequent and 
less informative (Kadan, Madureira, Wang, and Zach, 2009; Clarke, Khorana, Patel, and Rau, 2011).  
 
45
 Throughout the chapter, I use the terminology “informed selling” to refer to the pre-downgrade selling activity of 
affiliated asset managers that is associated with significantly negative pre-announcement abnormal returns (and 
abnormally high share turnovers).  
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holdings data set, I disregard the specific type of managers, and for each quarter I aggregate 
the holdings of affiliated asset managers at the brokerage firm level.
46
  
Who tips off whom? Brokerage firms and their affiliated asset managers have 
economic incentives to support each other. As documented by Gaspar, Massa, and Matos 
(2006), the mutual fund industry is concentrated into a number of mutual fund families, each 
of which is typically affiliated with a brokerage firm. The economic incentives faced by a 
brokerage firm and its affiliated mutual fund family may create a strong interdependence that 
would justify some brokerage analysts passing private information to their affiliated mutual 
fund managers. The cost of research is typically recovered, at least in part, by trading 
commissions paid by the affiliated fund family. Moreover, the fund family often pays sales 
commissions to its affiliated brokerage firm for promoting its shares. In exchange for these 
payments, the firm may provide early access to research to its affiliated mutual fund 
managers, who may exploit their early knowledge of research ahead of its public release.
47
 It 
is clear that such interdependence is likely to persist, and the practice of tipping is likely to 
thrive, absent appropriate regulatory constraints. 
In 2002-2003, however, a set of rulesNYSE Rule 472 (“Communications with the 
public”); NASD Rule 2711 (“Research analysts and research reports”); and the Global 
Research Analyst Settlement (collectively known as the GS)were enacted in an effort to 
address conflicts of interests faced by sell-side analysts, whereby analysts come under 
pressure from their affiliated investment bankers to assign favorable ratings to current and 
                                                          
46
 See Moussawi and Palacios (2009) for evidence on the misclassification problem of managers in the institutional 
(13f) holdings data set.  
 
47
 Similar arguments can be discussed to highlight the interdependence between brokerage firms and other affiliated 
asset managers, such as hedge fund managers. 
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prospective investment banking clients. Moreover, the new rules include provisions that 
require strict confidentiality of research reports until their public release. For example, NYSE 
Rule 472 (b) states that “Research reports may not be subject to review or approval prior to 
publication by Investment Banking personnel or any other employee of the member or 
member organisation who is not directly responsible for investment research (“non-research 
personnel”) other than Legal or Compliance personnel”.48 It follows that those asset 
managers who are affiliated with a brokerage firm may no longer be allowed to receive tips 
regarding the content of the soon to be released research reports from their brokerage analysts. 
The two main hypotheses of this chapter follow. 
 
 Hypothesis 1. (informed selling and the GS) If some affiliated asset managers are informed 
sellers, their pre-downgrade selling activity would be reflected in significantly negative pre-
announcement abnormal returns and abnormally high share turnovers. Moreover, if informed 
selling is limited to the pre-GS period, one would imply that some of the informed selling is 
likely to be induced by tips received from brokerage analysts. 
 
Hypothesis 2. (early knowledge of forthcoming downgrades) If pre-downgrade informed 
selling is related to the downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of 
forthcoming downgrades, one would conclude that tipping is likely to be responsible for some 
of the selling. 
 
Why does this chapter focus on downgrades only? Analysts are reluctant to assign 
unfavorable ratings to companies for many reasons (Mola and Guidolin, 2009). First, analysts 
                                                          
48
 See also NASD Rule 2711 (b). 
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have a preference to curry favor with companies’ executives. Second, analysts tend to assign 
favorable ratings to companies in response to pressure stemming from their affiliated 
investment bankers. Third, analysts are biased toward the issuance of favorable 
recommendations to induce those institutional clients subject to short-selling constraints to 
trade on the research and generate trading commissions for their affiliated brokerage 
divisions. It follows that those affiliated asset managers who benefit from early access to 
overoptimistic research would not perceive a significant information advantage from the 
research and may be unwilling to trade on their early knowledge.
49
 On the contrary, an 
analyst’s downgrade of a company represents an unequivocal signal that the analyst’s prior 
expectations about the company have not been satisfied and thus typically involves a reliable 
information advantage. Those managers with early access to negative research would be 
inclined to take immediate actions to cut their portfolio holdings of the soon to be 
downgraded stocks. 
It would be ideal to analyze the short-selling activity of affiliated asset managers prior 
to downgrade releases. Abnormal short-selling of a soon to be downgraded stock would 
provide direct evidence of tipping. Because short-selling data is available only on an 
aggregate level, my analysis is limited to the sell trades that are reported by affiliated asset 
managers. Hence, it is clear that my research design runs against finding evidence of tipping. 
In other words, if evidence of tipping exists based on an analysis of sell trades before 
downgrades, one would expect this evidence to be stronger based on an analysis of short-
selling before downgrades. 
                                                          
49
 Consistent with this view, I find no clear empirical evidence of informed buying by affiliated asset managers prior 
to analysts’ upgrades (unreported results). 
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I collect a sample of analysts’ recommendations from Thompson Reuters Institutional 
Brokers’ Estimates (I/B/E/S) U.S. Detail Recommendations File for the period from January 
1996 to December 2010. Downgrades are constructed as in Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston 
(2009). Only those downgrades from the most active full-service brokerage firms are retained 
in the sample.
50
 Since my analysis focuses on the holdings of affiliated asset managers that 
are reported during the month prior to a downgrade announcement, I ensure that any 
downgrade that is preceded by another downgrade or an earnings announcement in the prior 
month is excluded from the sample. Although this procedure significantly reduces the sample 
size, it ensures that the sample is insulated from analysts’ herding and earnings announcement 
effects. The resulting sample of downgrades is then matched with sell trades from affiliated 
asset managers as reported during the month prior to downgrade announcements. The final 
sample consists of 2,306 downgrades issued on 1,414 unique companies by 1,259 unique 
analysts, who are employed by 43 unique full-service brokerage firms.     
My findings support hypothesis 1. In the pre-GS period, I document significantly 
negative abnormal returns and abnormally high share turnovers in the month prior to 
downgrade announcements (Table 4.2). Compared with post-GS downgrades, pre-GS 
downgrades are associated with significantly more negative pre-announcement abnormal 
returns, after controlling for momentum effects (Table 4.3). It appears that the GS effect is 
stronger among downgrades that are from the sanctioned firms or affiliated analysts (Tables 
4.4 and 4.5).
51
 Overall, these findings are consistent with the view that some affiliated asset 
                                                          
50
 Specifically, the sample retains only those downgrades from full-service brokerage firms that contribute at least 
0.5% (or 2,326 recommendations) of the total recommendations in I/B/E/S during the sample period. 
 
51
 The sanctioned firms are those firms sanctioned by the GS. Affiliated analysts are those analysts with investment 
banking ties with the covered companies. Precise definitions are reported in Appendix E. 
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managers may receive tips from their brokerage analysts and engage in selling of the soon to 
be downgraded stocks.  
My findings also support hypothesis 2. I show that informed selling is relatively more 
prevalent prior to strong downgrades, downgrades of high magnitude, downgrades that are 
issued before Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect, or downgrades that are issued on 
high institutional ownership stocks (Table 4.6). Because informed selling is related to the 
downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of forthcoming downgrades, it is 
likely that some of the selling is induced by tips received from brokerage analysts.  
My contribution to the literature is twofold. First, I show that some affiliated asset 
managers may receive tips regarding the content of forthcoming downgrade reports, whereas 
prior research remains salient on the identity of those institutional investors who may benefit 
from tipping. Second, compared with prior research, my analysis relies on an up-to-date 
sample and emphasizes the role of regulatory changes in mitigating the practice of tipping.  
The remainder of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 describes the sample formation 
process and presents the features of the sample. Section 4.3 investigates evidence of informed 
selling. Section 4.4 analyzes the relation between informed selling and the characteristics of 
forthcoming downgrades. Section 4.5 concludes.  
 
4.2. Sampling procedure and features of the sample 
In this section, I describe the formation of the sample of downgrades, the construction 
of sell trades from the quarterly holdings of affiliated asset managers, and the features of the 
matched sample.  
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4.2.1. I/B/E/S Sampling procedure 
The sample of analysts’ recommendations is from I/B/E/S U.S. Detail 
Recommendations File. I select a large sample of recommendations from 1996 to 2010. 
I/B/E/S receives different wordings from different brokerage firms, but then translates them 
into numerical scores on the following scale: strong buy = 1, buy = 2, hold = 3, sell = 4, and 
strong sell = 5. 
Valid recommendation data consist of records for which activation dates, ACTDATS, 
and review dates, REVDATS, are subsequent to the announcement dates, ANNDATS; analyst 
identification number, AMASKCD, and CUSIP are not missing; recommendation levels are 
between 1 and 5; and shares are common equity.  
To construct downgrades, I follow Ljungqvist, Malloy, and Marston (2009) and code 
ratings as follows: the first time a brokerage firm issues a recommendation on a given firm in 
I/B/E/S is an initiation. Following recommendations are categorized as either outstanding or 
non-outstanding recommendations. Outstanding recommendations are those recommendations 
that are not stopped by the brokerage firm and recommendations for which no more than 12 
months have elapsed since the previous recommendation has been confirmed.
52
 Outstanding 
recommendations are further broken down into upgrades, downgrades, and re-iterations. Non-
outstanding recommendations are coded as re-initiations. Ultimately, only downgrades are 
retained in the sample.  
To keep the sample size manageable, I limit my analysis to those downgrades issued 
by the most active full-service brokerage firms in I/B/E/S. First, I identify those firms that 
issue recommendations representing at least 0.5% (or 2,326 recommendations) of the total 
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 I use the review date of the previous recommendation for the confirmation status and I/B/E/S stop file to check for 
broker scale changes and suspensions / terminations of broker coverage. 
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number of recommendations in I/B/E/S (or 458,426 recommendations). For example, 
Goldman Sachs is the most active contributor with 16,555 recommendations (or 3.6%), and 
Adams Harkness Inc. is the least active contributor with 2,326 recommendations (or 0.5%). 
This procedure identifies 51 I/B/E/S contributors, 43 of which are full-service brokerage 
firms.
53
 
I further refine the sample of selected downgrades to ensure my findings are not 
contaminated by the effects of concurrent observable events. I ensure that any downgrade that 
is preceded by another downgrade or an earnings announcement in the prior month is 
excluded from the sample. The resulting sample of downgrades is then matched with CRSP 
and COMPUSTAT data, a procedure that results in 29,164 downgrades. 
 
4.2.2. 13f trades sampling procedure 
The CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) holdings data set collects institutional holdings 
of asset managers from the SEC’s Form 13f and records these holdings on a manager-quarter 
basis. Asset managers holding more than $100 million in equity are required to file a quarterly 
report of all equity holdings greater than 10,000 shares or $200,000 in market value. Using 
the CDA/Spectrum holdings quarterly data, I infer quarterly trades made by affiliated asset 
managers. First, for each quarter I aggregate the shares held by the asset managers who are 
affiliated with the same brokerage firm. Second, I construct quarterly trades and classify them 
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 An I/B/E/S contributor is classified as a full-service brokerage firm if it provides investment banking and asset 
management services anytime during the sample period. I use SDC to check for whether an I/B/E/S contributor has 
underwritten equity or debt securities anytime during the sample period and CDA/Spectrum Institutional (13f) to 
check whether an I/B/E/S contributor (through its affiliated asset managers) has invested in stocks anytime during 
the sample period. For example, Buckingham Research, which contributes 3,834 recommendations to I/B/E/S, is a 
pure equity research firm that does not provide underwriting services and thus is excluded from the sample. 
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into buy, hold, or sell. For example, in a given quarter, a buy trade is the case in which a 
brokerage firm reports a number of shares held in a stock at the end of a quarter that is higher 
than that at the end of the previous quarter. Only sell trades are retained in the sample. To 
ensure these trades are not driven by either liquidity needs or reporting inaccuracies, in a 
given quarter I exclude any sell trade on a stock that represents less than 5% of the manager’s 
holdings in that stock in the previous quarter. In addition, there are cases in which holdings 
are reported discontinuously. Holdings that are reported with a one-quarter gap may be due to 
either a genuine share liquidating trade or an omission on the part of Thomson Reuters to 
record the holdings. Because of this uncertainty, I treat one-quarter gaps in quarterly holdings 
as missing. 
Finally, sample downgrades are matched with sell trades from affiliated asset 
managers, provided that the managers’ holdings are reported during the month prior to 
downgrade announcements. The final sample consists of 2,306 sell-preceded downgrades. 
 
4.2.3. Features of the sample 
In this chapter, firms that are sanctioned by the Global Research Analyst Settlement 
are referred to as the “sanctioned firms”.54 The Settlement required these brokerage firms to 
pay a total fine of $1.435 billion in an effort to promote independent research. Bear Stearns 
and Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith are among the 12 sanctioned firms, but they do 
not report recommendations to I/B/E/S. Thus, my sample includes downgrades from only ten 
sanctioned firms. 
                                                          
54
 The original ten sanctioned firms according to the Global Research Analyst Settlement are: Bear Stearns; Credit 
Suisse First Boston; Goldman Sachs; Lehman Brothers; J. P. Morgan; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith; 
Morgan Stanley; Citigroup Global Markets; UBS Warburg; and U.S. Bancorp Piper Jaffray. In August 2004, 
Deutsche Bank and Thomas Weisel joined the settlement, bringing the total number of sanctioned firms to twelve. 
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I classify analysts into two groups: affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. An affiliated 
analyst is defined as an analyst who issues a downgrade at any point during the two-year 
period after the file date on a debt or equity issue in which the analyst’s employer acts as the 
lead or co-lead underwriter.
55
 In all other cases, analysts are categorized as unaffiliated 
analysts.
56
 
Table 4.1 shows the sample distribution of downgrades, analysts, brokerage firms, and 
covered companies. During 1996-2010, the sampling procedure identifies 2,306 sell-preceded 
downgrades issued on 1,414 unique companies by 1,259 unique analysts, who are employed 
by 43 unique full-service brokerage firms. About 40% (913 downgrades) of sample 
downgrades are issued in the pre-GS period. The ten sanctioned brokerage firms are the most 
active contributors to the sample with about 59% (1,354 downgrades) of sample downgrades. 
Downgrades issued by affiliated analysts represent less than 15% (341 downgrades) of the 
total number of sample downgrades.  
 
4.3. Analyzing affiliated asset managers’ selling before analysts’ downgrades 
My first hypothesis states that if some affiliated asset managers are informed sellers, 
their pre-downgrade selling activity would be reflected in significantly negative pre-
announcement abnormal returns and abnormally high share turnovers. Moreover, if informed 
selling is specific to the pre-GS period only, and given that the GS includes provisions that 
would limit the information flow from analysts to their affiliated asset managers, one would 
imply that some of the selling is likely to be induced by tips received from brokerage analysts. 
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 I use the “affiliation” terminology for asset managers and analysts to mean different concepts. Affiliated asset 
managers are those managers reporting 13f security holdings under the name of a brokerage firm. Affiliated analysts 
are those analysts covering investment banking clients. 
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 This identification uses data from the Securities Data Company (SDC). 
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In what follows, I employ several tests of this hypothesis. First, I present univariate evidence 
based on pre-announcement Average Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (ABHARs) and 
Average Abnormal Share Turnovers (AASTs). Second, I conduct multivariate analyses 
measuring the effects of the regulatory changes on pre-announcement Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Returns (BHARs). Third, I investigate the extent of informed selling within 
sanctioned and non-sanctioned firms. Fourth, I study whether informed selling is more 
prevalent among downgrades from affiliated than unaffiliated analysts. 
 
4.3.1. Hypothesis 1: univariate evidence 
Table 4.2 reports percentage ABHARs and AASTs over several time periods 
measured relative to the downgrade announcement day, day 0. ABHAR is defined as the 
sample average of the buy-and-hold return on a stock less the buy-and-hold return on a size-
B/M matched portfolio. A share turnover is the daily share volume scaled by concurrent total 
outstanding shares. An abnormal share turnover is measured as the daily average percentage 
change in share turnover relative to a normal level of share turnover, which I estimate as the 
median daily share turnover during the year in which the downgrade is issued.
57
 AAST is 
defined as the sample average of abnormal share turnovers. 
The results in Table 4.2 are stratified by whether a downgrade is issued in the pre- or 
post-GS period. Panel A shows that pre-GS downgrades are associated with significantly 
more negative pre-announcement ABHARs than post-GS downgrades. For example, the pre-
announcement ABHAR from day -20 to day -1 of pre-GS downgrades is -2.718%, and that of 
post-GS downgrades is 1.551%. Whereas the former is negative and significant at the 1% 
level, the latter is positive and significant at the 1% level. The difference between these two 
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 This definition parallels the definition of normal daily short-selling in Christophe, Ferri, and Hsieh (2010). 
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numbers is -4.269%, which is significant at the 1% level. This difference remains negative 
and highly statistically significant over the sub-periods of the pre-event window. However, 
the largest difference in ABHARs occurs over the sub-period from day -5 to day -1 (-
1.608%). Panel B shows that pre-announcement AASTs are much higher in the pre- than 
post-GS period. The difference in pre-announcement AASTs between the pre-GS and post-
GS period is positive, economically large, and statistically significant at the 1% level for all 
pre-event sub-periods. For example, from day -5 to day -1, this difference is 52.4%.  
In sum, pre-announcement abnormal returns are significantly negative, and pre-
announcement share turnovers are abnormally high in the pre-GS period. After the GS came 
into effect, pre-announcement abnormal returns are no longer significantly negative, and pre-
announcement abnormal share turnovers are significantly positive, but they are much lower 
than those of the pre-GS period. Collectively, the results provide evidence consistent with 
affiliated asset managers engaging in informed selling prior to downgrades from their 
brokerage analysts. Because this evidence is specific to the pre-GS period only, it is likely that 
some of the selling is induced by tips received from brokerage analysts.    
 
4.3.2. Hypothesis 1: multivariate evidence 
In this section, I investigate the effects of the regulatory changes on pre-announcement 
abnormal returns in a multivariate setting. To examine these effects while controlling for 
other relevant factors that could influence pre-announcement abnormal returns, I employ the 
specification 
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The dependent variable is the BHAR from day -20 to day -1. The variable of interest is 
           , which is a dummy variable indicating a downgrade is issued prior to the GS 
came into force. If the GS has altered informed selling from affiliated asset managers prior to 
downgrades from their brokerage analysts, one would expect pre-announcement abnormal 
returns to be more negative before the GS came into effect, and thus    to be significantly 
negative. Equation (4.1) also includes three control variables.   (    ), the natural logarithm 
of equity measured in $ million, controls for size effects.   (  
 
 
), the natural logarithm of 
one plus Book-to-Market, controls for Book-to-Market effects. Finally,     (       ), 
the BHAR from day -86 to day -21, is used as a factor controlling for momentum effects. This 
factor is added to the regression to address the concern that analysts may be more inclined to 
issue downgrades on stocks with stronger negative momentum.  
Table 4.3 presents results from the estimation of Equation (4.1). To parsimoniously 
correct for biases that might arise from heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of the 
residuals, I employ the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM). It is well-known that GMM 
estimators are consistent, efficient, and asymptotically normal (Wooldridge, 2002). 
Specification [1] in Table 4.3 shows that the coefficient on the             (-3.81%) is 
significantly negative at the 1% level, implying that pre-announcement abnormal returns 
associated with pre-GS downgrades are much more negative than those associated with post-
GS downgrades. This is consistent with the view that the GS has altered informed selling 
before downgrades.  The coefficients on the size and B/M factors imply that pre-
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announcement abnormal returns are more negative among small-cap or value stocks. 
Specification [2] augments specification [1] by a momentum factor,     (       ). The 
coefficient on             remains economically large and statistically significant, 
whereas the coefficient on the momentum factor takes the correct sign, but is statistically 
insignificant.  
In sum, the results in Table 4.3 suggest that pre-announcement abnormal returns are 
substantially less negative after the GS came into effect, and this finding is independent of 
size, Book-to-Market, and momentum effects. It follows that sell trades from affiliated asset 
managers in the pre-GS period are likely to be informed trades, and those in the post-GS 
period are likely to be uninformed trades. Combining this interpretation with the 
confidentiality requirement of analysts’ research that is introduced by the GS, one would 
imply that in the pre-GS period some affiliated asset managers may have received tips from 
their brokerage analysts and engaged in informed selling of the soon to be downgraded stocks.     
 
4.3.3. Hypothesis 1: Sanctioned vs. non-sanctioned firms 
In December 2002, the Global Research Analyst Settlement was formally announced 
and required ten firms to pay a total fine of $1.435 billion. In August 2004, two additional 
firms joined the Settlement, bringing the number of sanctioned firms to 12. The settlement 
targeted those firms that had engaged in inappropriate practices, whereby research analysts 
come under influence of their investment bankers to issue favorable ratings. It seems natural 
to investigate whether the sanctioned firms had also engaged more than others in tipping 
practices. First, I test whether the GS had a relatively stronger effect on pre-announcement 
abnormal returns of downgrades from the sanctioned firms. Second, I investigate whether pre-
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announcement abnormal returns are more negative for downgrades that are from the 
sanctioned than non-sanctioned firms. 
Table 4.4 reports estimation results of Equation (4.1) for the subsamples of sanctioned 
(specifications [1] and [2]) and non-sanctioned (specifications [3] and [4]) firms. In 
specification [1], the coefficient on             is significantly negative (-4.85%), 
implying a strong association between pre-GS downgrades from the sanctioned firms and 
negative pre-announcement abnormal returns. Specification [2] uses momentum as an 
additional control factor. The coefficient on momentum is insignificant, and the effect of the 
GS on pre-announcement abnormal returns remains virtually unchanged. The results in 
specifications [3] show that the relation between pre-GS downgrades from the non-sanctioned 
firms and pre-announcement abnormal returns is also significant. The coefficient on 
            is significantly negative (-2.7%). Specification [4] considers momentum as 
an additional control factor and shows that the effect of the GS on pre-announcement 
abnormal returns remains strong. However, comparing the coefficients on              in 
specifications [2] and [4] suggests that the GS has had a stronger effect on pre-announcement 
abnormal returns of downgrades from the sanctioned firms than those from the non-
sanctioned firms. 
To complete the analysis, I focus on the pre-GS period and investigate whether pre-
announcement abnormal returns are more negative among those downgrades that are from the 
sanctioned than non-sanctioned firms. I consider the specification 
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Equation (4.2) is similar to Equation (4.1), with the exception of the new variable of 
interest,                      . This is a dummy variable indicating a downgrade is 
issued by a sanctioned firm. Specifications [5] and [6] in Table 4.4 report the estimation 
results of Equation (4.2). The coefficient on                       is negative and 
statistically significant at the 10% level in both specifications. The pre-announcement 
abnormal returns of downgrades from the sanctioned firms are 1.9% more negative than those 
from the non-sanctioned firms. This implies that informed selling before downgrades is more 
prevalent if these downgrades are from the sanctioned than non-sanctioned firms. 
 
4.3.4. Hypothesis 1: Affiliated vs. unaffiliated analysts 
Typically, brokerage firms acting as the lead or co-lead underwriters strive to develop 
and maintain the closest relationships with the corporate managers of the security issuing 
companies. Because affiliated analysts work for underwriters by definition, they are more 
likely than their unaffiliated peers to enjoy exclusive access to private information from 
companies’ management. Whether affiliated analysts are more likely than their unaffiliated 
counterparts to tip off their affiliated asset managers is an interesting question to investigate. 
The relation between analysts’ affiliation and the practice of tipping is conceptually 
ambiguous. On the one hand, unaffiliated analysts, those who are presumably with little 
access to private information from companies’ management, could produce research with 
little information advantage. It follows that affiliated asset managers who enjoy early access 
to this research may be relatively less willing to trade on their early knowledge. On the other 
hand, unaffiliated analysts have an incentive to increase their own private search for 
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information, thereby creating an alternative information advantage. Affiliated asset managers 
with early access to this research would be inclined to trade on this information advantage. In 
sum, it is unclear whether affiliated asset managers who enjoy early access to research from 
their unaffiliated analysts are relatively less likely to trade on their early knowledge. 
In what follows, I investigate the effect of the GS on the pre-announcement abnormal 
returns that are associated with downgrades from affiliated and unaffiliated analysts. Next, I 
examine whether abnormal returns before downgrades are relatively more negative if these 
downgrades are from affiliated analysts.  
Table 4.5 reports estimation results of Equation (4.1) for the subsamples of affiliated 
(specifications [1] and [2]) and unaffiliated (specifications [3] and [4]) analysts. In 
specifications [1] and [2], the coefficient on             is negative, economically large, 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. For example, after controlling for size, Book-to-
Market, and momentum effects, pre-announcement abnormal returns are, on average, 8.86% 
more negative in the pre- than post-GS period (specification [2]).  Turning to the unaffiliated 
analyst subsample, specifications [3] and [4] indicate that the effect of the GS on pre-
announcement abnormal returns is also statistically significant, but is economically weaker 
when compared with the same effect in the affiliated analyst subsample (specifications [1] and 
[2]). These results indicate that the GS effect is not uniform across analysts. Informed selling 
before downgrades from affiliated analysts appears to be substantially altered by the GS.  
A related question is whether informed selling before downgrades is more prevalent if 
these downgrades are from affiliated than unaffiliated analysts. To answer this question, I 
focus on the pre-GS period and propose the specification 
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The main variable in Equation (4.3) is                         , which is a 
dummy variable indicating a downgrade is from an affiliated analyst. Specifications [5] and 
[6] in Table 4.5 show the estimation results of Equation (4.3). Downgrades from affiliated 
analysts are associated with significantly more negative pre-announcement abnormal returns 
than those from unaffiliated analysts. For example, in specification [6] the coefficient on 
                         is -3.62%, indicating a substantial difference in pre-
announcement abnormal returns between the two groups of analysts. This result implies that 
informed selling is stronger among downgrades from affiliated than unaffiliated analysts. 
Because affiliated analysts are generally better informed than unaffiliated analysts, asset 
managers with early access to research would be more inclined to trade on this early 
knowledge if the research comes from affiliated than unaffiliated analysts.  
 
4.3.5. Discussion 
Combining the results of the previous sections, it is clear that informed selling is 
limited to the pre-GS period. Moreover, informed selling before downgrades is more 
prevalent if these downgrades are from affiliated analysts or the sanctioned firms. Based on 
these findings and the GS requirements in terms of confidentiality of analysts’ research, I can 
imply that in the pre-GS period some affiliated asset managers may have received tips from 
their brokerage analysts and engaged in selling of the soon to be downgraded stocks. 
138 
 
Although my sample is free of analysts’ herding and earnings announcement biases 
(see Section 4.2.1), one concern is that unobservable confounding events may induce 
managers to sell stocks and analysts to issue downgrades on these stocks. If so, one would 
expect downgrades to be dominated by sell-preceded rather than buy-preceded downgrades. 
To address this concern, I construct a secondary sample of downgrades that are matched with 
buy and sell trades from affiliated asset managers. In unreported results, I find that this sample 
contains only 2,306 (49%) sell-preceded downgrades. Hence, buy-preceded downgrades 
slightly outnumber sell-preceded downgrades. Moreover, the market reaction to sell-preceded 
downgrades, as measured by the ABHAR from day 0 to day 5, is negative, economically 
large, and statistically significant, indicating that the announcement of these downgrades 
signals substantial incremental information that would not otherwise exist if confounding 
events were already reflected into prices (Table 4.2). Thus, it appears that this concern is 
overstated. 
Finally, my findings suggest that tipping appears not to be a widespread practice. First, 
only some affiliated asset managers may have early access to research. Based on my 
secondary sample, unreported results show that more than 50% of the sample downgrades are 
buy-preceded downgrades, which are presumably free of tipping. Second, it is unlikely that 
every analyst tips off his affiliated asset managers and other favored institutional investors 
before the announcement of downgrades. If tipping is a widespread practice, downgrade 
announcements would be merely a secondary dissemination. My results indicate that this is 
unlikely to be the case. Pre-GS downgrades are associated with a pre-announcement abnormal 
return that is equal to -2.718% and a post-announcement abnormal return that is equal to -
4.873% (Table 4.2). Thus, it is clear that the largest price response occurs at the 
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announcement of the downgrades, whereas the less influential price response before the 
announcement of the downgrades seems to be consistent with the view that tipping is limited 
to some affiliated asset managers. Third, tipping appears to be more prevalent before 
downgrades from affiliated analysts or the sanctioned firms (Tables 4.4 and 4.5). This 
provides further evidence that tipping is limited to select analysts or firms.  
 
4.4. Hypothesis 2: early knowledge of forthcoming downgrades 
My second hypothesis states that if pre-downgrade informed selling is related to the 
downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of forthcoming downgrades, one 
would conclude that tipping is likely to be responsible for some the selling. To test this 
relation, I focus on the subsample of the pre-GS downgrades that are issued by the sanctioned 
firms and employ the binary logistic regression 
 
                                (                        ( ))  
                                      
                                                     
      (                    (  ))   
                                
                           (    )   
          (  
 
 
)
 
         (       )    , (4.4) 
 
The dependent variable is                       , which is a dummy variable 
indicating that the pre-announcement BHAR from day -20 to day -1 is negative. Thus, this 
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dummy captures situations in which the selling activity of affiliated asset managers is 
reflected in negative pre-announcement abnormal returns. As explanatory variables, I include 
factors that proxy for the downgrade characteristics that would suggest early knowledge of 
forthcoming downgrades. I expect that the more institutions invest in a stock, the more likely 
they search for information about that stock and thus engage in informed selling. 
                      ( ) is defined as the number of common shares, measured in 
millions, held by institutional investors at the end of the previous fiscal quarter. Christophe, 
Ferri, and Hsieh (2010) present evidence of informed short-selling prior to the release of 
downgrades in a sample of NASDAQ-listed stocks. To see whether informed selling is more 
pronounced among NASDAQ-listed stocks, I include a dummy variable,             , 
indicating a downgrade is issued on a stock that is listed on NASDAQ. I expect informed 
selling to be relatively more prevalent if the characteristics of a forthcoming downgrade 
would imply a greater loss in stock value. To test this prediction, I employ three variables. 
                  is a dummy variable indicating a stock is downgraded to a strong sell 
recommendation (I/B/E/S numerical score = 5).                    is the difference in 
I/B/E/S numerical score between the current and previous recommendation.  
                      is a dummy variable indicating a stock is downgraded to a 
recommendation that is below the consensus recommendation. Experienced analysts may be 
less likely than others to tip off their affiliated asset managers because of their career 
concerns.                   (  ) is defined as the number of quarters since the analyst 
issued the first recommendation in I/B/E/S. Based on the evidence in Table 4.5, it appears that 
pre-announcement abnormal returns are relatively more negative if downgrades come from 
affiliated analysts. So, I expect a positive association between informed trading and affiliated 
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analysts.                          is a dummy variable indicating a downgrade is issued 
by an analyst who is categorized as affiliated. After Regulation Fair Disclosure was enacted, 
the precision and informativeness of analysts’ research have substantially decreased (Bailey, 
Li, Mao, and Zhong, 2003). It is interesting to investigate whether this regulation has also 
altered informed selling before downgrades.             is a dummy variable indicating 
a downgrade is issued after  Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect.
58
 Equation (4.4) also 
includes control factors that proxy for size, Book-to-Market, and momentum effects.  
Table 4.6 presents the estimation results of Equation (4.4). The results are generally 
consistent with my predictions. Informed selling is relatively more prevalent among high 
institutional ownership stocks. The coefficient on the NASDAQ dummy takes the expected 
sign, but is statistically insignificant. Informed selling before downgrades is relatively more 
likely if these downgrades are strong sell downgrades or downgrades of high magnitude. 
However, informed selling seems to be unrelated to whether a stock is downgraded to a 
recommendation that is below the consensus recommendation. The coefficients on the analyst 
experience and affiliation variables take the correct signs, but are statistically insignificant. As 
expected, informed selling before downgrades is relatively weaker if these downgrades are 
issued after Regulation Fair Disclosure took effect.  
Now, I turn to discussing the effects of the control factors. The coefficients on the size 
and Book-to-Market factors indicate that informed selling is relatively more prevalent among 
small-cap or value stocks. Informed selling is relatively more likely among stocks with 
negative momentum; however, this relation is statistically insignificant.  
The general picture that emerges from this analysis is that informed selling is related 
to the downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of forthcoming 
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 I assume Regulation Fair Disclosure came into force on November 23, 2000. 
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downgrades. Specifically, informed selling is relatively more prevalent prior to strong 
downgrades, downgrades of high magnitude, downgrades that are issued before Regulation 
Fair Disclosure, or downgrades that are issued on high institutional ownership stocks. Thus, it 
seems reasonable to conclude that informed selling prior to downgrades is at least partly 
induced by tips received from brokerage analysts. 
  
4.5. Conclusion 
The economic interdependence between a full-service brokerage firm and its affiliated 
asset managers may result in unfair practices that are against the interests of investors. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that affiliated asset managers may receive tips from their 
brokerage analysts regarding the content of the soon to be released research reports, while 
other investors remain uninformed. For example, on March 14, 2007 the SEC fined Banc of 
America Securities LLC US$26 million over the claims that trading employees had access to 
research reports before they were published, and in at least two instances the bank traded in 
advance of their release. 
This chapter investigates whether affiliated asset managers engage in informed selling 
prior to downgrade releases from their brokerage analysts. I find that, in the period prior to the 
Global Settlement and related regulations, the selling activity of affiliated asset managers is 
associated with significantly negative pre-announcement abnormal returns and abnormally 
high share turnovers, implying pre-downgrade informed selling. Because these regulations 
include provisions that would limit the information flow from sell-side analysts to their 
affiliated asset managers, I can conclude that some of the selling activity is likely to be 
induced by tips received from those analysts. 
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Focusing on downgrades issued by the sanctioned firms before the Global Settlement, 
I show that pre-downgrade informed selling of affiliated asset managers is related to the 
downgrade characteristics that would imply early knowledge of the soon to be released 
downgrades. Specifically, I find that informed selling is relatively more prevalent prior to 
strong downgrades, downgrades of high magnitude, downgrades that are issued before 
Regulation Fair Disclosure, or downgrades that are issued on high institutional ownership 
stocks. This provides further evidence that some affiliated asset managers may have received 
tips from their brokerage analysts before downgrade releases and engaged in selling of the 
soon to be downgraded stocks. 
However, my results also indicate that the extent of tipping practices is somewhat 
limited. First, tipping is limited to the period prior to the Global Settlement. Second, tipping 
appears to be stronger among downgrades from the sanctioned firms or affiliated analysts. 
Third, the substantial market impact of downgrades implies that the public announcement 
remains the primary dissemination of information. Fourth, an analysis of a secondary sample 
shows that buy-preceded downgrades dominate sell-preceded downgrades. 
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Table 4.1. Features of the sample. 
This table reports the number and percentage of sample downgrades, analysts, brokerage firms, and covered 
companies. The results are stratified by whether a downgrade is issued before or after the Global Research Analyst 
Settlement (GS) (October 01, 2002), from a sanctioned or non-sanctioned firm, or from an affiliated or unaffiliated 
analyst. Appendix E provides the definitions of sanctioned firms and affiliated analysts. The sample consists of 
I/B/E/S downgrades from the most active full-service brokerage firms (contributing at least 0.5% of the total 
recommendations in I/B/E/S) between 1996 and 2010. Only those downgrades that are associated with a sell trade 
from affiliated asset managers in the preceding month are retained in the sample. To minimize the impact of 
confounding events, the sample includes only those downgrades for which the company did not experience another 
downgrade or make an earnings announcement in the preceding month. 
Sample Downgrades Analysts Firms Companies 
Pre-GS 913 617 36 735 
 
39.6% 49.0% 83.7% 52.0% 
Post-GS 1,393 795 35 929 
 
60.4% 63.1% 81.4% 65.7% 
     Sanctioned firms 1,354 700 10 938 
 
58.7% 55.6% 23.3% 66.3% 
Non-sanctioned firms 952 612 33 757 
 
41.3% 48.6% 76.7% 53.5% 
     Affiliated analysts 341 280 30 297 
 
14.8% 22.2% 69.8% 21.0% 
Unaffiliated analysts 1,965 1,141 43 1,245 
 
85.2% 90.6% 100.0% 88.0% 
     Overall 2,306 1,259 43 1,414 
  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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Table 4.2. Hypothesis 1: univariate evidence. 
This table reports Average Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns (ABHARs) and Average Abnormal Share Turnovers 
(AASTs) over several sub-periods of the event window (-20, 20). The results are stratified by whether a downgrade 
is issued before or after the Global Research Analyst Settlement (GS) (October 01, 2002). ABHAR is defined as the 
sample average of the buy-and-hold return on a stock less the buy-and-hold return on a size-B/M matched portfolio. 
AAST is measured as the sample average of the daily average percentage change in share turnover relative to a 
normal level of share turnover, which I estimate as the median daily share turnover during the year in which the 
downgrade is issued. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. Difference t-tests 
are based on the Satterthwaites’s method (unequal variances). 
  Pre-GS Post-GS Difference 
Relative day Panel A: ABHAR 
-20 to -1 -2.718*** 1.551*** -4.269*** 
0 to 20 -4.873*** -3.300*** -1.573** 
    -20 to -11 -0.680* 0.847*** -1.527*** 
-10 to -6 -0.428* 0.271** -0.699** 
-5 to -1 -1.407*** 0.201 -1.608*** 
0 to 5 -4.837*** -3.686*** -1.151** 
6 to 10 0.480 0.161 0.319 
11 to 20 -0.306 0.279 -0.585 
  Panel B: AAST 
-20 to -1 50.2*** 16.6*** 33.6*** 
0 to 20 87.0*** 51.6*** 35.4*** 
    -20 to -11 41.9*** 14.4*** 27.5*** 
-10 to -6 39.9*** 13.1*** 26.8*** 
-5 to -1 77.1*** 24.7*** 52.4*** 
0 to 5 159.7*** 85.4*** 74.3*** 
6 to 10 63.0*** 38.3*** 24.7*** 
11 to 20 55.2*** 37.3*** 17.9*** 
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Table 4.3. Hypothesis 1: multivariate evidence. 
This table reports GMM estimation results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) from day -20 to day -1, relative to the event day, day 0. BHAR is defined as the buy-and-
hold return on a stock less the buy-and-hold return on a size-B/M matched portfolio. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix E. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable BHAR(-20,-1) 
  [1] [2] 
Number of observations = 2,306 
  Intercept -0.0328 -0.0324 
 
(0.112) (0.115) 
Pre-GS dummy -0.0381*** -0.0372*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(Size (m$)) 0.0087*** 0.0084*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(1 + B/M) -0.0503*** -0.0456** 
 
(0.006) (0.014) 
BHAR(-86,-21)  
0.0239 
 
 
(0.208) 
   
Adjusted R
2
 0.043 0.044 
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Table 4.4. Hypothesis 1: sanctioned vs. non-sanctioned firms. 
This table reports GMM estimation results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) from day -20 to day -1, relative to the event day, day 0. BHAR is defined as the buy-and-
hold return on a stock less the buy-and-hold return on a size-B/M matched portfolio. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix E. Specifications [1] and [2] ([3] and [4]) [[5] and [6]] report estimations results when the 
sample is restricted downgrades issued by the sanctioned firms (by the non-sanctioned firms) [before the Global 
Research Analyst Settlement (GS) (October 01, 2002)]. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable BHAR(-20,-1) 
Subsample Sanctioned firms Non-sanctioned firms Pre-GS 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Number of observations 1,354 1,354 952 952 913 913 
       Intercept -0.0625** -0.0615** 0.0076 0.0072 -0.1033*** -0.1035*** 
 
(0.026) (0.028) (0.795) (0.805) (0.002) (0.002) 
Pre-GS dummy -0.0485*** -0.0476*** -0.0270*** -0.0263*** 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.006) (0.008) 
  Sanctioned firm dummy 
  
  -0.019* -0.019* 
   
  (0.092) (0.091) 
Ln(Size (m$)) 0.0111*** 0.0107*** 0.0056* 0.0054* 0.016*** 0.0157*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.076) (0.087) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(1 + B/M) -0.022 -0.0178 -0.0972*** -0.0924*** -0.0787*** -0.0717*** 
 (0.333) (0.440) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
BHAR(-86,-21)  
0.0244 
 
0.0193 
 
0.0225 
 
 (0.339) 
 
(0.478) 
 
(0.395) 
       
Adjusted R
2
 0.052 0.053 0.043 0.043 0.060 0.060 
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Table 4.5. Hypothesis 1: affiliated vs. unaffiliated firms. 
This table reports GMM estimation results of a regression in which the dependent variable is the Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) from day -20 to day -1, relative to the event day, day 0. BHAR is defined as the buy-and-
hold return on a stock less the buy-and-hold return on a size-B/M matched portfolio. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix E. Specifications [1] and [2] ([3] and [4]) [[5] and [6]] report estimations results when the 
sample is restricted to downgrades issued by affiliated analysts (by the unaffiliated analysts) [before the Global 
Research Analyst Settlement (GS) (October 01, 2002)]. *, **, and *** denote significance levels of 10%, 5%, and 
1%, respectively. 
Dependent variable BHAR(-20,-1) 
Subsample Affiliated analysts Unaffiliated analysts Pre-GS 
  [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Number of observations 341 341 1,965 1,965 913 913 
       Intercept -0.0514 -0.0488 -0.0166 -0.0168 -0.0960*** -0.0964*** 
 
(0.256) (0.276) (0.462) (0.453) (0.005) (0.004) 
Pre-GS dummy -0.0896*** -0.0886*** -0.0294*** -0.0286*** 
  
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  Affiliated analyst 
dummy 
  
  -0.0368** -0.0362** 
   
  (0.023) (0.025) 
Ln(Size (m$)) 0.0112** 0.0106** 0.0069*** 0.0066*** 0.0146*** 0.0143*** 
 (0.010) (0.016) (0.004) (0.005) 
(0.000) (0.000) 
Ln(1 + B/M) -0.0172 -0.0134 -0.0607*** -0.0561*** -0.0800*** -0.0734*** 
 (0.748) (0.805) 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
BHAR(-86,-21)  
0.0227 
 
0.0222 
 
0.0212 
 
 (0.686) 
 
(0.257) 
 
(0.422) 
       
Adjusted R
2
 0.104 0.103 0.035 0.036 0.063 0.063 
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Table 4.6. Hypothesis 2: early knowledge of forthcoming downgrades. 
This table reports GMM estimation results of a logit regression in which the dependent variable, Informed selling 
dummy, is a dummy variable indicating the BHAR(-20,-1) is negative. BHAR(-20,-1) is the Buy-and-Hold 
Abnormal Return from day -20 to day -1, relative to the event day, day 0. BHAR is defined as the buy-and-hold 
return on a stock less the buy-and-hold return on a size-B/M matched portfolio. The explanatory variables are 
defined in Appendix E. Standard errors are clustered at the brokerage firm level. *, **, and *** denote significance 
levels of 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.  
Dependent variable Informed selling dummy 
  
Normative 
direction 
Actual 
direction 
Regression 
coefficient 
P-value 
Number of observations = 453 
    Intercept 
  
1.737 (0.274) 
Characteristics 
       Ln(1 + Institutional ownership (m)) + + 0.390** (0.015) 
   NASDAQ dummy + ? 0.597 (0.135) 
   Strong sell dummy + + 11.800*** (0.000) 
   Downgrade magnitude + + 0.456*** (0.004) 
   Below consensus dummy + ? -0.040 (0.840) 
   Ln(1 + Analyst experience (# of Q)) - ? -0.307 (0.198) 
  Affiliated analyst dummy + ? 0.117 (0.526) 
   Post-FD dummy - - -0.611*** (0.000) 
Controls 
       Ln(Size (m$)) 
  
-0.361** (0.041) 
   Ln(1 + B/M) 
  
0.772* (0.095) 
   BHAR(-86,-21) 
  
-0.189 (0.433) 
     Wald test     321.6*** (0.000) 
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation investigates novel issues related to information intermediaries in 
financial markets and is organized in three essays on the following distinct topics: (1) the 
monitoring role of credit rating agencies, (2) heterogeneity in the influence of sell-side analyst 
recommendation changes, and (3) the information flow from sell-side analysts to their 
affiliated asset managers. 
The first essay (Chapter Two) investigates whether credit rating agencies act as third-
party monitors through the mechanism of a credit watch with direction downgrade. The 
related empirical predictions follow from two main channels resulting from third-party rating 
agency monitoring. First, by exerting informal influence the agencies can induce firms to 
undertake safe projects, helping improve their profitability. Second, when the agencies reveal 
the true credit quality of firms following the monitoring episode, they can help reduce 
information asymmetry and thus facilitate access to capital markets. Accordingly, firms 
increase their long-term financing and ramp up their investment activities.    
I provide evidence consistent with these predictions and document that firms with 
watch-preceded rating confirmations (treatment firms) experience an increase in long-term 
financing, investment, and profitability immediately following the credit watch period when 
benchmarked against firms with watch-preceded rating downgrades (control firms). 
Interestingly, these patterns are stronger for treatment firms of lower credit quality, for which 
external monitoring is more valuable. I further show that financially constrained treatment 
firms substantially increase their long-term financing immediately following the watch period, 
indicating that agency’s monitoring can help alleviate capital constraints resulting from 
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information asymmetry. Additional tests show that treatment firms are more profitable 
regardless of corporate governance, implying that agency’s monitoring is independent of 
corporate governance. Collectively, these findings indicate that a credit watch with direction 
downgrade acts as an effective monitoring mechanism.  
The second essay (Chapter Three) presents and empirically evaluates a theory of 
ambiguity that predicts stronger influence of recommendation changes issued on firms with 
more ambiguous environments. I focus on two aspects of ambiguity in the firm environment: 
the ambiguity aspect that emerges from lack of knowledge of nonexistent relevant 
information and that manifests itself through the difficulty investors face in formulating prior 
beliefs about firm fundamentals (ambiguity in fundamentals or AIF); and the ambiguity 
aspect that pertains to the difficulty investors face in updating their prior beliefs in response to 
firm information of uncertain quality, (ambiguity in information or AII). 
I provide evidence that both aspects of ambiguity substantially increase the influence 
of recommendation changes (the “mean” effect). Moreover, I show that the influence of 
recommendation changes issued on higher AII firms substantially increases when their 
fundamentals are perceived to be more ambiguous (the “interaction” effect). This essay 
contributes to the analyst literature by providing a behavioral explanation for anomalous 
heterogeneity in the influence of recommendation changes. 
The third essay (Chapter Four) documents evidence that affiliated asset managers 
engage in informed selling prior to downgrade releases from their brokerage analysts. I find 
that, in the period prior to the Global Settlement and related regulations, the selling activity of 
affiliated asset managers is associated with significantly negative pre-announcement abnormal 
returns and abnormally high share turnovers, implying pre-downgrade informed selling. 
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Because these regulations include provisions that would limit the information flow from sell-
side analysts to their affiliated asset managers, I can conclude that some of the selling activity 
is likely to be induced by tips received from those analysts. Focusing on downgrades issued 
by the sanctioned firms before the Global Settlement, I also show that pre-downgrade 
informed selling of affiliated asset managers is related to the downgrade characteristics that 
would imply early knowledge of the soon to be released downgrades. Collectively, these 
findings point to evidence on tipping, but also highlight the effectiveness of the Global 
Settlement in mitigating this unfair practice. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
Appendix A. Variable definitions (Chapter Two).  
This appendix defines the variables employed in this study. Credit watch data are from Moody’s, and accounting 
information is from Compustat. Firm characteristics are defined using Compustat data items. The variable 
ATQ_AVG is equal to (ATQ + ATQ_LAG) / 2, where ATQ_LAG is previous year's ATQ. The variable 
SEQQ_AVG is equal to (SEQQ + SEQQ_LAG) / 2, where SEQQ_LAG is previous year's SEQQ. The variable 
DLTTQ_LAG is previous year's DLTTQ. The variable DLCQ_LAG is previous year's DLCQ. The variable 
PPENTQ_LAG is previous year's PPENTQ. 
Variable Definition 
Panel A: Watch characteristics 
 1. Watch days Number of days in the watch period, i.e., from the watch assignment date to the watch 
resolution date. 
2. Non-investment grade (NIG) Dummy variable indicating a rating placed under watch is of non-investment grade, i.e., a rating 
within the rating class range Ba-C. 
3. Rating on watch Numerical score associated with a rating on watch, where allocation of scores is based on the 
following scale: Aaa = 1; Aa1 = 2; Aa2 = 3; Aa3 = 4; …; and C = 21. 
4. Rating off watch Numerical score associated with a rating after watch, where allocation of scores is based on the 
following scale: Aaa = 1; Aa1 = 2; Aa2 = 3; Aa3 = 4; …; and C = 21. 
5. Rating change Magnitude of a rating change, measured as rating off watch minus rating on watch. 
6. Fallen angel Dummy variable indicating a downgraded rating has crossed the investment grade boundary, 
i.e. a rating moving from the rating class range Aaa-Baa to Ba-C. 
7. Past confirmations Number of watch-preceded rating confirmations issued on a given firm between sample 
inception (1992) and the current date. 
  Panel B: Firm characteristics  
Financing  
   1. Change in long-term debt ratio (DLTTQ - DLTTQ_LAG) / ATQ_AVG. 
   2. Equity issuance ratio trailing-twelve-months SSTKY adjusted for fiscal quarter accumulation scaled by ATQ_AVG. 
   3. Change in long-term financing ratio Change in long-term debt ratio plus equity issuance ratio. 
   4. Change in short-term debt ratio (DLCQ - DLCQ_LAG) / ATQ_AVG. 
   5. Change in cash holdings ratio Trailing-twelve-months CHECHY adjusted for fiscal quarter accumulation scaled by 
ATQ_AVG. 
Investment  
   6. Capital expenditures ratio Trailing-twelve-months CAPXY adjusted for fiscal quarter accumulation scaled by ATQ_AVG. 
   7. PPE growth rate Ln(PPENTQ / PPENTQ_LAG). 
   8. Asset growth rate Ln(ATQ / ATQ_LAG). 
Profitability  
   9. Operating income ratio Trailing-twelve-months OIBDPQ scaled by ATQ_AVG. 
   10. Return on assets Trailing-twelve-months NIQ scaled by ATQ_AVG. 
   11. Return on equity Trailing-twelve-months NIQ scaled by SEQQ_AVG. 
Others  
   12. Assets (million $) ATQ. 
   13. Tobin's Q (ATQ - CEQQ - TXDITCQ + CSHOQ * PRCCQ) / ATQ. 
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   14. Tangibility PPENTQ / ATQ. 
   15. Governance index The G Index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003). 
   16. Cash flow investment gap ratio Trailing-twelve-months IBQ plus trailing-twelve-months DPQ minus trailing-twelve-months 
CAPXY adjusted for fiscal quarter accumulation all scaled by ATQ_AVG. 
   17. Reg FD Regulation Fair Disclosure dummy variable, which indicates a credit watch is resolved after 
November 01, 2000. 
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Appendix B. Switching regression with endogenous switching (Chapter Two). 
The model comprises a binary outcome equation along with a latent equation that matches watch resolution 
decisions with firm characteristics and other relevant factors, and a set of two equations that model changes in the 
firm fundamentals measure of interest in two different regimes. Formally, the model is described by the following 
set of equations 
 
     iff   
   , and      iff   
   , where   (B.1) 
  
        ; and       (B.2) 
             , and       (B.3) 
             .      (B.4) 
 
Eq. (B.1) models the observed watch resolution outcomes, in which the binary variable    indicates whether 
a credit watch issued on firm   is resolved with a rating confirmation. Eq. (B.2) is the latent watch resolution 
equation, where the vector    consists of variables that may help shape watch resolution decisions. Eq. (B.3) and 
(B.4) are the fundamentals equations for the rating confirmation and downgrade regimes, respectively. To capture 
the cumulative effects of watch resolution outcomes, I compute  -quarter changes in a fundamentals measure from 
quarter   to quarter  , where quarter   represents the quarter ending prior to the watch period, and    1, 2, 3, or 4 
quarters. Accordingly, the variables      and      represent  -quarter future changes in a fundamentals measure of 
firm   in case of a rating confirmation and a rating downgrade, respectively. For a given watch observation either 
Eq. (B.3) or (B.4) is realized depending on the watch resolution outcome for firm  . For example, if a credit watch is 
resolved with a rating confirmation, we observe     , and never     , so that only Eq. (B.3) is realized. The vector 
   consists of variables that may affect the future pattern of firm fundamentals.
 
To facilitate model estimation and 
inferences, I assume that the residuals    ,    , and    have a trivariate normal distribution.
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A key distinctive feature of the endogenous switching regression model is the explicit modeling of 
endogeneity by allowing the residuals in the fundamentals equations, Eq. (B.3) and (B.4), to correlate with the 
residual in the watch resolution equation, Eq. (B.2). That is, unobserved or missing variables that influence watch 
resolution decisions are allowed to affect future changes in firm fundamentals. Formally, this implies that the 
residual vector has a nondiagonal covariance matrix with the following structure 
 
   (          )  [
         
         
       
].    (B.5) 
 
To estimate the switching regression model, it is important to note that OLS estimation of Eq. (B.3) and 
(B.4) yields inconsistent estimates, given the above residual covariance structure. To see this, I take the expected 
                                                          
59 In my empirical tests, Eq. (B.3) and (B.4) also include industry fixed effects,          , and calendar year fixed effects,      , which are not 
shown here for brevity of presentation. 
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values of the future changes in the fundamentals measure in Eq. (B.3) and (B.4), where I apply standard rules for 
conditional normal variables (see, e.g., pp. 367 in Maddala, 1983). I define     as the unconditional future change in 
the fundamentals measure of firm   and compute the expected values as follows  
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   ]       
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where     is the covariance between     and    ;     is the covariance between     and    ;  ( ) is the density 
function of the standard normal distribution; and  ( ) is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal 
distribution. The last terms in Eq. (B.6) and (B.7) are the associated inverse Mills ratios, which result from the 
nonzero conditional expectation of the residuals. Because of these additional terms, OLS estimation of Eq. (B.3) and 
(B.4) yields inconsistent estimates. However, if I augment Eq. (B.3) and (B.4) with the inverse Mills ratios as 
additional explanatory variables, OLS estimation will generate consistent estimates. The augmented fundamentals 
equations are 
 
                               , and   (B.8) 
                               ,     (B.9) 
 
where     and     are the new residuals, each of which has a zero conditional mean. In light of the above results, the 
two-stage estimation of the switching regression model is now clear. First, I estimate Eq. (B.1) and (B.2) using a 
probit regression and obtain consistent estimates of  , denoted by  ̂. Next, I obtain estimates of the inverse Mills 
ratios for Eq. (B.8) and (B.9) by substituting  ̂ for  . I then estimate Eq. (B.8) and (B.9) by OLS, yielding consistent 
estimates of   ,   ,    , and    . This two-step estimation procedure was first proposed in Lee (1976) and later 
discussed in Maddala (1983). 
To investigate the effects of watch resolution decisions on firm fundamentals while controlling for 
endogeneity, it is necessary to address the following question: for a firm with a rating confirmation, what would the 
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alternative change in a fundamentals measure be had its rating been downgraded instead? To answer the question, I 
need an empirical methodology that evaluates for the same firm the effects of switching from an actual rating 
confirmation to a hypothetical rating downgrade. The above analysis lays the grounds for answering such a question. 
What I have to do next is compare the actual change in a fundamentals measure for a firm with a rating confirmation 
with the predicted change in that measure under a hypothetical rating downgrade scenario. Following Fang (2005), I 
compute the following difference  
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  [         
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              (
 (   )
 (   )
).   (B.10) 
 
The difference in Eq. (B.10) has an intuitive interpretation. For example, if the firm fundamentals measure 
of interest is profitability, a positive difference can be interpreted as an improvement in profitability for the same 
firm  . From Eq. (B.10), note that     is the vector of characteristics for the firm with a rating confirmation and 
(
 (   )
 (   )
) is its associated inverse Mills ratio, and the parameters    and     are the coefficients from the 
fundamentals equation for the rating downgrade regime. Therefore, the hypothetical future change in a firm 
fundamentals measure is the predicted value from evaluating the characteristics of a firm with a rating confirmation 
and its associated inverse Mills ratio in the fundamentals equation for the rating downgrade regime. My inferences 
with respect to the effects of watch resolution outcomes on future changes in firm fundamentals shall draw upon the 
key result in Eq. (B.10).  
Empirically, I estimate a probit regression that models the decision of a rating confirmation, as described in 
Eq. (B.1) and (B.2). The vector    includes the following variables: a non-investment grade dummy, firm size, 
Tobin’s Q, and asset tangibility. I also consider other variables that may influence credit watch outcomes, but are 
unlikely to directly affect corporate fundamentals.
60
 These are: a dummy variable indicating whether a watch is 
resolved after Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect (Reg FD); the natural logarithm of the duration of the 
watch period (watch days); the natural logarithm of the number of instances a firm has been placed under watch in 
the past (Ln(1 + past watches)); and the natural logarithm of the number of instances a firm has received a watch-
preceded rating confirmation in the past (Ln(1 + past confirmations)). Lastly, I also include dummy variables that 
indicate calendar years and 38 SIC-based industries. Next, I estimate the augmented fundamentals equations (B.8) 
and (B.9). The vector    consists of the following variables: a non-investment grade dummy, firm size, Tobin’s Q, 
asset tangibility, cash flow investment gap, and the natural logarithm of the G Index. I also include dummy variables 
that indicate calendar years, fiscal quarters, and 38 SIC-based industries. Finally, I compute the empirical analogs of 
the difference in Eq. (B.10) and report the results in Table 2.11. 
                                                          
60 Technically, these variables serve as identification restrictions in the endogenous switching model. 
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Appendix C. Derivation of Eq. (3.7.a)-(3.7.c) (Chapter Three) 
 
 
   
        
  
   
 ( 
 
   )
( 
 
(  
    
 )   
   
 )(  (  
    
 )   
   
 )
  .    (C.1) 
   
        
    
 (  
 
   
 )
(  (  
 
   
 )   
 
  
 )(  (  
    
 )   
   
 )
  .    (C.2) 
   
          
    
 
 
  
 (  
 
   
 )
( 
 
(  
 
   
 )   
 
  
 )( 
 
(  
    
 )   
   
 )
  .   (C.3) 
(   
          
   )  (   
       )        
(  
 
   
 )( 
 
   )  
 ( 
 
  (  
 (  
 
   
 )   
 
(  
    
 )   
   
 
  
 ( 
 
   )))
( 
 
(  
 
   
 )   
 
  
 )( 
 
(  
    
 )   
   
 )(  (  
 
   
 )   
 
  
 )(  (  
    
 )   
   
 )
  .  (C.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
166 
 
Appendix D. Variable definitions (Chapter Three).  
This appendix defines the variables employed in this chapter. Most variables are constructed as of the end of the 
calendar month prior to the announcement of a recommendation change (denoted by month  ). The sample of 
recommendations is from the I/B/E/S U.S. Detail Recommendations File. Stock data are from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP), accounting information is from Compustat, data on institutional ownership 
are from Thompson Reuters, and information on analyst affiliation is from the Securities Data Company (SDC) 
database.  
Variable Description Calculation detail 
Firm characteristics 
     1. N52WL A stock price's nearness to 
its 52-week low 
       (          )       ⁄ , where 
     stock  ’s price observed at the end of month  , 
        stock  ’s 52-week high price determined from the 
52-week period prior to the end of month  , 
        stock  ’s 52-week low price determined from the 
52-week period prior to the end of month  . 
 
   2. ME Market capitalization of 
common equity measured in 
millions of dollars 
The price of a common share multiplied by the common shares 
outstanding observed at the end of month  . 
 
 
   3. BM Book-to-Market equity ratio The book value of equity (definition from Daniel and Titman 
(2006)) observed at the end of the previous fiscal year scaled 
by the market capitalization of common equity (ME) observed 
at the end of month  . 
 
   4. MOM Stock return momentum       ∏ (     )
 
       ∏ (     
    )       , where 
      the month-  raw return on stock  , 
   
      the month-  raw return on a benchmark portfolio 
with comparable size, book-to-market, and momentum 
characteristics as stock   (Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and 
Wermers, 1997, or DGTW). 
 
   5. IO Institutional ownership of 
common shares measured in 
millions 
The number of the common shares held by institutional 
investors scaled by the total number of outstanding common 
shares observed at the end of month . 
 
   6. AGE Firm age measured in 
quarters 
The number of quarters between the first time a stock appears 
in CRSP and month . 
 
   7. ACOV Analyst coverage The total number of analysts in I/B/E/S following the firm 
during the year prior to the end of month  . 
 
   8. FDISP Earnings forecast dispersion The standard deviation of analyst annual EPS forecasts (a 
minimum of three forecasts) submitted any time during the 
three-month period prior to the end of month   , scaled by the 
stock price as of the end of this period. If an analyst makes 
more than one forecast during the three-month period, only the 
last forecast is used in my calculations. 
 
Analyst characteristics  
    9. AEXP Analyst experience  The number of quarters between the first time an analyst issued 
the first recommendation in I/B/E/S and month  . 
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   10. AFF dummy Affiliated analyst dummy = 1 if the analyst issues a recommendation at any point during 
the period after the file date on an equity or debt issue in which 
the analyst employer acts as the lead or co-lead underwriter or 
after the file date on an acquisition in which the analyst 
employer acts as an advisor. 
 
   11. IND dummy Independent analyst dummy = 1 if the analyst is from an independent non-investment bank 
firm, i.e. a firm that has never been classified as a lead or co-
lead on any equity or debt deal or has never advised either the 
target or acquirer in an acquisition at any point in the sample 
period. 
 
Recommendation characteristics   
   12. DC Recommendation deviation 
from consensus 
 (                    )
  (                  )
 
, where 
            a current recommendation, 
          a prior recommendation,  
           a consensus recommendation. 
 
   13. MAG Magnitude of a 
recommendation change 
 |                   |, where 
            a current recommendation, 
          a prior recommendation.  
 
   14. FD dummy Regulation Fair Disclosure 
dummy 
= 1 after September 01, 2000. 
 
 
   15. GS dummy The Global Research 
Analyst Settlement dummy 
= 1 after August 01, 2002. 
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Appendix E. Variable definitions (Chapter Four).  
This appendix defines variables. The data sources are: I/B/E/S, CRSP, COMPUSTAT, SDC, and CDA/Spectrum 
Institutional (13f) holdings data set. 
Variable Definition 
Stock characteristics 
    1. Size (m$) is the company's market capitalization of equity (measured in 
millions of dollars) on day -1, relative to the event day, day 0  
   2. B/M is measured as the company's book value at the end of the 
most recent fiscal year divided by the company's market 
capitalization of equity on day -1, relative to the event day, 
day 0 
   3. BHAR(-86,-21) is a proxy for momentum and is measured as the BHAR from 
day -86 to day -21, relative to the event day, day 0 
   4. Institutional ownership (m) is the number of the company’s common shares, measured in 
millions, held by institutional investors at the end of the most 
recent fiscal quarter. 
   5. NASDAQ dummy is a dummy variable indicating a stock is listed on NASDAQ 
Analyst/rec characteristics 
    6. Analyst experience (# of Q) is the number of quarters since the analyst issued the first 
recommendation in I/B/E/S. 
   7. Affiliated analyst dummy is a dummy variable indicating an analyst issues a downgrade 
any time during the two-year period after the file date on a 
debt or equity issue in which the analyst’s employer acts as 
the lead or co-lead underwriter. 
   8. Strong sell dummy is a dummy variable indicating a stock is downgraded to a 
strong sell recommendation (I/B/E/S numerical score = 5) 
   9. Downgrade magnitude is the difference in I/B/E/S numerical score between the 
current and previous recommendation 
   10. Below consensus dummy is a dummy variable indicating a stock is downgraded to a 
recommendation that is below the consensus recommendation 
   11. Sanctioned firm dummy is a dummy variable indicating a downgrade is issued by a 
sanctioned firm. The original ten sanctioned firms according 
to the Global Research Analyst Settlement are: Bear Stearns; 
Credit Suisse First Boston; Goldman Sachs; Lehman Brothers; 
J. P. Morgan; Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith; Morgan 
Stanley; Citigroup Global Markets; UBS Warburg; and U.S. 
Bancorp Piper Jaffray. In August 2004, Deutsche Bank and 
Thomas Weisel joined the settlement, bringing the total 
number of the sanctioned firms to twelve. 
   12. Informed selling dummy is a dummy variable indicating that the pre-announcement 
BHAR from day -20 to day -1 is negative 
Others 
    13. Post-FD dummy is a dummy variable indicating a downgrade is issued after 
Regulation Fair Disclosure came into effect (= 1 after 
November 23, 2000) 
169 
 
   14. Pre-GS dummy is a dummy variable indicating a downgrade is issued before 
the Global Research Analyst Settlement came into effect (= 1 
before October 01, 2002) 
 
 
 
